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It is one of his greatest weaknesses that he has no confidants, and seeks none. No man should hold such a position without tried and trusty friends to whom he can unbosom himself, and with whom he can consult and advise freely on all questions. To me, perhaps, he has been as free and as communicative as to any one, and yet there has been constant reserve. Many of his most important steps have been taken without the knowledge of any of his Cabinet, and I think without the knowledge of any person whatever. He has wonderful self-reliance and immovable firmness in maintaining what he believes to be right, is disinclined to be familiar with men in prominent positions, or to be intimate with those who fill the public eye. There are around him too many little busy-bodies, almost all of whom are unreliable and often intentionally deceive him. It is a misfortune that he permits them to be so familiar; not that he means they shall influence him on important questions, but in appointments they sometimes have influence and mislead him. He does not make these fellows his confidants any more than greater men, but they are intrusive, glad to crowd around him, when men of mind and character will not intrude uninvited, and he invites none. Yet he willingly listens, receives information and suggestions, but without reciprocating.

Coming into the Presidency under peculiar circumstances, he has hoped to conciliate Congress and those who elected him, without making proper discriminations as regards men, and the conflicting views of his supporters on fundamental questions. Many of the Republican members were kindly disposed towards him and believed in the Lincoln policy which he adopted. These he could and should have detached from the extremists. They were not leaders not radicals at the be

ginning ginning like himself, they were sincere Republicans, but not having the faculty of receiving and giving confidence, these passive men were treated coolly, as were the radicals who constituted the positive element opposed to him as well as to Mr. Lincoln before him. Stanton who conformed to this policy in Mr. Lincoln's time has been a constant intriguer with the radicals to thwart the President. Seward and Weed undertook, with Raymond and partisans of this school, to make a division, but Raymond was so uncertain and unreliable that the really honest and worthy men, while acknowledging his genius, despised his pusillanimity. Like Seward himself, Raymond became a source of weakness, a positive injury. For a time he assumed, under Seward's management and givings-out, to be the organ of the administration on the floor of the House; but under the irony and sarcasm of Thaddeus Stevens, who ridiculed his conscientious scruples, he soon stood alone. The President really had no organ or confidential friend in the House, no confidant who spoke for him and his policy among the Representatives. Seward and Weed, to whom he listened, alienated the Democrats and almost all of his friends.

Monday, September 2, 1867. General Grant has issued an order forbidding the District Commanders from reinstating through other courts any of the removed civil officers displaced by themselves or their predecessors. This order is in bad taste and in a bad spirit, prompted without doubt by radical advisers. The manifest intention is to keep Sheridan and Sickles appointees in place, to antagonize the President, to defeat his intentions, provided he thinks it proper and correct for the public interest to reappoint one or more of the local State

officers who may have been unfairly with the President and had twenty displaced.

Tuesday, October 8, 1867.

An application from Mr. Siddons of Richmond for a pardon was presented by the Attorney-General. Siddons says he had opposed extreme measures, was in retirement when invited to the War Department of the Confederacy, did what he could to mitigate the calamities of war while in that position, made himself unpopular thereby, had taken the Union oath, etc., etc. Seward thought it best to postpone the subject until after the election, when it might be well to grant the pardon, for Siddons was a harmless old man, and undoubtedly true to the Union.

I said that I had no spirit of persecution in me, that two and a half years had passed since the rebellion was suppressed and I thought it unwise and unjust to continue this proscription. I was, therefore, ready at any time to consider favorably such an application as Mr. Siddons'.

General Grant said very curtly and emphatically, that he was opposed to granting any more pardons, for the present at least. This seemed to check the others, who expressed no opinion. I remarked, if as a matter of policy it was deemed expedient to delay three or four weeks until the November elections had passed, I would not object, but I thought the time had arrived for the display of some magnanimity and kindly feeling.

A year since General Grant expressed to me very different views from those he now avows. Said he was ready to forgive the rebels and take them by the hand, but would not forgive the Copperheads. He is pretty strongly committed to the radicals, is courting and being courted.

After the Cabinet adjourned, Stanbery, Browning, and myself remained

minutes talk on the condition of affairs. Browning said that Governor Cox was spoken of as a suitable man for Secretary of War, provided he would take the place. Stanbery said he had not before heard Cox's name, but he thought it would be an excellent selection. Grant being ad interim, it was important the change should take place and Stanton be removed. Cox would hold on to the close of the session. I enquired if he was firm and reliable, and if he would stand by the President against Congress and General Grant, if they resorted to revolutionary measures, which from certain indications are not improbable. On that point neither of them was assured. I named Frank Blair as a man whom Grant respected and Stanton feared, who had courage and energy to meet any crisis, and who would be a fearless and reliable friend of the President and of sound constitutional principles. Browning responded favorably, Stanbery said nothing.

The President, after the others left, expressed himself favorably to Blair. I urged the point farther. Told him Seward would be likely to object, but that, I thought, ought not to influence his action. I did not hesitate to tell him my apprehensions of Sherman, that if Grant opposed the administration Sherman would be likely not to support it.

Something had been said of Tom Ewing, senior, for a Cabinet officer. He is too old for such a period as this; but I thought him right on present questions, and if here, he might have influence with Sherman, who married his daughter. I doubted, however, whether he would detach Sherman from Grant. The President spoke of Sherman's intellect as being superior to Grant's. I acknowledged that he had more genius and brilliancy, but had

not the firmness, persistency, and stubborn will which are the strong points of Grant, who is not a very enlightened man. Whenever the two are associated, Grant's obstinacy will make his the master mind, and if there were to be antagonism with Grant, the President might have to depend on some other man than Sherman.

The President said that Grant had gone entirely over to the radicals, and was with Congress. I told him that was my opinion, and I was fearful he was so far involved that he could not be withdrawn from mischievous influences. The elections of to-day may have their influence however in this

matter.

Saturday, October 19, 1867.

Time has been wanting for some days to enter occurrences. The President informs me that he called on General Grant in pursuance of my advice. He went to the War Department last Saturday, a week to-day, and consulted in a friendly way with General Grant, told Grant he could not be ignorant of the schemes and threats that were made, and must be aware that it was his (the President's) duty to be prepared to vindicate the rights of the Executive, to maintain the Constitution, and resist invasions and usurpations.

Should an attempt be made to depose or arrest him before trial or conviction, if impeachment were attempted, he desired to know if he would be sustained and whether officers in high position would obey his orders.

He says Grant met him frankly; seemed to appreciate fully the question and the object of his enquiry; said he should expect to obey orders; that should he, Grant, change his mind he would advise the President in season, that he might have time to make arrangements.

dent thought he might rely on General Grant. He could, after this avowal, press the point no farther.

In this, I think he was correct. Grant will make good his word, and act, I have no doubt, in good faith. I so said to the President, and expressed my gratification that the interchange of views had taken place. At the same time I requested him to continue and increase his intimacy with Grant, who though not intelligent seems to be patriotic and right-minded, but the radicals of every description are laboring to mislead him. Defeated in the recent elections, and with public opinion setting against the obnoxious measures, the scheming intriguers begin to rally around Grant, speak of him as their candidate for President; not that they want him, but they are fearful he will be taken up by the Democrats.

Wednesday, October 23, 1867.

Randall says that Boutwell disavows any intention of arresting, or attempting to arrest the President before impeachment and conviction. Says it cannot be done, and does not favor the scheme of Stevens to that purpose. If this is so, the conversation of the President with General Grant is already having its effects. Boutwell is a fanatic, a little insincere - violent, and yet has much of demagogic cunning. He has been, and is, for making Grant the radical candidate for President. He has the sagacity to see that with Grant opposed to them, the radicals would be annihilated. Grant had, therefore, I infer, admonished Boutwell that he cannot be a party to any movement for arresting the President before trial and conviction, and will not be an instrument in such a work. This accounts for Boutwell's declarations to Randall. I so stated to the President this afternoon, and he seemed

Under these declarations the Presi- struck with my explanation.

Saturday, November 30, 1867.

A long and serious illness has prevented me from recording some important events. Yesterday, though weak and debilitated, I for the first time in four weeks attended a Cabinet meeting. When last at the Council room I was quite ill, came home and went on to my bed which I did not leave for twenty-one days, except once, on the 7th, for a few moments, which did me no good. Thanks to a good God, my health is restored, for which I am indebted to the faithful nursing of the best of wives, and the kind attention of my physician.

Little of interest was done in Cabinet yesterday. The President and all the Cabinet manifested great pleasure on seeing me. Each of them has been friendly in calling during my illness, the President sometimes twice a day. To-day the President laid before us his annual Message. A sound, strong, good document.

After its perusal, and running criticism, he submitted a letter addressed to the Cabinet, stating the condition of affairs, the proposed impeachment, and the proposition to suspend the President, or any officer when impeached, until after his trial and judgment by the Senate. There was great uncertainty of opinion on the subject in the discussion.

That the President should submit to be tried if the House preferred articles, was the opinion of all. That he should consent to, or permit himself to be arrested or suspended before conviction, was in opposition to the opinion of each and all.

General Grant said it would be clearly ex post facto to pass a law for suspension in the case of the President, and unless the Supreme Court sustained the law, it ought not to be submitted to. If Congress should pass a law directing that officers should be suspend

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Mr. Randall was very emphatic in denouncing such a movement as destructive to the government.

General Grant said he thought a mere law of Congress would not justify suspension or authorize it, but that there should be an amendment of the Constitution to effect it.

We all assented that if the Constitution so ordered, submission was a duty, but not otherwise.

A few days since, the Judiciary Committee, who have been engaged by direction of the House to search the Union, ransack prisons, investigate the household of the President, examine his bank accounts, etc., etc., to see if some colorable ground for impeachment could not be found, made their several reports. A majority were for impeachment. Until just before the report was submitted, a majority were against, but at the last moment, Churchill, a member from the Oswego, N. Y., district, went over to the impeachers. Speculators and Wall Street operators in gold believed that a resolution for impeachment would cause a sudden rise in gold. Unfortunately for them, no rise took place, but there was a falling off. If Churchill was influenced by the speculators, as is generally supposed, his change did not benefit them, and in every point of view was discreditable to him.

Boutwell, who made the report to the House, is a fanatic, impulsive, violent

an ardent, narrow-minded partisan, without much judgment, not devoid of talents, with more industry than capacity, ambitious of notoriety, with a mind without comprehension and not well-trained; an extreme radical, destitute of fairness where party is involved. The report was drawn up by Thomas Williams of Pittsburg, a former partner of Stanton's, a rank disorganizer, a repudiator, vindictive, remorseless, unscrupulous, regardless of constitutional obligations and of truth as well

as fairness, [who] was put upon the Committee because he had these qualities. The other three gentlemen of the majority may be called smooth-bores, men of small calibre, but intense partyism. The report and its conclusions condemn themselves, and are likely to fail even in this radical House. Whether such would have been their fate had the election gone differently, is another question. The voice of the people 1 has cooled the radical mania, and checked their wild action.

1 The recent elections in Ohio and Pennsylvania.

(To be continued.)

IN THE RAINY SEASON

BY WILLIAM DAVENPORT HULBERT

ACROSS Vancouver harbor the mountains loomed dimly blue in the deepening twilight. High up on the steep, rocky slope was a big brushwood fire, and its warm, red glow was reflected, pastel-like, in the clouds above and the quiet water below. Down on the shore of the inlet a heap of sawmill refuse was burning, and between us and the blaze towered a tall square-rigged ship

a black network of spars and ropes against the glare. Cityward a huge white shape, a little ghostly in the dusk, but graceful even now, told where the Empress of India lay in her berth at the Canadian Pacific wharf. Pushing hard against the swift incoming tide, we swung round the point, threaded the Narrows, and struck out upon the broad, dark, lonely waters of the Gulf of Georgia.

By morning we were in a land of granite and sandstone, where the islands rose steeply out of the sea in lofty hills and mountains, with no level shores, no sandy or pebbly beaches, no green meadows or grassy intervals. The sky was gray and gloomy, and the wind that came down the channels was looking for the marrow of one's bones and found it. There were spurts and dashes of rain, and torn shreds of mist went trailing along the hillsides or climbed slowly up the forest-clad slopes to join the heavy clouds that hung low overhead. In the higher ravines the tops of tall trees stood up out of snowdrifts fifty or a hundred feet deep.

A day or two later we sat in a handloggers' shack on the shore of a small, land-locked bay, where, under the shadow of the hills, our launch lay at

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