Page images
PDF
EPUB

that foreign officers can lend their official positions to the spreading before the world, for unworthy objects, untruths patent to every officer of this squadron." Previous to the preparation of this paper the blockading fleet before Charleston had been strengthened by the New Ironsides, Powhattan, and Canandaigua.

On January 30th, the gunboat Isaac Smith, Lieutenant Conover, while engaged in reconnoitring the Stono river, was obliged to surrender to a rebel land force. She had passed some miles beyond Legaréville, as she had been in the habit of doing for weeks previous, and was on her way back, when three shore batteries, previously concealed, opened a concentrated fire upon her from heavy rifled guns. Lieut. Conover replied with vigor, and endeavored to steam down past the batteries, but a shot in the Smith's steam chimney effectually stopped the engine, and with no wind, little tide, and boats riddled with shot, she was left at the mercy of the enemy. Resistance appearing useless, the ship was surrendered, after 24 men had been killed and wounded. It subsequently appeared that, from information communicated by a deserter, the enemy had planned the ambuscade by which the Smith was captured, and had aimed at her boiler and machinery, which were very much exposed.

On the morning of Feb. 1st, the Montauk again engaged Fort McAllister, at a distance of about 1,400 yards, the water being too shoal to permit her to approach nearer. Some injury was done to the parapets of the fort, and the Montauk was hit 46 times, but without receiving material damage. For eight months previous the privateer Nashville had been lying under the protection of the fort, watching an opportunity to run the blockade; and to prevent any attempt by the gunboats to cut her out, the river had been staked and a line of torpedoes laid across the channel. She had been frequently observed close under the fort, ready to make a dash if the opportunity offered, or quietly waiting for an ironclad to tow her to sea. On the morning of the 27th, a reconnoissance discovered the Nashville aground, and Commander Worden seized the opportunity to bring the Montauk close up to the obstructions in the river, and commence a bombardment upon her. In less than 20 minutes the Nashville was in flames from exploding shells, and half an hour later her magazine blew up with terrific violence, leaving not a vestige of the vessel in sight. The Montauk was struck five times by shots from Fort McAllister, and while she was dropping down beyond the range of the enemy's guns a torpedo exploded under her, inflicting a slight amount of injury.

By this time several additional ironclads had arrived at Port Royal, and for the purpose of subjecting their various mechanical appliances to the full test of active service, before entering upon more important operations, Admiral Dupont ordered them to make a concentrated

attack on Fort McAllister. This took place on March 3d, the Passaic, Capt. Drayton, the Patapsco, Commander Ammen, and the Nahant, Commander Downes, participating, under the command of Capt. Drayton. The Passaic, by skilful pilotage, was brought up to within about 1,000 yards of the fort, and for eight hours withstood its chief fire, retiring only when her ammunition was expended. Few of her shots failed to strike above the parapet of the fort; but beyond disfiguring the face of the work they effected no injury which a night's work would not repair; and, in the opinion of Capt. Drayton, the fort could "not be made untenable by any number of ironclads which the shallow water and narrow space would permit to be brought in position against it." The Passaic was struck 34 times in all, 9 shots being against her side armor, 13 against her deck, 5 against her turret, and 2 against her pilot house. In all these parts of the vessel the bolts were more or less started by the violence of the concussion; and indentations, varying from half an inch to 2 inches, were made in the armor. A 10-inch mortar shell, loaded with sand, fell on the deck over the bread room, crushing in the planking, and would have gone through, had it not struck on a beam. "Had it been loaded with powder instead of sand," said Capt. Drayton, "it might have set the vessel on fire. This certainly does not say much for the strength of the deck, the injury to which has been so much more serious than to that of the Montauk, that I must attribute it to a worse class of iron, unless heavier guns have been mounted since the attack made by Commander Worden." Everything about the guns and carriages was reported to have worked well, except that the concussion of the 15-inch gun broke all the bolts holding the side of the box to the turret. The Patapsco and Nahant were unable to approach so near the fort as the Passaic, and received but a slight fire from the enemy, who directed their efforts chiefly against the latter. The Patapsco was struck but once, and the Nahant not at all. Satisfied with the experiment (for such the engagement had been on the part of the ironclads). Capt. Drayton immediately returned to Port Royal, where the Passaic, and also the Montauk, underwent repairs.

By the commencement of April, the preparations, which for many months previous had been making for a combined attack by the ironclads upon the fortifications of Charleston harbor, were completed, and on the morning of the 6th the whole fleet crossed the bar, with the intention of reducing Fort Sumter on the same day, and thence proceeding up to the city. But the weather becoming so hazy as to prevent the pilots from seeing the ranges, the attack was deferred until the next day, and the fleet anchored about five miles from Fort Sumter. At noon, on the 7th, this being the earliest hour at which, owing to the state of the tide, the pilots would consent to move, signal was given

by Admiral Dupont from his flag-ship, the New Ironsides, for the vessels to weigh anchor. According to the plan of attack the vessels were to form in the following order ahead, at intervals of one cable's length: 1. Weehawken, Capt. John Rogers; 2. Passaic, Capt. Percival Drayton; 3. Montauk, Commander John L. Worden; 4. Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; 5. New Ironsides, Commodore Thomas Turner; 6. Catskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; 7. Nantucket, Commander Donald McN. Fairfax; 8. Nahant, Commander John Downes; 9. Keokuk, Lieut. Commander Alexander C. Rhind. The squadron was then to pass up the main ship channel without returning the fire of the batteries on Morris Island, unless signalized to do so, and was to take up a position to the northward and westward of Fort Sumter, and engage its northwest face at a distance of from 1,000 to 800 yards. A squadron of reserve, consisting of the Canandaigua, Unadilla, Housatonic, Wissahickon, and Huron, under the command of Capt. Joseph H. Green, of the Canandaigua, was ordered to remain outside the bar, and be in readiness to support the ironclads, when they should attack the batteries on Morris Island, which would be subsequent to the reduction of Fort Sumter.

The chief works erected by the enemy for the defence of Charleston may be thus briefly described: On the upper or north end of Sullivan's Island a powerful sand battery guarding Maffit's Channel; another large sand battery, called Fort Beauregard, between this and the Moultrie House; Fort Moultrie, which had been greatly strengthened since the commencement of the war; Fort Sumter, built upon an artificial island in the middle of the channel, near the entrance of the inner harbor, and about 1 miles west of Fort Moultrie; Battery Bee, adjoining Fort Moultrie, on the western extremity of Sullivan's Island; the Mount Pleasant battery on the mainland between Sullivan's Island and Cooper river; Castle Pinckney, built on an island about a mile distant from Charleston; all, with the exception of Sumter, being on the right or northerly side of the harbor. On the other side of the harbor, in the immediate vicinity of the city, was the Wappoo battery on James Island, commanding the embouchure of Ashley river; next to which was Fort Johnson, and between it and Castle Pinckney, Fort Ripley, a work erected on an artificial island in what is known as the "Middle Ground." On Cumming's Point, Morris Island, opposite Fort Moultrie, was Battery Gregg, and a mile south of this Fort Wagner, an extensive sand battery of the most powerful construction. Finally, at Light House Inlet, which divides Morris Island from Folly Island, was another fortification covering the landing at that place. Within a few days of the attack the enemy also erected a new sand work between the two last mentioned. The number of guns mounted on these works was estimated at several hundred, comprising the heaviest

smooth-bore ordnance, and many rifled pieces of English manufacture; and as an additional means of protection, the channel between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island was obstructed by rows of floating casks supporting torpedoes and other submarine obstacles, and in that between Sumter and Cumming's Point were no less than four rows of piles extending nearly up to Charleston.

At half past twelve the fleet began to move, the Weehawken, the leading ship, having a pioneer raft attached to her bows for the purpose of exploding torpedoes and clearing away obstructions. Almost immediately her raft became deranged, and nearly an hour was consumed in putting it in position. At half past one the vessels were again under way and moved slowly up toward Fort Sumter, passing the works on Morris Island, which held an ominous silence. They then steered toward the entrance of the inner harbor, intending to pass between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island, and shortly before 3 o'clock came within effective range of these positions. At 2.50 P.M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon the Weehawken, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island and Morris Island, and by Fort Sumter. The remainder of the squadron followed steadily in the wake of the leading ship, which, however, upon reaching the entranco of the channel between Sumter and Sullivan's Island, encountered obstructions of so formidable a nature, that Capt. Rodgers considered it impossible to pass through them. He accordingly turned his ship to gain a better position for attack, and his movements being followed by the vessels immediately behind him, the line, in consequence of the narrowness of the channel, and the force of the tide, was thrown into some confusion. The New Ironsides, in attempting to turn, was caught in the tideway, refused to obey her rudder, and became in a degree unmanageable; while, to add to the complication, the Catskill and Nantucket, which kept in her wake, fell foul of her, and for fifteen minutes the three vessels were in a dead lock. On this occasion, and once subsequently, the Ironsides was obliged to come to anchor to avoid drifting ashore, in which case she would inevitably have been lost.

Nothing now remained but for the admiral to make signal to the fleet to disregard the movements of the flag-ship, and take up such positions as might seem most available. This was at once done, and shortly before 4 o'clock the remaining eight vessels were ranged opposite the northeast front of Sumter, at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards. The enemy during this time had not been idle, and from Forts Beauregard, Moultrie, and Sumter, Battery Bee and Fort Wagner, the concentrated fire of 300 guns was poured upon the devoted fleet, exceeding probably in rapidity and power any cannonade previously known in warfare. To this the eight ironclads could oppose but 16 guns. During the climax of the fire 160 shots

[graphic][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed]

were counted in a single minute, and officers described the projectiles as striking their vessels sometimes as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. It is estimated that from first to last the enemy fired not less than 3,500 rounds of ammunition.

Placed in the focus of this tremendous fire, the ironclads fought at a disadvantage which rendered their offensive power of little effect. The confined space in which they were obliged to manoeuvre called for unusual vigilance on the part of their commanders in avoiding collisions, as also in keeping clear of the floating obstructions and submerged batteries against which the tide was constantly bearing them. The dense clouds of smoke which hung over the water proved an additional source of embarrassment. They, nevertheless, entered resolutely upon the work before them, and directed their principal attack against Fort Sumter. Upon receiving the order to disregard the movements of the flag-ship, Lieut. Commander Rhind gallantly ran his vessel, the Keokuk, up through the others to within 550 feet of the fort, where she became a special target for the enemy. During the short period that she was able to retain this position, she was struck 90 times in the hull and turrets, 19 shots piercing her at and below the water line, and others entering her turret. The vessel was in fact so completely riddled, that her commander, fearing she could not much longer be kept afloat, withdrew from action at the end of half an hour, and succeeded in getting her to anchor out of range of fire. She was kept afloat during the night by means of her pumps, but sank the next morning. The Keokuk was only able to fire three times during the engagement, one of her guns having been almost immediately disabled, and the other rendered unavailable She differed in conby casualties to the crew. struction and strength from the other ironclads of the squadron, and her side and turret armor of an average thickness of 5 inches, proved entirely insufficient to withstand the terrible fire to which she had been subjected.

The remaining vessels, though suffering no calamity comparable in extent with that of the Keokuk, were more or less damaged by the fire from the forts. The Nahant had her turret so jammed as effectually to prevent its turning, and the pilot house became nearly untenable in consequence of flying bolts and nuts. The Passaic was unable to use her 11-inch gun after the fourth fire, and had her turret temporarily jammed. The Patapsco lost the use of her rifle gun after the fifth fire, owing to the carrying away of her forward cap square bolts; and the Nantucket had her 15-inch gun permanently disabled after the third fire. The Weehawken, Montauk, and Catskill were obstructed in the use of their guns only by the obstacles to navigation above mentioned. The New Ironsides never got nearer than within 1,000 yards of the enemy's fire, and directed her chief attention to Fort Moultrie, against

29

which, however, she was unable to discharge
but a single broadside.

At 4.30 P. M. Admiral Dupont observing signs
of distress on the part of several of his ships,
made signal to withdraw from action, intend-
ing to resume the attack the next morning.
The reports, however, which the different com-
manders made on that evening respecting the
injuries to their vessels, the character of the
obstructions in the inner harbor, and the num-
ber and weight of the enemy's guns, convinced
him of the "utter impracticability of taking
the city of Charleston with the force under his
command." During the forty-five minutes that
the fleet had been under the hottest concentra-
ted fire of the enemy, one vessel had been
wholly, and four partially disabled, and in the
opinion of the admiral another half hour would
have sufficed to put the remainder hors de com-
bat. To compensate for these damages, noth-
ing had been effected by the ironclads beyond
some injuries to the east wall of Fort Sumter
-a result which confirmed the admiral in his
opinion that the opposing forces were too un-
equal to justify him in renewing the contest.
The nine ships of the squadron had been able
to fire but one hundred and thirty-nine shots
against Fort Sumter in reply to the thousands
of shells, solid shot, and steel pointed bolts
hurled against them from six or seven different
forts; and there was good reason to suppose
that even had Sumter been silenced, the ob-
structions beyond would have been impassable,
and the fire from the forts have sunk every
vessel attempting to go up the harbor. This
opinion, however, was not shared by all. Un-
der these circumstances Admiral Dupont not
only determined not to renew the fight, but to
recross the bar and return with the ironclads
to Port Royal; being prompted to the latter
course partly by the necessity of making re-
pairs, and partly by his belief that the anchor-
age inside or outside the bar was unsafe for
vessels of the Monitor class. On the 12th the
whole fleet, with the exception of the New
Ironsides, which anchored outside Charleston
bar, returned to Port Royal.

The casualties of the fleet were remarkably few, considering the fierceness of the enemy's fire, and resulted in almost every case from flying bolts and concussions within the turrets. But one man died of injuries received, and about twenty-five were wounded, principally on the Keokuk and Nahant. In some of the vessels no casualities whatever were reported. The Passaic was struck 35 times, the Nahant, 36 times, the Patapsco, 47 times, the Nantuck et, 51 times, the Montauk, 14 times, and the Catskill, 20 times. Many of the shots made but slight indentations in the turrets and side armor, but in every ship repairs of greater or less extent were considered necessary. The Ironsides escaped with comparatively little injury, having during the whole engagement been out of range of the severest fire. The capabilities of the ironclads in contests of this

nature were proved. In explanation of his failure to renew the attack, Admiral Dupont wrote as follows to the Navy Department, on the 15th:

Any attempt to pass through the obstructions I have referred to, would have entangled the vessels and held them under the most severe fire of heavy ordnance that has ever been delivered; and while it is barely possible that some vessels might have forced their way through, it would only have been to be again impeded by fresh and more formidable obstructions, and to encounter other powerful batteries, with which the whole harbor of Charleston has been lined. I had hoped that the endurance of the iron-clads would have enabled them to have borne any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed; but when I found that so large a portion of them were wholly or one-half disabled, by less than an hour's engagement, before attempting to overcome the obstructions, or testing the power of the torpedoes, I was convinced that persistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the iron-clad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbor, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The slowness of our fire, and our inability to occupy any battery that we might silence, or to prevent its being restored under cover of the night, were difficulties of the gravest character; and until the outer forts should have been taken, the army could not enter the harbor or afford me any assistance.

On the 13th the President despatched the following telegram to Admiral Dupont:

Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston; or, if you shall have left it, return to it and hold it until further orders. Do not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defences on Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him out. I do not herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to depend on your own discretion or a further order. A. LINCOLN.

And by another order, dated on the succeeding day, he directed him, should he not succeed in taking the batteries on Morris Island or Sullivan's Island, to continue the demonstration for a time, and to make "the attempt a real one, though not a desperate one, if it affords any considerable chance of success." In reply, Admiral Dupont said that he should use every exertion to push forward the repairs of the iron-clads, and get them inside the bar. "I think it my duty, however," he observed, "to state to the department that this will be attended with great risk to these vessels from the gales which prevail at this season, and from the continuous fire of the enemy's batteries." He urged various objections to a further employment of them against the works on Morris Island, but expressed his willingness to obey all orders with the utmost fidelity, even should his judgment be opposed, and to renew, if necessary, the attack on Charleston, although he thought such a measure "would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of the coast."

In the early part of June, Admiral Dupont, having reason to believe that the Atlanta and other rebel iron-clads at Savannah were meditating an attack upon the blockading vessels in Warsaw Sound, despatched the Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, and the Nahant, Com

mander J. Downes, thither to prevent any disaster to the fleet. The Atlanta, originally a swift and powerful British steamer called the Fingal, had early in the war run. the blockade of Savannah, and been converted by the enemy into an iron-clad at a great expense. She was 191 feet in length and 40 feet beam, somewhat over 1,000 tons in measurement, and had a low deck, with a casemate or covered iron-plated house in the centre, with sloping sides and ends, in which was her battery, consisting of two 6-inch and two 7-inch rifled guns. Of these the former were broadside guns, and the latter worked on a pivot, either as broadside or bow and stern guns. She was further armed with a powerful ram, and had attached to her bow a submarine torpedo, charged with about fifty pounds of powder. No efforts had been spared to render her formidable, and it was believed by the enemy that her speed, her heavy armament, and her ram, would render her more than a match for any two vessels of the Monitor type. They therefore boldly steamed down the sound at dawn of June 17th, followed by several small steamers conveying pleasure parties who were to be the witnesses of her triumph. At a few minutes past four she was perceived by the Federal iron-clads, which were lying at anchor near the mouth of Wilmington River, and they at once prepared for action. The Weehawken being nearest the enemy got under way first and stood up the sound, followed by the Nahant, which, having no pilot, was ordered by Capt. Rodgers to keep in the wake of his vessel. A few minutes before five the Atlanta, which was then lying across the channel awaiting the attack of the Federal steamers, fired a single shot at the Nahant, which failed to take effect. The Weehawken steamed steadily toward the Atlanta, and when about three hundred yards distant opened upon her with her 15-inch gun. Drifting one hundred yards nearer, she discharged both her guns, upon which the Atlanta hauled down her colors, and ran up a white flag in token of surrender. The signal was not understood until after another discharge from the Weehawken, when all firing ceased, and the prize was taken possession of, after a contest of scarcely fifteen minutes, in which the Weehawken alone had participated.

On examination it was found that the enemy had been struck four times. The first shot knocked a hole in her casemate, without, however, going through, and scattered over the enclosed decks great quantities of wood and iron splinters, by which upward of forty men were stunned and wounded, one of whom subsequently died. This is believed to have been the first shot from a 15-inch gun fired in a naval combat, and according to the rebel officers its effect was to demoralize the whole crew of the Atlanta. The second shot struck the edge of the overhang; the third knocked off the top of the pilot house, wounding two pilots and stunning the men at the wheel, and

« PreviousContinue »