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garrison but to surrender or evacuate the position. On the 14th of July, an expedition was sont against a body of Confederate cavalry at Wallace Cross Roads, and after a brief skirmish the latter retired. Again, on the 9th of August, Col. De Courcy was on a foraging expedition with the 16th and 42d Ohio, 14th and 22d Kentucky, when the 14th Kentucky, being advanced a short distance beyond Tazewell, was attacked by the 11th and 42d Tennessee, 30th Alabama, and 21st Georgia, under Col. Rains. A severe conflict ensued, in which the Confederate forces were compelled to retire before the artillery that was brought to the aid of the Federal forces.

On the 17th of August, a small Confederate force approached in front of the position, and attacked a body of Union cavalry some two miles out in the valley, who were compelled to retire with a loss of two or three killed and wounded. Their camp, however, was protected from the approach of the Confederate force by the guns on the mountain. On the same day information was received by Gen. Morgan that a large Confederate force had appeared at Barboursville and London, Ky., and captured his supply trains nearly as far back as Crab Orchard. Its object was to hold the Blue Grass region of Kentucky, and ultimately to force the entire division of Gen. Morgan to surrender or hastily evacuate the position. The comparative success of Gen. Bragg in his movements in Kentucky, cut off all the communications of Gen. Morgan, and by Sept. 11, his corn was all gone and nothing remained for his troops but a scanty supply of beans and rice. The force, however, had not remained inactive during this period; about three hundred prisoners and two hundred horses had been captured. The destitute condition of the force for clothes and food, caused the evacuation of the gap by Gen. Morgan on the 17th of September. On that day the 23d Indiana and the 9th Ohio battery left with all the ammunition. During the succeeding night all the troops left except a squad that remained to finish the work of destruction. The magazine was blown up, and the commissary building burned. Nothing but ammunition and a few of the most useful cooking utensils were brought away. Tents, wagons, gun carriages, arms, and accoutrements were changed to a mass of fragments and ashes. The line of retreat was two hundred and fifty miles with a large Confederate force intervening. But the position was one of the strongest in the country, and Gen. Morgan had represented that his supplies were abundant. By the 4th of October the division reached the Ohio river. It had foraged on the country, but suffered at times for water. During the entire march, a Confederate cavalry force harassed the retreat. During nineteen nights the troops bivouacked without a tent. New roads were made, trees cut out, provisions gathered, a hovering enemy kept at check, and a large

force brought safely through to the borders of Ohio.

This body of troops under Gen. Morgan numbered more than ten thousand men. It brought twenty-eight pieces of artillery, six of which were 20-pounder siege guns, and four hundred wagons. Four heavy siege guns were destroyed before evacuating the gap, and a large number of sick men were left behind.

The march was through a mountainous and unproductive country. A court of inquiry was subsequently ordered to investigate the causes of this evacuation. The position was soon afterwards occupied by a small Confederate force.

It has been stated, that on the advance of the Confederate army from Richmond to at→ tack the forces of Gen. Pope, troops were summoned by the general-in-chief from points adjacent to come to his support. Among others a portion of the troops of Gen. Cox in western Virginia were brought on to unite with the army of Virginia. The effect of thus reducing the force in western Virginia was an invasion by a Confederate force under Gen. Loring. He advanced up the Kanawha Valley as far as Charleston, which he occupied for some time. His troops were finally required to reenforce Gen. Lee's army, when he retired. The chief advantage derived from this invasion by the Confederate people was the seizure of the salt works in the Kanawha Valley. Perhaps there was no article of which they were so destitute in comparison to its importance as salt. It was exchanged by the Confederate colonel Echols, who had charge, for forage for his troops. Affairs remained in this situation until the return of Gen. Cox's forces early in November, when the Confederate forces retired.

It has also been stated that, on the invasion of Kentucky by Gen. Bragg, a portion of Gen. Grant's troops were withdrawn from Mississippi and sent to Kentucky and Cincinnati to give confidence to the new levies, and to reenforce Gen. Buell. The consequence of the withdrawal of these troops was to induce the Confederate officers to renew their operations in north Mississippi and western Tennessee. On the departure of Gen. Halleck to take the position of general-in-chief, Gen. Grant was put in command of the department of west Tennessee, including the districts of Cairo and Mississippi, that part of the State of Mississippi occupied by Federal troops, and that part of Alabama which might be occupied by the troops of his particular command, including the forces heretofore known as the army of the Mississippi.

In the department of Gen. Grant it became apparent in August that the Confederate forces south of his position had assumed a threatening attitude upon his line between Corinth in Mississippi, and Tuscumbia in Alabama. On the 10th of September the 2d brigade of Gen. Stanley's division, commanded by Col. Murphy, evacuated Tuscumbia, and fell back thirty

miles upon Iuka. On the next day the Ohio brigade, which had been occupying Iuka, fell back to Corinth, leaving the force with Col. Murphy in its place. Scarcely, however, had it reached Corinth before information was received that a body of Confederate cavalry had dashed into Iuka, and after a slight skirmish put the force of Col. Murphy to flight. A considerable amount of medical and commissary stores was captured, among which were six hundred and eighty barrels of flour that Col. Murphy had neglected to destroy. Col. Murphy was immediately placed under arrest by Gen. Rosecrans, who now commanded the forces previously under Gen. Pope, and the brigade was ordered back to Iuka under Col. Mower, It, however, finally reached the neighborhood of Jacinto, and was there instructed to await further orders. The preparations of the army for an active campaign were now commenced. Transportation and baggage were reduced, and the supply of tents cut down. At this time information was received that the Confederate general Price had not only occupied Iuka in force, but was endeavoring to cross the Tennessee river for the purpose of getting in the rear of Gen. Buell, then falling back toward Nashville. It was also a part of the plan of Gen. Price, by his movement upon Iuka, to draw the Federal forces away from Corinth, and thus render its capture easy by Gen. Van Dorn, who was to attack it during the absence of Gen. Grant's forces. The design was then formed by Gens. Grant and Rosecrans to cut off the retreat of Gen. Price, and force him to surrender. For this purpose eighteen thousand men under Gens. Grant and Ord were to move by way of Burnsville, and attack Gen. Price, while Gen. Rosecrans should move with part of his force by the way of Jacinto, and attack him on the flank; at the same time the remainder of Gen. Rosecrans' force was to move on the Fulton road and cut off Gen. Price's retreat if he should attempt it. With this understanding the army was put in motion on the morning of the 18th of September. The divisions of Gens. Stanley and Hamilton under Gen. Rosecrans, after a fatiguing march in a drenching rain, bivouacked at Jacinto. Early the next morning they were again on the march, and at ten o'clock the advance encountered the Confederate pickets at Barnett's Corners. A sharp skirmish ensued, which resulted in driving them six miles toward Iuka, with a small loss. At this time the entire column had arrived at Barnett's Corners, and awaited, according to the previous understanding, for Gen. Grant to commence the attack, which would be known by the sound of his artillery. After two hours had elapsed a despatch arrived from Gen. Grant, seven miles distant, to the effect that he was waiting for Gen. Rosecrans to open the battle. The column was immediately moved forward within two miles of Iuka, when the Confederate force was discovered posted on a broad ridge commanding the country for some

distance. The Confederates opened fire upon the skirmishers as they advanced in sight, under which Gen. Hamilton's division formed in line. They were also received by a hot fire of artillery and musketry, which was replied to by the 11th Ohio battery, that had now got into position. The engagement soon became general, and continued for two hours, when darkness prevented any further advantage to either side. The contest was exceedingly fierce, and the troops behaved with great bravery.. The 11th Missouri and the 5th Iowa stood the severest portion of the contest, and the former lost seventy-six, and the latter one hundred and sixteen in killed and wounded. The 11th Ohio battery was exposed to a severe fire of musketry, and in less than half an hour seventytwo of its men were killed or wounded. The Confederate officers, perceiving that it was poorly supported, ordered a charge to be made on it, by which the six guns were captured, and two of them spiked. It was afterward retaken twice by the 5th Iowa at the point of the bayonet, but finally fell into the possession of the Confederates. The night was spent in taking care of the wounded and burying the dead, while the troops lay on their arms awaiting the dawn of the next day to renew the battle.

Early in the morning, as no movement was perceived on the part of the Confederate force like renewing the contest, Gen. Rosecrans ordered his line of pickets to advance. Not meeting with any opposition the whole force was thrown forward, and within a half mile of the town a flag of truce was seen approaching. It reported that Gen. Price had evacuated the town during the night. Pursuit was immediately made and kept up by three companies of cavalry during the day, skirmishing with the Confederate rear guard, and capturing many prisoners. The loss of Gen. Rosecrans's force was 148 killed, 570 wounded, and 94 missing. The Confederate loss was supposed to be larger in killed and wounded, and about one thousand prisoners were taken by Gen. Rosecrans. At luka the six pieces of the 11th Ohio battery were found, having been abandoned, and also a large number of wounded, and commissary stores and camp equipage. Among the killed were the Confederate generals Lytle and Berry. Gen. Whitfield also was mortally wounded. The road by which Gen. Price retreated being unobstructed, he marched that day twenty-seven miles to Bay Spring.

The force of Gen. Grant left Corinth at the same time when Gen. Rosecrans marched, and reached Burnsville, Miss., in the afternoon. There it remained one night and the next day, and then pushed forward until it met the Confederate pickets. Then it retired and awaited the next morning, when a flag of truce was sent to the Confederate camp, which did not return until late in the afternoon. Thus while Gen. Rosecrans engaged the Confederates on the south, Gen. Grant was prevented from engaging them on the west and north.

The effect of this battle was to relieve Gen. Buell from all danger of an attack by Gen. Price on his rear, while moving against Gen. Bragg. On the 22d Gen. Grant's forces returned to Corinth, and Gen. Rosecrans to Jacinto. Gen. Van Dorn through delays had not reached Corinth as soon as had been planned, and Gen. Grant by now abandoning luka reached the former place in advance of Gen. Van Dorn. On the 26th Gen. Rosecrans proceeded to Corinth, and took command of that position, Gen. Grant having been ordered to Jackson, and Gen. Ord to Bolivar. Jackson is forty-seven miles, and Bolivar nineteen miles by railroad north of Grand Junction, which is forty-one miles by railroad west of Corinth. By the ordinary routes Jackson is fifty-one miles north, and Bolivar forty miles northwest of Corinth. Meantime, Gen. Price retreating southwesterly from Iuka by Bay Spring, reached Baldwin, Miss., thirty miles. Thence he moved northwest to Dumas, fifteen miles, where he joined Gen. Van Dorn; thence to Pocahontas, thirty miles, where he was joined by Gen. Lovell; thence down the Chewalla, and from thence to Corinth by the old State Line road. Gen Van Dorn took the chief command at Dumas.

Meanwhile Gen. Rosecrans, anticipating that an attack would be made on his position at Corinth, prepared to meet it. The fortifications constructed by Gen. Beauregard in the beginning of the year were on the north and east, and two miles from the centre of Corinth, and required an immense force to occupy them. After Gen. Halleck took possession of the town he constructed a line of intrenchments inside those of Gen. Beauregard. Afterward, upon consultation between Gens. Grant and Rosecrans, it was determined to construct a line inside that of Gen. Halleck. This was done under the direction of Capt. Prim of the U. S. engineers. It consisted of a chain of redoubts, arranged for the concentric fire of heavy batteries. Learning the approach of the Confederate forces, Gen. Rosecrans ordered Gen. Ogleby with his brigade to proceed up the Chewalla road and meet them, with instructions to resist strongly enough to draw them under the defences of Corinth. McArthur next went forward and sent back for assistance. Gen. Davis was then ordered to send a small force, but moved with his whole division. This occupied the 30th of September, and the 1st and 2d of October. On the 3d the Confederate force was greatly increased, and the fighting became severe; Gen. Oglesby was wounded, and Gen. Hackelman killed, and the loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was considerable, and the Union troops were driven back to their defences.

On the north and east of Corinth, hill and swampy ground alternate, which is on the whole heavily timbered. On the left hand side of the railroad there is occasionally an open field. The Union army faced to the

north. On the front of its right centre there was a heavily thicketed swamp almost impassable for masses of infantry. On the left centre the ground was quite hilly. Where the right wing was posted it was rolling, but feli off in front into heavily timbered ground, such as to be swampy in rainy weather. The Chewalla road enters the town on the left, and the Bolivar road on the right centre. Excepting at this last named point Corinth was approachable in an unbroken line of battle. The new line of fortifications consisted of four revetted redoubts, covering the whole front of the town, and protecting the flanks. The front of the extreme right was strengthened by the old works of Gen. Beauregard. On the left of the extreme right, which was held by Gen. Hamilton's division, a new five-gun battery was constructed on the night of Friday the 3d. This was in direct range of the point where the Bolivar road entered the town. The previously mentioned fort on the extreme right flanked that road. The hills over which the Chewalla road entered the town were commanded by Fort Williams, which mounted twenty-pounder Parrotts. On a high, narrow ridge was located Fort Robinson, which with Fort Williams enfiladed both the Chewalla and Bolivar roads. Another fort on the extreme left protected the left and strengthened the centre. Several forts in the rear were so located as to be of much service during the action. Their guns were reversed, and turned toward the centre.

On the extreme right was stationed the division of Gen. Hamilton. Its right rested near the fort first mentioned and the old works of Gen. Beauregard, and stretched from the south side of the road to Purdy. Its left rested behind Fort Richardson. On the left Gen. Davies' division joined it, and in consecutive order six companies of Illinois sharpshooters and Burke's Missouri sharpshooters; Gen. Stanley's division, consisting of two brigades, and Gen. McKeon's division, with Gen. Arthur's brigade, were on the extreme left. The cavalry, under the command of Col. Misener, was stationed on the wings and in the rear. Suitable forces were held as reserves and to protect the rear. The front line was covered by crests of undulations on the surface. On the night of the 3d, the Confederate line was formed within a thousand yards of the Union position. Before daybreak the Confederates were heard at work planting a battery on a hill in front of and about 200 yards from Fort Robinett, and soon after they opened a furious fire on Corinth. At daylight, the Parrott guns in Fort Williams opened upon this Confederate battery and in a few minutes silenced it. Two of the guns were removed, but the third was taken and drawn within the Federal line. Skirmishing also opened at various points in front, which was constantly increasing to the magnitude of a battle. The Confederate lines, however, were still invisible. About half past nine o'clock dark and threat ening masses of Confederate troops were sud

denly discerned on the east of the railroad moving up the Bolivar road. They assumed a wedge-like form and advanced impetuously. It was now manifest that the Confederate force had been enticed to attack at the very point where the Federal artillery could sweep it with direct, cross, and enfilading fire. These batteries rent hideous gaps in those massive lines, but they were closed at once and inflexibly pressed forward. Suddenly the Confederate force extended to the right and left, and approached covering the whole field. In front of them, however, was a broad turfed glacis sloping upward to a crest, fringed with determined soldiers and covered with frowning batteries. The few obstructions from fallen timber produced no disorder in the approaching lines but what was quickly restored. The entire Federal line next opened fire, but the Confederate forces, as if insensible to fear, steadily pressed forward undismayed. As they approached the crest of the hill in front and to the right of Fort Richardson, the division of Gen. Davis, although not in immediate danger, began to fall back in disorder. Gen. Rosecrans, seeing the disgraceful scene, dashed forward inflamed with indignation and began thrashing the fugitives with the blade of his sabre. His staff, and even his orderlies, followed his example, and the panic was checked and the line restored. Much space was thus lost, and the enemy reached the headquarters of Gen. Rosecrans and took possession. The loss of fort Richardson now appeared certain. The Confederates gained the crest of the hill, swarmed around the little redoubt, and were swept away. Again they came like infuriated tigers, and with a yell made a desperate dash before which the battery, unsupported, gave way. The guns were seized, but before they could be manned, the 56th Illinois, rising from cover in the ravine, fired a deadly volley and with a shout made a sweeping charge, before which the Confederates fled. When the division of Gen. Davis broke, it was necessary for all to fall back, but this charge of the 56th Illinois recovered the ground. The whole line advanced, and the Confederates were broken and fled to the woods, whither they were pursued. The attack on the Federal right was made by Gen. Price. On the left Gen. Van Dorn was expected to make a simultaneous approach and thus carry Corinth by assault. În the extension of the Confederate right, artificial obstructions interfered. Gen. Van Dorn was obliged to move with his left over a rugged ravine through dense thickets and over a heavy abatis up hill. His centre moved down hill under the fire of Fort Williams, the siege guns in the rear of the town, and under heavy musketry. His right was obliged to move round a ridge and advance over almost insurmountable abatis under the direct fire of both Fort Williams and Fort Robinett well supported by experienced troops. Gen. Van Dorn's advance had necessarily been slower than that of Gen.

Price, and the latter was overwhelmed and defeated when the former was ready to commence the attack. His forces advanced steadily, with troops from Mississippi and Texas in front. Huge gaps were made through their ranks by the great guns of the batteries, but they closed and at once moved unflinchingly onward. The slaughter was great, but none wavered. As they reached the ditch a pause, as if for breath, was made. That pause was fatal to them. The two redoubts, Fort Robinett and Fort Williams, were on the same ridge, and the former, which was in front, was commanded by the latter. They were about 150 yards apart. The Ohio brigade, Col. Fuller commanding, was formed behind the ridge on the right of the redoubts. The left of the 63d Ohio rested on Fort Robinett, and its right joined the left of the 27th Ohio; the 39th Ohio was behind the 27th supporting it; the right of the 43d Ohio joined the left of the 63d, forming a right angle with it, and extending to Fort Williams behind the crest of the ridge. The 11th Missouri was formed behind the 63d Ohio, with its left in the angle and the regiment facing obliquely to the right of the 63d. The brigade were required to lie flat on their faces, and reserve their fire until the Confederates were close upon them. At the moment when the Confederate advance paused, as above stated, the 63d Ohio was ordered to fire. An officer has thus described the scene which ensued: "There were only 250 of the 63d in the conflict, but their volley was fearful. It is said 50 Confederates fell at once. Six volleys were fired and the enemy was gone. The 63d again lay down. Directly the supporting Confederate brigade advanced. The 63d was ordered to make a half left wheel to sweep the front of the redoubt, and the manoeuvre was handsomely executed. The 11th Missouri moved on the left into line into the vacant space; the 43d moved by the right of companies to the left, and the 27th half-faced to the left. Suddenly the enemy appeared, and a furious storm of lead and grape was launched at them. The 63d fired five or six volleys and the enemy rushed upon them. A terrific hand to hand combat ensued. The rage of the combatants was furious and the uproar hideous. It lasted hardly a minute, but the carnage was dreadful. Bayonets were used, muskets clubbed, and men were felled with brawny fists. Our noble fellows were victors, but at a sickening cost. Of the 250 of the splendid 63d, 125 lay there on the field, wounded, dead, or dying. The last final struggle terminated with a howl of rage and dismay. The foe flung away their arms and fled like frightened stags to the abatis and forests. The batteries were still vomiting destruction. With the enemy plunging in upon him, brave Robinett, with his faithful gunners of the 1st U. S. artillery, double shotted his guns and belched death upon the infuriate host, and now he sent the iron hail after the fugitives with relentless fury. The abatis was full of them,

but they were subdued. Directly they began to wave their handkerchiefs upon sticks in token of submission, shouting to spare them "for God's sake." Over 200 of them were taken within an area of a hundred yards, and more than 200 of them fell in that frightful assault upon Fort Robinett. Fifty-six dead were heaped up together in front of that redoubt, most of whom were of the 2d Texas and 4th Mississippi."

The battle was now over. It had begun in earnest about 9 o'clock, and at half past 11 the Confederate force was falling back. The front was so thoroughly masked that it was late in the afternoon before it could be determined whether a second assault was intended. Pursuit in force could not be attempted before rations and ammunition were provided. It was 3 o'clock on the morning of the next day, Sunday the 5th, before the column moved in light order and swiftly. The vigor and determination with which Gen. Rosecrans would pursue a flying foe may be understood from his views expressed to his officers: "Follow close; force them to pass to the rear; compel them to form often in line of battle and so harass and discourage them; prevent them from communicating from front to rear; give them no time to distribute subsistence; don't let them sleep." Meantime, after the Confederate force had retired, Gen. McPherson arrived with 3 regiments from Jackson, and led the van of the pursuit.

The Confederate force retreated by the route on which they had advanced, which was the Chewalla road. It was necessary for them to cross the Tuscumbia river in the neighborhood of Pocahontas. They sent a body of troops to protect the Hatchie river bridge, which is two miles from the bridge across the Tuscumbia. On the 4th Gens. Ord and Hurlbut, from Gen. Grant's force, moved down and encountered this detachment and defeated it, capturing a large number of prisoners and two batteries of 6 guns. The Federal loss here was 50 killed, 493 wounded, and 17 prisoners. This action compelled the Confederate force to retrace their steps and by making a wide circuit they finally crossed the Hatchie at Crum's Mill, about 6 miles farther up. Gen. Rosecrans, however, continued the pursuit to Ripley, whence he was ordered by Gen. Grant to return. He captured nearly 1,000 prisoners, part of the Confederate ammunition and baggage trains, and 11 guns. The Federal loss at Corinth was stated at 315 killed, 1,312 wounded, and 232 prisoners, taken chiefly on Friday, and two Parrott guns. The additional effects of the battle are thus stated by Gen. Rosecrans in an address to his troops, dated October 25:

I have now received the reports of the various commanders. I have now to tell you that the magnitude of the stake, the battle and the results, become more than ever apparent. Upon the issue of this fight depended the possession of west Tennessee, and perhaps even the fate of operations in Kentucky. The entire available force of the rebels in Mississippi, save a few garrisons and a small reserve, attacked you. They

were commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Villipigue, Rust, Armstrong, Maury, and others in person. They numbered, according to their own authorities, nearly 40,000 men-almost double your own numbers. You fought them into the position we desired on the 3d, punishing them terribly; and on the 4th, in 3 hours after the infantry went into action, they were completely beaten. You killed and buried 1,423 officers and men; some of their most distinguished officers falling-among whom was the gallant Colonel Rogers, of the 2d Texas, who bore their colors at the head of his storming column to the edge of the ditch of "Battery Robinett," where he fell. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed 5,000. You took 2,268 prisoners, among whom are 137 field officers, captains, and subalterns, representing 53 regiments of infantry; 16 regiments cayalry; 18 batteries of artillery; 7 battalions; making 69 regiments, 13 batteries, 7 battalions, besides several companies. You captured 3,300 stands of small arms, 14 stands of colors, 2 pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns 40 miles in force with infantry, and 69 miles with cavalry, and were ready to follow him to gratulate you on these decisive results; in the name of Mobile, if necessary, had you received orders. I conthe Government and the people, I thank you. I beg you to unite with me in giving humble thanks to the Great Master of all for our victories.

After the battle at Corinth and the pursuit of the Confederate force, the troops of Gen. Grant returned to their respective positions. Gen. Rosecrans, on the 25th of October, was ordered from Corinth to Cincinnati to take command of the forces preparing for a new campaign. On the 4th of November the forces of Gen. Grant advanced from Jackson and Bolivar to Lagrange, 3 miles east of Grand Junction on the Cairo and New Orleans railroad. The scattered forces of Gens. Van Dorn and Price had rallied and were within 20 miles of the same place, at Cold Water and Holly Springs, Mississippi. Their numbers had not been increased by reënforcements, but they had been rendered more effective by concentration. The forces of Gen. Grant had been slightly increased by the new levies. His army was required to garrison Columbus, Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, and Grand Junction, and was now designated as the army of west Tennessee. The position of the army was unchanged until near the end of November. It required reenforcements and supplies. Active efforts were made to repair the Memphis railroad in order that supplies might be brought from that point instead of Columbus in Kentucky. The distance to the latter place is 138 miles, and to the former, from Lagrange, 49 miles. On the south a small body of troops was thrown forward a few miles to Davis's Mills, and on the west a heavy force had been stationed at Moscow. On the 28th, however, the advance of Gen. Hamilton's corps began to move in the direction of Holly Springs, which place was reached on the 29th. By the 1st of December, Gen. Grant's forces had arrived and were chiefly encamped at Lumpkin's Mills, south of Holly Springs, and 7 miles north of the Tallahatchie river. The Confederate force had retired to the river. At the same time that the movement was commenced from Davis's Mills, a division of Gen. Curtis's army left Helena,

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