furnishing the instruction likely to be useful to him. The student who is destined for the ministry, reads what is called ecclesiastical history, as furnishing the instruction likely to be useful to him. Both come short of the true idea of history. Who does not know that an event in the church is often the cause of an event in the state?—that the religious history of a country is inseparably blended with its civil history? Who that believes in the moral government of God, does not believe that the facts which come under the head of religious history, control, in a great measure, the facts that come under the head of civil history? How then can the history of one class of events be written entirely disjoined from the other? Yet this is the way in which history has been written.

Suppose one should attempt to record the phenomena of vegetation, and state their causes; he makes a distinction between light and heat, which is indeed proper, and confines his attention to the influence of heat alone. It is plain that his account will be very imperfect. But will the account of the historian be less imperfect who leaves out of view the influence of vital Christianity in his account of the causes of events?

The truth is, the history of the world is yet to be written, and from a different standing-point from that occupied by our standard historians. It is to be written in view of the fact that God governs the world, that Christians are the salt of the earth. Then the Luthers, and the Calvins, and the Knoxes, and those who prayed and acted in their spirit, will appear in another light, and be no longer incidentally mentioned as fanatical disturbers of despotism and sin.

From the book before us, the reader will get a clear idea of the relations which exist between the church, and the state and general governments; and will be pleased to see it incontestably shown that our governments are not (as has been asserted by the advocates of the union of church and state) atheistic or irreligious.

We are disposed in this connection, to give our views. of the nature and origin of the state, or of civil society; inas

much as clear and elementary ideas on this subject will be serviceable to a full understanding of the true relation of Christianity to the state. We shall not be careful to prove every statement-as our object is to throw out hints, not to present a system.

Let us glance, then, at the origin of the state. Whence the origin of the state, or of civil society? for we regard the expressions as synonymous. The doctrine of a social compact, of a general convention of the human race, the result of which was the formation of civil society, with its law of justice, binding in consequence of the consent then and there given, this doctrine so often resorted to as the foundation of arguments, was exploded long ago by Paley, though he failed to point out the truth in relation to the matter-or in place of the error exposed.

At the outset of this theory, it is assumed that the savage state is natural to man. Now, perhaps, few whose opinions are of consequence entertain this idea; yet the language expressive of this idea is in frequent use. Inaccuracy in the use of terms often leads to error, when the error originally connected with those terms has been exploded. We shall therefore state what we conceive the natural state of man, properly speaking, to be.

We affirm that the natural state of a thing is that which is best adapted to cause it to attain the end for which it was made. The natural state of a tree is that best adapted to its growth and productiveness. The natural state of man is that which is best adapted to the development of his physical, intellectual, social, and moral nature: and that is a state of society-of civilization. It is not necessary to adduce proof of the truth that a social civilized state is necessary to the fullest development of all the powers of man. The true natural state of man is not the savage state.

Society, then, is the only necessary result of the constitution of man, and hence may properly be said to be of divine origin. God is the author of society, just as much as he is author of the constitution of man. It is not the result of hu

man agreement; man does not become a member of it by giving his consent to its laws. What," says a true Jeffersonian republican, who believes that all laws owe their just authority to the consent of the governed, "am I a member of civil society without my consent? Am I subject to its laws before I have had a voice in making them? I object to thisit is anti-republican."

We reply, it is true you are a member of society without your consent, you are subject to its fundamental law, the law of justice, whether you give your consent or not. The proof of this (if proof it can be called) lies in your moral nature. You see that you are a member of society-you feel that you are bound by its law-you might as well object to being born without your consent. You have nothing to do but to submit with the best grace you are able to assume. The facts are self-evident. The voice of your moral nature tells you that "these things are so."

It is commonly said that by becoming a member of society, man gives up some of his rights, that he may retain others-surrenders a part of his natural liberty, that he may retain the rest. We regard this as an erroneous assertion. In the first place, we object to the phrase, "becoming a member of society," as involving an erroneous idea. But not to dwell upon this; we affirm that liberty is wholly of social origin. We know not what is meant by natural liberty, unless it be liberty to be a savage or a brute; we deny that man ever had any such liberty to give up. The law of his nature forbids it. A man has no right to be a savage or a brute, for he thereby would defeat the end for which he was made.

Liberty consists in security against wrong. This definition was first given by Sir James Mackintosh, and its adoption removes a host of difficulties, and leads us along a way which bears infallible marks of being the true way. A man has liberty, when he is permitted to do right, and when he is secured against wrong. Society requires him, or can lawfully require him only to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong. He gives up no right, for he had not the right of

doing wrong before-even if we could conceive of his existing anterior to society. He receives liberty.

We see, then, the relation between liberty and law, and the folly of the notion that men enjoy liberty in proportion to the absence of law. If laws were perfect, and perfectly executed, they would permit every man to do right, and secure him perfectly against wrong-which would meet our idea of a state of perfect liberty, where a man is perfectly free to do all that is right, and prevented from doing wrong; that is, the perfection of law would be perfection of liberty.

We have thus far spoken of civil society, of the state as distinct from government, with which it is often confounded. When we speak of the union of church and state, we speak of the union of the church, as a religious society, with the government. The church can be separated from the government, and must be, if it would attain the end for which it exists; but religion cannot be separated from the state. The state is a religious institution as much as man is a religious being. It is founded on the idea of justice-it exists for the realization of justice between man and man.

Government is the organ by which the state ordinarily acts. Its existence is needful to the attainment of the ends for which the state exists, and hence is of divine origin. The state is bound to adopt the form of government which is best adapted to carry out its ends; and as these may vary with the varying circumstances of the state, one form may be obligatory at one time, and another at another. The Scriptures teach this view. They speak of government as the ordinance of God, but are silent as to its forms.

If the state and government are institutions of divine origin, it is not necessary to prove that they are subject to the divine government and control. The principles of the divine government with respect to the state is a most interesting topic of inquiry, and one which we may discuss at another time.

1845.] Necessity of the Holy Spirit's influence, etc. 493

ARTICLE VI.

NECESSITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT'S INFLUENCE IN THE WORK OF MAN'S REDEMPTION.

By Rev. SETH WILLISTON, D. D.

THE universe, in its most extensive sense, comprehends all existence, whether created or uncreated. The parts of creation, in many respects, differ exceedingly one from another; some being nothing more than lifeless matter; others having vegetable, and others animal life; while other created existences bear the image of the only wise God. But there is one particular in which all parts of the created universe are perfectly alike; viz., in their dependence on the Creator. is self-evident that one part of creation must have been as dependent for its first existence as another. An angel could no more begin to be, without the exertion of creative power, than an insect. Nor is the angel any less dependent than the insect, for the protraction of his existence, or the preservation and exercise of those noble faculties, which give him such an elevated place in the scale of being.

All can see that it would be absurd to suppose the attribute of self-existence imparted to any thing which is made. And I would inquire, whether it would be any less absurd, to suppose the created universe, or any part of it, after being brought into existence, henceforward to become independent of the Creator? If reason does not decide this point, revelation does. Revelation declares that God, particularly in the person of his Son, upholds all things, by the word of his power, and that by him all things consist. Heb. 1: 3, Col. 1: 17. According to the Bible, God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, both in the natural and moral world. At his pleasure, he gives us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons. Nor does the Bible represent man, the lord of this lower world, as any less dependent on his Creator than those creatures over which he rules. "Man's goings