eral general having determined that the enemy's position was unassailable except by a flank movement across the river, amused his enemy by demonstrations south of the railroad bridge, as if he intended crossing there. His real object was, by rapidly shifting masses of troops from extreme right to extreme left, to turn the enemy's right flank, and seize and hold the vital strategic points in that direction.

Gen. Schofield was, accordingly, directed to move due eastward from his position at Smyrna to the Chattahoochee, and to make a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek, eight miles north of the railroad bridge. This was successfully accomplished on the 7th, with the capture of a gun and a number of prisoners, and a lodgment was effected on high ground on the left bank, and a substantial bridge constructed. At the same time Gen. Garrard occupied Rosswell, a town near the Chattahoochee, nearly due north of Atlanta, and about seven miles above Gen. Schofield's crossing, where he destroyed some woollen and cotton mills which had supplied the rebel armies. In accordance with Gen. Sherman's orders he secured the ford at this place until a corps could be sent thither from the Army of the Tennessee on the right wing. On the 9th, while the enemy were amused by feints extending from Power's Ferry, four miles above the railroad bridge, to Turner's Ferry, three miles below it, a crossing was effected at Rosswell, and the river firmly bridged; and under cover of the same demonstrations Gen. Howard was enabled to throw a bridge across at Power's Ferry. Gen. Johnston at length took the alarm, and during the night of the 9th gave orders for another retreat. His heavy guns were removed to Atlanta, seven miles distant, Gen. Hardee's corps was safely crossed to the left bank, and at daylight of the 10th the railroad bridge, the road bridge, and the pontoons, were in flames. The rebel army then fell back toward the fortifications of Atlanta, abandoning the whole line of the river, although its left wing kept in the neighborhood of Turner's Ferry, in the expectation of an attack from that quarter. Leaving Gen. Johnston to his delusion, Gen. Sherman rapidly and quietly moved the rest of the Army of the Tennessee behind the line of our forces, to its old position on the extreme left, and busied himself with strengthening his bridges and collecting supplies, which, as early as the 8th, were brought by railroad within a mile of the railroad bridge.

A week's rest was now allowed the army, a sufficient force being detailed to the left bank of the Chattahoochee to secure the several positions there and occupy the works of the enemy. These proved to be of the most formidable character, and had evidently cost many months of labor, the lines extending for upward of five and a half miles along the river, with almost impenetrable abatis in front. The sudden abandonment of them caused more consternation to the enemy than any previous disaster of

the campaign, as it was anticipated that here, in the immediate neighborhood of his supplies, Gen. Johnston could make a long and probably successful stand; or at least keep Gen. Sherman at bay until reënforcements from other parts of the confederacy should arrive. The catastrophe completed the long catalogue of complaints against this general which his enemies had sedulously arrayed before the public, and his removal was clamored for as indispensable to the salvation of the cause. The inhabitants of Atlanta in particular urged that the retreating policy had been followed far enough. It can hardly admit of a doubt, however, that he had conducted the campaign with prudence and skill, and considering his inferiority in numbers to Gen. Sherman, who was always in a condition to outflank him, he had probably delayed the Federal advance as long as it was possible.

On the 17th the whole army was across the Chattahoochee, with the exception of Gen. Davis's division of the 14th corps, left to watch the railroad bridge and the rear, and prepared to move upon Atlanta. The Army of the Cumberland now occupied the right wing and right centre, resting on the river just above the railroad bridge, the Army of the Ohio the left centre, and the Army of the Tennessee the left. In this order a grand right wheel was commenced, the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland serving as the pivot, which, on the evening of the 17th, brought the Federal line into a position about northeast of the railroad bridge, along what is known as the old Peach Tree road. On the 18th the left wing, swinging rapidly around, struck the Georgia Railroad, which connects Atlanta with Augusta, at a point two miles west of Stone Mountain, a vast elevation of granite towering over the surrounding country, fifteen miles northeast of Atlanta. With the aid of Gen. Garrard's cavalry, which moved on his flank, Gen. McPherson broke up a section of about four miles of the road, while Gen. Schofield occupied Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and Gen. Thomas brought his troops close up to Peach Tree Creek, a small stream rising five or six miles northeast of Atlanta, and flowing southwesterly into the Chattahoochee, near the railroad bridge. In these manoeuvres our extreme left encountered little else than cavalry, supported by a few guns and a very inadequate force of infantry, an evidence that the enemy was still laboring under the delusion that his left and not his right was the real point of attack, and that Atlanta was to be approached from the southwest instead of from the northeast. Under these circumstances Gens. McPherson and Schofield were enabled, on the 19th, to pass with little trouble westward of Decatur, within the naturally strong defensive lines of Nance's and Peach Tree Creeks. Gen. Thomas, moving more directly from the north of Atlanta, found the enemy in larger force, but succeeded on the same day in crossing Peach Tree Creek in front of their intrenched lines.

The Federal line then held the arc of a circle, extending from the railroad between Atlanta and the river to some distance south of the Georgia Railroad, and in a direction north and northeast of Atlanta.

Meanwhile, on the 17th, Gen. Johnston had, in accordance with orders from the confederate war department, turned over his command to Gen. Hood, accompanying the act with the following farewell address to his troops:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, July 17, 1864. In obedience to the orders of the War Department, I turn over to Gen. Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I cannot leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed so conspicuously-every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage.

The enemy has never attacked but to be severely repulsed and punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your fears. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.

J. E. JOHNSTON, General. General Hood, on assuming command, issued the following address:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TENNESSEE, July 18, 1864. SOLDIERS: In obedience to orders from the War Department, I assume command of this Army and Department. I feel the weight of the responsibility so suddenly and unexpectedly devolved upon me by this position, and shall bend all my energies and employ all my skill to meet its requirements. I look with confidence to your patriotism to stand by me, and rely upon your prowess to wrest your country from the grasp of the invader, entitling yourselves to the proud distinction of being called the deliverers of an oppressed people. J. B. HOOD, General.

With this change in commanders commenced a change in the method of conducting the campaign, by which it was expected that the morale of the rebel army, weakened by the persistent Fabian policy of Gen. Johnston, would be fully reestablished. The time for retreating had passed when the chief city of western Georgia Îay almost in the grasp of Gen. Sherman; and the rebel army, which, to give Gen. Johnston due credit, had been kept in a compact body, and had experienced but insignificant losses of guns or material of war, was to be launched, after their well-known tactics, in fierce assaults upon the invader. With this view the command was given to Gen. Hood, who had an unequalled reputation among their generals for energy and impetuous bravery.

On the 20th the Federal lines converged still more closely around the northern and eastern sides of Atlanta, and as a gap existed between Gens. Schofield and Thomas, Stanley's and Wood's division of Gen. Howard's corps were moved to the left to connect with Gen. Schofield, leaving Gen. Newton's division of Gen. Howard's corps, with inadequate force, to hold an important position on the road leading from Atlanta to Buckhead. This weak point was soon detected by Gen. Hood, who determined to signalize his appointment to the chief com

mand by an assualt which, at one blow, should retrieve the disasters of the campaign. Gen. Sherman also was well aware that his line was vulnerable at this point; and as there were indications during the morning of a concentration of troops on the enemy's right, as if to attack the left, orders were sent to Gen. Newton and the rest of the Army of the Cumberland to close rapidly up in the latter direction. Gen. Newton accordingly pushed forward to a prominent ridge, where, about two o'clock in the afternoon his troops stacked arms and made a temporary halt. Some prisoners, gathered up by the skirmishers, having reported that there was no considerable force of the enemy within a mile and a half, no apprehension of an attack seems to have been felt, and no preparations had been made beyond the accustomed piles of logs and rails, which the Federal troops constructed as a matter of course, whenever halting for any considerable time on new ground in presence of the enemy. Gen. Hood had meanwhile been massing his main body in the woods immediately in front of Gen. Newton and of Gen. Hooker, who was approaching from the right, expecting, by a sudden and overwhelming attack upon the columns while in motion, to cut the Federal army in twain. At 4 o'clock he advanced from his covert without skirmishers, and pushed directly for Gen. Newton's position. Notwithstanding the unexpectedness of his appearance, the Federal troops sprang instantly to their arms, deliberate and deadly volleys into the dense and from behind their breast works poured masses of the Confederates, who were further kept in check by well-served batteries which Gen. Newton had posted on each of his flanks.

Almost at the instant of the attack on Gen. Newton, Gen. Geary's division of Gen. Hooker's corps was struck by the advancing columns of the enemy and thrown back in some confusion. But quickly rallying, it recovered its ground and kept the enemy in check until Ward's division could arrive to its assistance. The latter met the enemy's charge by a counter charge, and the two columns mingling in the shock of battle, the enemy, after a brief and fierce struggle, were driven back. Further to the right, and next to Geary, Williams' division, though attacked with desperation, stood manfully up to the work, and repulsed with heavy loss every onset of the enemy. After four hours of incessant fighting, the latter retired precipitately to his intrenchments, leaving on the field upward of six hundred dead, one thousand severely wounded, seven regimental flags, and a number of prisoners. His total loss was estimated by Gen. Sherman at five thousand. That of the Federal troops was one thousand nine hundred, of which the greater part fell on Gen. Hooker's corps, which fought wholly on open ground, and bore the brunt of the battle.

During the 21st the enemy kept within his intrenched position, commanding the open valley of Peach Tree Creek, his right beyond the

Georgia railroad to the east, and his left extended toward Turner's Ferry, at a general distance of four miles from Atlanta. In the course of the day a steep and strongly-fortified hill, about five hundred yards in advance of the skirmish line of the extreme Federal left, was gallantly carried by Gen. Leggett's division of the 17th corps, though with a loss of seven hundred and fifty men. Four desperate attempts were made by the division of Gen. Cleburne to regain the position, which completely commanded Atlanta and the two principal roads leading north and south from the city; but the enemy finally retired, baffled and severely crippled, leaving his dead and most of his wounded on the slope of the hill. He also lost about a hundred prisoners. Gen. McPherson immediately threw out working parties to the hill, with the intention of occupying it with strong batteries.

On the 22d the whole advanced line of the enemy was found abandoned, a circumstance which at first led Gen. Sherman to believe that they intended to surrender Atlanta without further contest. Gen. Hood, however, was only preparing to repeat, on a larger scale, the experiment of the 20th. By a show of retreating upon the city he hoped to decoy Gen. Sherman into a rapid advance, and then suddenly, with heavy masses of troops, to strike the Federal army while in motion, at such weak points as should present themselves. "It is now quite evident," says an army correspondent, writing on the 24th, "that the enemy, when they fell back out of their works, did not retire to the inner line around the city at all, though by taking that direction, and showing themselves in large numbers upon their works, they intended to make us believe they had done so. Gen. Hardee's corps, instead, marched during the night away round to the eastward, sweeping entirely the circle of the Federal left wing, and then, as we closed in around the city, and before the left wing had got in position, struck us upon the front, and also upon the flanks." Unsuspicious of this deep laid plan for his discomfiture, Gen. Sherman pushed his troops beyond the abandoned works, and found the enemy occupying in force a line of finished redoubts completely covering the approaches to Atlanta, and busily occupied in connecting these redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle trenches, abatis, and chevaux-de-frise. This satisfied him that Gen. Hood meant to fight, and he immediately resumed the dispositions previously commenced for pressing the city on its eastern and northern fronts. As the Federal line closed in, the circle which it formed became so contracted, that the 16th corps, Gen. Dodge, which formed the right of the Army of the Tennessee, was thrown out of position, and fell behind the 15th corps, the latter thus closing up with Gen. Schofield, who held the centre. Gen. McPherson accordingly ordered Gen. Dodge to shift his position to the extreme left of the line, and occupy the hill carried by the 17th corps on

the previous day, and which was still held by Gen. Leggett's division. At about 11 A. M., soon after this movement had commenced, Gen. McPherson met the commander-in-chief near the centre of the lines. "He described to me," says Gen. Sherman in his official report, "the condition of things on his flank and the dispositions of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by Gen. Leggett's division of Gen. Blair's (17th) corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use Gen. Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by Gen. McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position."

At noon Gen. McPherson rode off to the left, where the enemy appeared to be making a slight cavalry demonstration. He had not been. gone half an hour when the desultory skirmishing which had been going on in that quarter all the morning suddenly deepened into a loud crash of musketry, followed by rapid artillery firing, indicating the presence of the enemy in large force. Gen. Hood had in fact secured the opportunity which he desired, and apprehending rightly that a demonstration was least expected on the left flank, had massed Gens. Hardee's and Stewart's corps under the cover of the thick woods which skirt the railroad, and was preparing to attack the 16th and 17th corps while they were getting into position, his forts meanwhile holding the Federal centre and right in check. Gen. Sherman instantly transmitted orders to Gens. Schofield and Thomas to keep the enemy employed on all parts of their front, and the former was directed to hold as large a force as possible in reserve to sustain the left, should aid be needed.

Gen. McPherson, upon reaching the left, found the 16th corps just about moving into position to prolong the flank, and temporarily facing to the left in a direction perpendicular to our main line. Between the right of the 16th and the left of the 17th corps was a wooded space of about half a mile which was not occupied by any troops. Shortly after twelve o'clock the enemy emerged from the dense woods in front of these corps in three solid columns, and marched directly upon the 16th corps for the purpose of turning our whole line. Three desperate assaults were repelled by Gen. Dodge, in the last of which the enemy suffered severe loss from the well-directed fire of the Federal batteries. Finding that the attempt to break the lines had failed at this point, Gen. McPher

son took advantage of a temporary lull in the fighting to ride through the woods to Gen. Giles A. Smith's division, which held the left of the 17th corps. A report that the enemy in heavy force were moving around the left of the 17th corps, and were pushing in through the gap above mentioned, as existing between it and the 16th (the attack on the 16th corps having, in fact, been a feint to draw attention from the real point of attack), induced him to hasten in that direction. After reaching the gap he gave directions to the only member of his staff who accompanied him, the rest having been sent with orders to different portions of the field, to obtain a brigade from Gen. Logan's command and throw it across the gap, and then, with a single orderly, struck into a cross road leading directly to Gen. Smith's position. Already, however, unknown to him, the enemy's skirmish line had advanced close up to this road, and when it was too late to retrace his steps he found himself within fifty feet of it. The rebel officer in command called upon him to surrender, but he only dashed his horse to the right of the road, and was almost immediately brought to the ground, mortally wounded, by a volley from the skirmishers. His body was for a time in the possession of the enemy, but was subsequently recovered and brought within the Federal lines. Upon hearing of this disaster, Gen. Sherman ordered Gen. Logan to assume command of the Army of the Tennes

see.

The brigade (Wangelin's) ordered up from Gen. Logan's corps, arrived in time to partially check the enemy, but could not prevent him from getting a portion of his force in the rear of the 17th corps, while heavy masses of troops, principally from Gen. Stewart's corps, were pushed against the works held by Gen. Leggett on the hill, wrested from Gen. Cleburne the day before, and which they were evidently determined to retake at any sacrifice. Sweeping up in their advance the working party engaged upon the fortifications, the enemy bore heavily against Gens. Smith's and Leggett's divisions, which, attacked in front and rear, were obliged to fire alternately from behind their own breast work and the old abandoned parapet of the enemy. Gen. Leggett's troops clung firmly to their important position on the top of the hill, against the fortified angle of which the rebels dashed their columns with desperate but fruitless energy. Gen. Smith had meanwhile been compelled to abandon his more exposed lines, but by a skilful movement he gradually withdrew his men, regiment by regiment, to a new line connecting on the right with Gen. Leggett, his left, refused, facing to the southeast. In executing this movement he was obliged to abandon two guns to the enemy. Against this new formation of the 17th corps the enemy could make no impression, but recoiled again and again before the deadly fire of the Federal troops, which mowed down whole ranks at a time, and covered the ground and ditches with dead and

wounded men. A part of the rebel force that pushed for the gap between the 16th and 17th corps renewed the attack upon the right flank of the former, and upon its first advance captured a six-gun battery of the regular army, which was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger. Gens. Sweeney's and Fuller's divisions soon checked the enemy's advance, and finally drove him back in confusion with the loss of many prisoners. At a critical period of the battle several of Gen. Sweeney's régiments were found to be without ammunition; but as it was indispensable that they should hold their position, their commander ordered them to meet the enemy with the bayonet, whereupon the latter broke and fled to the rear. At about half-past three o'clock the enemy desisted from his attack on our left flank, having gained no ground and suffered enormous losses, for which his capture of eight guns ill compensated.

Meanwhile two divisions of Gen. Wheeler's cavalry, with a section of artillery, took a wide circuit to the east and fell upon Decatur, now three miles in our rear, where Col. Sprague, with three infantry regiments, and a battery, was guarding a number of wagon trains filled with commissary and ammunition supplies. By a skilful disposition of his small force, Col. Sprague held the enemy in complete check until every wagon except three was sent to the rear of Gens. Schofield and Thomas, when he also fell back nearer the main body, having inflicted considerable damage upon the enemy and secured a number of prisoners. Gen. Wheeler's unopposed approach to Decatur was owing to the absence of Gen. Garrard's cavalry on a raid southeast of Atlanta.

About 4 P. M. a pause occurred in the battle, occasioned by Gen. Hood's massing troops for an assault upon Gen. Logan's (15th) corps, temporarily commanded by Gen. Morgan L. Smith, which held the right of the Army of the Tennessee behind substantial breastworks, immediately adjoining the 17th corps. At halfpast 4 P. M., while just enough of an attack was maintained against the extreme left to occupy the attention of the troops in that quarter, a heavy force two lines deep marched directly toward the left of the 15th corps, driving before it a couple of regiments of skirmishers and capturing two guns. Protected by their works, Gen. Lightburn's brigade, which held this part of the line, for half an hour kept the enemy at bay by well-directed discharges from a battery of 20-pounder Parrotts; but a second strong rebel column now approached, which scarcely faltered beneath the volleys which ploughed its ranks in long furrows, and presently, to add to the perplexity of the situation, a third column was seen pouring in at the rear through a deep cut in the Georgia railroad. Finding that to hold their position would insure capture, Gen. Lightburn's troops retired in considerable confusion to the second line of breastworks, five hundred yards from

the main line, and the abandoned works, with two batteries, fell into the hands of the enemy. The position gained by the latter, if allowed to be held by them, threatened such serious disaster that Gen. Sherman sent orders to Gen. Logan, which had already been anticipated by that general, to make the 15th corps regain its lost ground at any cost. In aid of this movement he posted certain batteries from Gen. Schofield's corps where they could shell the enemy and the works beyond, so as to prevent reënforcements. Just as the enemy were preparing to turn the captured Parrotts upon the inner Federal line, the 15th corps, supported by portions of Gen. Schofield's troops, advanced with loud cheers upon them; and after a desperate struggle, in the course of which both Federals and rebels at times fought hand to hand across the narrow parapet, the latter were driven out of the works and the guns retaken. Their retreat was accelerated by repeated discharges of grape and canister among their crowded ranks which caused an awful carnage. With this repulse the battle terminated.

This was by far the bloodiest battle yet fought in Georgia; and notwithstanding the complete defeat of the enemy at all points, the Federal army sustained an irreparable loss in the death of Gen. McPherson, described by Gen. Sherman as "a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men." The heroic conduct of the Army of the Tennessee during the whole battle was in no slight degree owing to the desire to avenge the fall of their commander. The total Federal loss on the 22d was 3,722, of whom much the greater portion were killed and wounded. The enemy's dead alone in front of our lines numbered 2,200 from actual count, and of these 800 were delivered to the enemy under flag of truce. Their total loss in killed was computed by Gen. Logan at 3,240. Upwards of 3,000 prisoners, including 1,000 wounded, and many commissioned officers of high rank, beside 18 colors and 5,000 small arms, fell into the hands of the Federals. The enemy of course removed many of their dead and most of their wounded. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the conflict, the proportion of wounded to killed was much less than usual-probably not more than two to one-which would make their loss in wounded about 6,500, and their total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, more than 12,000.

As an important feature in his campaign, Gen. Sherman had contemplated, in addition to offensive operations against the enemy in the field, a series of expeditions against the several railroads by which supplies or reënforcements were brought to Atlanta. The first line of rebel communications selected to be broken was the railroad system connecting Atlanta with the southwest, comprising the Atlanta and West

Point and the West Point and Montgomery roads; and on July 10, in accordance with orders long previously issued by Gen. Sherman, a body of 2,000 Federal cavalry, under Gen. Rousseau, started from Decatur, Ala., for Opelika, a station on the latter of these roads, in eastern Alabama, whence a road diverges cast to the important manufacturing town of Columbus, Geo., and thence to Macon. On the 13th Gen. Rousseau crossed the Coosa near the Ten Islands, routing a body of Alabama cavalry; passed rapidly through Talladega; skirmished again with the enemy at the crossing of the Tallapoosa; and on the 16th struck the West Point and Montgomery road at Loachapoka, ten miles west of Opelika. From this point to Opelika the railroad was well broken up, and the bridges and culverts destroyed, beside three miles of the branch toward Columbus and two toward West Point. Gen. Rousseau then turned north, and brought his command in safety to Marietta on the 22d, with a loss of less than thirty men.

The next operation was to more thoroughly disable the Georgia railroad. This had been broken up between Decatur and Atlanta as the army closed around the city; but as Gen. Sherman already contemplated prolonging his right toward the west and south of the town, and possibly abandoning his hold on the railroad, it became necessary to render the latter unavailable to the rebels. Gen. Garrard was therefore detached on the 21st, and ordered to proceed with his cavalry to Covington, forty-one miles east of Atlanta, and destroy the railroad bridges over the Yellow and Ulcopauhatchee Rivers, branches of the Ocmulgee. He returned in safety on the 24th, having completely destroyed the two bridges, of which that over the Yellow River was 550 feet in length, and the other 250 feet, and broken up the railroad for seven miles between the two. He also burned three trains of cars, numerous depots, minor bridges and culverts, 2,000 bales of cotton, a new and extensive hospital building at Covington, and a considerable quantity of commissary and quartermaster's stores, and brought in with him several hundred prisoners and negroes and many horses. He lost but two men in the expedition.

Having rendered the Georgia road useless to the enemy Gen. Sherman next turned his attention to the Macon and Western Railroad, connecting Atlanta with Macon, and the only avenue left for the conveyance of stores and ammunition to the rebel army. For the purpose of effectually crippling this, he organized his cavalry in two large bodies, to move in concert from each wing of the army, while simultaneously with this movement the Army of the Tennessee was to be shifted by the right toward East Point, a station six miles south of Atlanta, where the Atlanta and West Point and Macon and Western Railroads diverge from a common track. Gen. Stoneman was transferred to the left flank, and assumed command of his own