historical synthesis as true in any absolute sense. Institutions, he would agree, are true or false only as they are adapted for survival. But there is, is there not, an evolution of ideas too, only the fittest surviving? One can readily imagine the doctrine of survival of the fittest proving socially disintegrating in the end, in which case some other hypothesis will doubtless prove itself fittest to survive by surviving in fact.

Certainly, the evolutionary hypothesis gives us no assurance that detachment will forever be in fashion among historians. The state of mind best calculated to find out exactly what

happened is perhaps incompatible with a disposition to care greatly what it is that happened; and whatever value the notion of detachment may have just now, the time may come there have been such times in the past - when it is most important that every one should care greatly what happens. In that case, one can hardly think of the 'objective man' as possessing qualities exceptionally well adapted for survival. Then we may perhaps have histories as interesting as Professor Minot imagines the Cambridge Modern History is now. One scarcely ventures to hope they will be as scientific as he thinks they ought to be.

Thursday, December 12, 1867.

The President requested me by note to call on him at eleven to-day. Stanbery and Browning were also there by invitation. The President submitted a message to the Senate, communicating some of his reasons for suspending the Secretary of War; no removal has yet taken place. He first asked my opinion, and I stated it, but in view of the traits and peculiar attitude of Grant, in whom the President had not lost all confidence, suggested that it would be well to inform the Senate that the Secretary ad interim had performed the duties acceptably, and that the reforms he had made and the economy he had practiced were of benefit to the country. He says he has dismissed some forty supernumerary clerks. Both S[tanbery] and B[rowning] concurred in the suggestion. S[tanbery] said it was a wise suggestion. A brief statement was accordingly added to the close. I should have made it more full and declared that General Grant had my confidence thus far in administering the office, if such is the fact, and thus have hitched him to the administration. It would have made an issue between him and the Stanton radicals.

Tuesday, December 24, 1867.

A few members of Congress remain in the city but most have left for Christmas vacation. The adjournment and

an interview with their constituents may do them and the country good. The elections of the year and the unmistakable evidence of condemnation by the people have annoyed them, but there is not among them the patriotism, ability, and independence to extricate themselves from the control of intriguing conspirators, who by secret caucuses have made it impossible for them to retrace their steps, and try to do right. Among the radicals there is little statesmanship. They are striving to retain their usurped power by outrageous measures and violence.

Chief Justice Chase still aspires to be the radical candidate for President, but few of the radicals are disposed to gratify his aspirations. Among bankers, speculators, and a certain class of capitalists he finds supporters, and he has a quasi strength among the Southern radicals and Negroes. The Republicans, or the conservative element of what was the Republican party, are favoring General Grant. Comprising the largest segment, they will be likely to control party action, to the disgust of the earnest radicals who, however, dare not oppose the movement. Grant himself is not only willing but grows daily more and more anxious. His aspirations, although he strives to conceal them, are equal and even surpass those of the Chief Justice. His reticence is all a matter of calcula

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tion. He fears to commit himself on anything lest he should lose votes. But popular opinion moves him. A year since he believed that the country was fully committed to radicalism, and under that conviction he became identified with the radicals changing his previously expressed opinions and acting with them until the recent fall elections. Those results astonished no man more than Grant, and he has felt uneasy under his hasty committals, while striving to be reserved.

Stanton, whom he dislikes, has managed to get him committed, which he would not have done had Grant better understood public sentiment. But in Washburne and other little radicals he had had surroundings that controlled him.

I am becoming impressed with the idea that Grant may prove a dangerous man. In discussion, from time to time, in Cabinet, when he has been necessarily to some extent drawn out, this shadow of military absolutism has crossed my mind. It struck me more forcibly to-day when the military government of the South was under consideration.

Friday, January 3, 1868.

Little of interest in Cabinet. Dined with Mrs. W[elles] at the President's. The dinner was complimentary to General Sherman. Only he and his daughter, his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, and Stanbery and lady, who were old township acquaintances of Sherman's, were present, except the President and his daughter. It was a pleasant party. General Sherman says it is the first time he has ever dined at the Executive mansion. The President is desirous of making close friendship with Sherman, and may succeed; but he cannot detach him from General Grant, even if disposed. Although the

E. B. Washburne of Illinois.

two men are unlike, there is between them close identification.

Tuesday, January 14, 1868.

General Grant attended the Cabinet meeting to-day, but stated it was by special request of the President. The Senate had notified him last evening that the reasons for suspending Mr. Stanton were insufficient, and he had therefore gone early to the War Department, locked the doors and given the keys to the Adjutant-General. Subsequently he had sent General Comstock to the President with a letter and a copy of the resolution of the Senate, and had received a request through General C[omstock] when he returned, to be present to-day, and had therefore come over, though he was now at the Headquarters and considered himself relieved of the duties of Secretary.

The President asked if this proceeding conformed to previous understanding, etc. General Grant, without answering directly, said he had promised some time ago that he would give the President notice before relinquishing the office; but that he had not then examined closely the second and fifth sections of the Tenure-of-Office bill. He was not willing to suffer five years' imprisonment and pay ten thousand dollars fine, but preferred to give up the office.

The President asked why, when he had read the sections and come to the conclusion to leave, he had not informed him as agreed; and remarked that he would undergo the whole imprisonment and fine himself, which might be adjudged against General Grant; and said he so told Grant when he spoke of apprehensions on Saturday.

The General said he was not aware of the penalties in the Tenure-of-Office bill, until he saw the discussion in the papers, did not know of them when he

had his first talk with the President, and he came over on Saturday expressly to take up this subject. Had spoken of these difficulties at that time, and expected to see the President again on Monday, but he was busy with General Sherman, and had a good many little matters to attend to. He did not suppose the Senate intended to act so

soon.

'Was it not our understanding, did you not assure me some time ago, and again on Saturday, that if you did not hold on to the office yourself, you would place it in my hands that I might select another?' said the President.

"That,' said Grant, 'was my intention. I thought some satisfactory arrangement would be made to dispose of the subject. Mr. [Reverdy] Johnson and General Sherman spent a great deal of time with me on Sunday. Did n't Mr. Johnson come to see you? I sent General Sherman yesterday, after talking the matter over. Did n't you see Sherman?'

The President said he saw each of them, but he did not see what the interview with either had to do with giving back into his hands the place, agreeably to the understanding.

'Why did you give up the keys to Mr. Stanton and leave the Department?'

General Grant said he gave the key to the Adjutant-General and sent word to the President by General Comstock.

'Yes,' said the President, but that you know was not our understanding.'

Grant attempted some further apologies about being very busy, stammered, hesitated, said Sherman had taken up a great deal of his time, but he had intended to call on the President on Monday, asked to be excused and left.

This is as nearly as I recollect the substance of the conversation as it occurred. I do not claim to give the

precise words, though in many instances I probably have done so. My intention and wish is to do injustice to neither, but fairly present what took place and the remarks of both. I write this on the evening of Tuesday, the 14th, while the subject is fresh in my mind.

The President was calm and dignified, though manifestly disappointed and displeased. General Grant was humble, hesitating, and he evidently felt that his position was equivocal and not to his credit.

There was, I think, an impression on the minds of all present, there certainly was on mine, that a consciousness that he had acted with duplicity, [that he had] not been faithful and true to the man who had confided in and trusted him, oppressed General Grant. His manner, never very commanding, was almost abject, and he left the room with less respect, I apprehend, from those present than ever before.

The President, though disturbed and not wholly able to conceal his chagrin from those familiar with him, used no harsh expression, nor committed anything approaching incivility, yet Grant felt the few words put to him, and the cold and surprised disdain of the President, in all their force.

After Grant had left, the President remarked that it had been said no man was to be blamed for having been once deceived, but if the same person a second time imposed upon him, the fault and folly were his. He said that Reverdy Johnson and General Sherman had called on him, after the consultation with Grant alluded to, and wanted him to nominate Governor Cox of Ohio, whom they had selected to be his Secretary of War. They thought the Senate might be induced to consent that he might have Cox, and in that way dispose of Stanton.

There is no doubt that Grant has been in secret intrigue in this business, acting in concert with and under the direction of the chief conspirators. He did not put the office in the President's hands on Saturday, because the Senate had not acted, but he anticipated, as I and others did, that they would. If therefore the subject was delayed until Monday it would be too late. But the Senate came to no conclusion on Saturday as he expected; he therefore avoided seeing the President on Monday as he promised. On Tuesday he yielded to Stanton.

All the members of the Cabinet present were astonished and declared themselves unqualifiedly against both Grant and Stanton, except Seward, who was very reticent, but expressed an opinion that no action should be taken hastily. On grave and important questions he always perferred to take a night's sleep.

Wednesday, February 5, 1868. Saw the President this evening.

I took occasion to express my apprehensions of public affairs, and of threatening impending calamities which were to be met. I reminded him that it was a duty for us all, and particularly for him, to be prepared for approaching extraordinary emergencies. Reckless, unprincipled men in Congress had control of the government, were usurping executive authority, and would exercise these powers to extreme and evidently beyond constitutional limits.

I asked the President if he was prepared for that crisis. Should they attempt to seize the government, to arrest him? Had he determined the course he would pursue? Such a step is, I know, meditated by some of the extreme radicals. They have intended, by any measure, no matter how unprincipled and violent, to get possession of and to exercise the executive

authority. Grant would help them. Congress, unmindful of the Constitution, will place the money at his disposal instead of the President's. Who, I asked the President, had he got in whom he could confide if a collision took place?

The President became somewhat excited, arose, and walked the room. I had evidently touched on topics which had been in his mind. He spoke of Sherman as having been more emphatic in his language before he left, and suggested that Washington might be made a military Department and Sherman ordered to it. Sherman, he knew, would take it.

I expressed misgivings as to Sherman if Grant were to be his antagonist. He is friendly disposed, but would yield, I feared, and follow Grant rather than the President. I admitted that he was a man of superior intellect and of a higher sense of honor than Grant, but their military association and the ties and obligations of military fellowship and long personal intimacy and friendship would attach him to Grant, though I hoped not to the overthrow of the government.

Friday, February 21, 1868.

After disposing of regular Cabinet business, as we were about rising, the President informed us he had this morning removed Mr. Stanton. He had, he said, perhaps delayed the step too long. At all events it was time the difficulty was settled.

Some one, I believe myself, enquired who was to be his successor. The President said General Thomas, AdjutantGeneral, ad interim and until a regular Secretary was appointed.

I asked if Stanton had surrendered up the place and General Thomas taken possession. The President said General Thomas had called on S[tanton] and informed him of his appointment,