Final Order-Forfeited Recognizance.
1. A final order either terminates the action itself, decides some matter litigated by the parties, or operates to divest some right in such a manner as to put it out of the power of the courts making the order, after the expiration of the term, to place the parties in their original condition. (15 B. Mon., 48.)—Applegate vs. Ap- plegate...........
2. An order of a county court refusing to qualify a person as a deputy sheriff on motion of the sheriff, is not a final order, and no appeal lies.-Ib........................................236 See Judgment.
1. Eee the opinion in this case for a discussion of the question as to the rights to what are called fixtures; (1,) as between heir and executor; (2,) between the executor of a tenant for life and the remainder man or reversioner; (3,) between landlord and tenant; (4,) in respect to fixtures erected for the purposes of trade; (5,) between ven- dor and vendee, mortgagor and mortgagee.-Johnson vs. Wiseman ........................... ....... ......................... 357 2. Upon the sale of the freehold, fixtures will pass in the absence of any express provision to the contrary.-Ib..... ...............357
3. What will give chattles the character of fixtures and deprive them of that of personalty? See opinion for a review of the authorities on this subject.-Ib...357 4. In this case chandeliers or gas burners in a house are held to be fixtures.- Ib......... ..358
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-
1. The provisions of the Civil Code regulating proceedings in cases of forcible entry and detainer, (sections 500 to 518, inclusive,) are a substantial re-enactment of the act of 1810. (Statute Law, 715.)-Belcher vs. Barret, &c.............
2. The want of a judgment upon the verdict of a jury in the country, on a writ of forcible entry and detainer, is no ground for dismissing the traverse in the cir- ouit court. Such judgment is not necessary to enable a party to maintain a tra- Ib................
3. In such case the truth of the inquisition in the country is the only matter in- volved in the issue to be tried by the jury in the circuit court.-Ib......... 307 4. Upon an inquest in the country on a writ of forcible entry and detainer, the verdict of the jury, "the defendants not guilty," is sufficiently explicit and respon- sive to the inquiry submitted to them, and a traverse thereof may be brought. Strict technical precision and regularity not required in verdicts and proceedings under the statutes regulating this remedy. .307
1. A recognizance, entered into in October, 1860, was filed in the clerk's office in December, 1860. The case was before the grand jury at the term to which the de- fendant was recognized, who reported to the court that they had failed to indiet; but the court failed to enter of record the discharge of the defendant and the exoneration of the bail. (Crim. Code, sec. 116.) In September, 1862, (no indictment in the meantime having been found, nor any other step taken towards the prosecution of the charge,) proceedings were taken to forfeit the recognizance. Held, That the cir- cuit court properly dismissed the proceeding, the effect of which was to exonerate all the parties from liability on the recognizance-an order which, under the section supra, should have been made upon the failure of the grand jury to indict.-Common- wealth vs. Roberts........
Frauds, Statute of-Gaming.
2. In an action upon a forfeited recognizance the defendant must make a written statement of the facts constituting his defense. Without this the mere exhibition to the court of the evidence relied on by him, either to defeat or suspend the action, will be disregarded.-Brown vs. Commonwealth.....
3. In such case the production of the respite of the Governor, not relied on by pleading, constitutes no defense to the action. The court is not authorized to take any judicial notice of the paper presented in that way.-Ib...........
4. That the Governor remits, not the forfeiture, but the judgment itself except as to "fees and costs," furnished no ground for setting aside the judgment so in part .221
6. The power of the circut court to remit, in whole or in part, the penalty of a for- feited recognizance, is derived solely from section 94 of the Criminal Code, and is a judicial, not an arbitrary discretion, to be exercised upon consideration of the fact, relied upon in the defense. (1 Met., 383.)-Commonwealth vs. Rowland............225 6. The fact that the defendant had been either surrendered or arrested must be al- leged and shown in the defense, and is indispensable to the exercise of the discretion allowed by section 94, supra. And, quere, what additional fact or facts, (if any,) will be necessary to justify a remission in whole or in part of the penalty.-I.. .225
1. A sale of standing trees, in contemplation of their immediate separation from the soil, by either the vendor or vendee, is a constructive severance of them, and they pass as chattles; and, consequently, the contract of sale is not embraced by the stat- ute of frauds. (1 Green. Ev., sec. 271; 13 B. Mon., 340.) And this though no definite time be fixed for their removal.-Byassee vs. Reese....
2. The phrase, "in contemplation of immediate separation from the soil," is used to distinguish a sale of standing trees, or growing crops, which passes no interest in the land, except a license to enter upon it for the purpose of removing them, from a contract conferring an exclusive right to the land for a time for the purpose of mak- ing a profit out of the growth upon it.-Ib....
3. Where standing trees are sold as chattles, the selection and morking of them by the purchaser, with the knowledge and consent of the vendor, is a constructive de- livery, and the title vests in the purchaser. But-
In such case, if one bona fide purchase the land for a valuable consideration paid, and acquire title thereto, before he had notice of the sale of the trees, he is entitled to them, and the purchaser of the trees must look to his vendor for damages. That he had notice before the trees were cut would be immaterial.-Ib...
1. The second and fourth sections of chapter 42 of the Revised Statutes, (title GAMING,) secure to the loser and his creditor the right to sue for money or property lost at gaming, for five years, and the exclusive right to do so for six months, after which any other person may sue for its recovery within the five years; the one first suing to have the preference.-Barnes vs. Turner.......
2. If the loser or his creditor sues, the recovery will only be the amount lost, and be for the sole benefit of the party suing. If another sues, the recovery will be treble the amount lost and won, one-half to the use of the plaintiff, the other to the Commonwealth.-Id .............114
3. Although more than six months may have elapsed, the loser has the right to adjust the loss by private arrangement with the winner, if no other person has com-
General Assembly-Guaranty.
menced suit. If the transaction be made in good faith by both parties, and free from any device to evade the statute, both the winner and loser should be protect- ed.-1b
A member of the legislature in attendance upon its session, is not privileged against being served with a summons in a civil action.-Johnson vs. Offutt......... 19
1. Gifts causa mortis are in general conditional, like legacies, but it is absolutely es- sential to them that they be made by the donor in his last illness, or in contempla- tion or expectation of death.-Knott's adm'r. vs. Hogan..........
2. To make a valid gift, simply so called, or a gift inter vivos, it is essential that it should be irrevocable by the donor. (5 Litt., 12; 5 Mon., 170; 4 B. Mon., 538.)- Ib
3. At the time a note for money loaned was executed, payable three years after date, the interest thereon to be paid annually, the payee executed and delivered to the payor, a writing stipulating that, if the payee should not collect the note in her lifetime, her representatives were directed to surrender it to the payor, "as I intend it as a gift from me to him." The payee retained the note in her possession during her life, and died within less than a year after the execution of the writings. Held, That this is not a valid executed gift which a court of equity should enforce.- Ib..... ................ 99
4. The writing supra, might, if established according to the requirements of the statute of wills, take effect as a testamentary disposition.-Ib...
1. It is a general rule that if a person offers to pay money upon the performance of an act by another. the performance of the act by the latter, without any notice of his acceptance of the offer, or of his intention to act upon it, gives him a right to demand the money. But it is settled as an exception to that rule, that where the offer is to guaranty a debt for which another is primarily liable, in consideration of some act to be performed by the creditor, mere performance of the act is not sufficient to fix the liability of the guarantor; but the creditor must notify the guarantor of his acceptance of the offer, or of his intention to act upon it. (2 Amer. Lead. Cases, pages 35 to 107; 7 B. Mon., 5; 13 b., 381; 14 Ib., 184; 7 Pet., 113.)—Steadman vs. Guthrie
2. That the guarantors might, by inquiry from the person in whose favor the guar- anty was given, have learned what had passed between the guarantees and himself, will not dispense with notice. A person thus proposing to become surety for an- other is not bound to inquire as to the acceptance of his proposal-the creditor, whe intends to hold him responsible for the debt of another, must show that he had rea- sonable notice of such intention.- Ib................. ..............148
3. When notice of the acceptance of an offer to guaranty is requisite, (in an action on such guaranty,) the allegation of notice in the petition should be special, and such as will enable the court to determine from its statements whether or not the notice was given as the law requires. (2 Ala., 373; 3 Conn., 438.) The general averment, "of all which the defendants had notice," is not sufficient. Ib......................... 148 4. Plaintiff alleged in his petition, in substance, that public confidence in C., a banker, being greatly impaired, in consideration that the plaintiff and the other de-
Heirs and Devisees-Husband and Wife.
positors would forbear to withdraw their deposits, and would permit C. to keep and use the same during the panic or until he could conveniently pay them, and to pre- vent a run upon him, and of sustaining his credit, the defendants signed and deliv- ered to C., (the banker,) and published in the newspapers, the following instru-
"Louisville, Oct. 1, 1857. We the undersigned agree to guaranty the depositors of W. E. C. in the payment in full of their demands against said C., on account of money deposited with him. We have entire confidence in his ability to meet all de- mands." That the paper was shown to plaintiff by C., and that accepting and re- lying upon the same, he, upon the faith of the guaranty, forbore to withdraw his money as he purposed to do, of all which defendants had due notice; and that C. failed and closed his banking house on the 5th of October, 1857. Held, (upon de- murrer to the petition,) That the petition is fatally defective for want of special averment of reasonable notice to the guarantors of the plaintif 's acceptance of the offer, or of his intention to act upon it.—Ib................
1. Where lands are devised by a testator, and after his death a patent issues to him therefor, the legal title upon the issuing of the patent vests in his heirs, who bold the title thus acquired in trust for the benefit of the devisees under the will.-
2. In such case, in a suit by the devisees to recover the land, the heirs are neces- sary parties; and the action must be in equity.-Ib............ .255
1. The release by a wife of her potential right of dower forms a valuable consid- eration, sufficient to sustain a settlement upon her by her husband, even against his creditors. Ward vs. Crotty, &c............................
2. An agreement by a husband to transfer to his wife a note, for a part of the pur- chase money, for her separate use, in consideration of her release of her potential right of dower in land sold by him, is binding in equity, and may, upon her appli- cation, be specifically enforced against him--Ib.............. 59
3. A husband sold land in which his wife had a potential right of dower, which she refused to release unless he would give her one of the notes which he had taken from the purchaser. He agreed to assign the note to her for her separate use, and delivered it to her, endorsed, "I assign the within note to C. W., [the wife,] for sat- isfactory consideration." No trustee was named, nor was the assignment recorded. She then signed and acknowledged the deed. Afterwards his creditors sought to subject the note, when she asserted her claim thereto. Held, That against the sub- sequent creditors she is entitled to the note. Against the prior creditors she is enti- tled to the value of her potential right of dower at the time she released it, with in- terest; the residue, if any, due upon the note, to go to the prior creditors.-Ib... 59 4. In an action by husband and wife, and their assignee, upon two notes, one of which was executed to her, and the other to her and her husband jointly, and both reciting that they were given to secure the rent of a tract of land which had been as- signed to her for dower in the estate of her former husband, who died in 1851, held, that the defendant cannot set up demands against the husband as a set off against the debts sued on.-Green va. Carson....... 76
5. The case of Smith, &c. ve. Long, &c.,(1 Met. Ky. Rep., 486,) merely decides that where a husband and wife had jointly executed a bond for the conveyance of land belonging to the wife, and had put the vendee in possession, she was not entitled in equity to recover of the vendee rent for the time he had occupied the land under the purchase.-Ib..................
6. Antenuptial executory contracts between husband and wife, to be performed during marriage, have been frequently enforced in equity, although void at law.— Maraman vs. Maraman......................................................................... ..... 84
7. Conveyances from husband to wife, without a trustee, have been frequently sup- ported in equity, although at law, as a general rule, executed as well as executory contracts between them, without a trustee, are void.-Ib.............. 84
8. At law the husband is entitled to a note given to his wife by a stranger. Yet, where the purchaser of land executed a note payable to the vendor's wife, in pur- suance of an agreement between the husband and wife, and in consideration of her releasing dower, her right to the note was sustained in equity.-Ib... 84 9. A husband is legally entitled to his wife's earnings, but his agreement to give them to her has been held valid in equity.-Ib............
10. Executory contracts between husband and wife, without the intervention of a trustee, have been held to be valid in equity. As a general rule, wherever a con- tract would be good at law, when made with trustees for the wife, that contract will be sustained in equity when made by husband and wife with each other without the intervention of trustees, if it does not affect the rights of third persons.—Ib...... 84 11. If, in consideration of a married woman conveying her land and slaves for her husband's benefit, he agrees to pay the value of her interest to a trustee for her sep- arate use, the contract will be valid at law. If there is no trustee, her equitable right to the money will not be defeated, because whenever a separate use is created for a married woman, whether by her husband or by a stranger, whether by an exe- cuted or executory contract, equity will if necessary make her husband her trustee-
12. Nor is it necessary, in order to give her a right to the money for her separate ase, that the notes of the husband to her should be so expressed. Though a stran- ger's conveyance of property or covenant to pay money to a married woman, or to a trustee for her, in order to give her a separate use, must contain words indicating such intention, such words are unnecessary in a husband's conveyance or covenant.- fb..................
13. Sec. 2, art. 2, of chap. 47, of the Revised Statutes, which provides that hus- band and wife may sell and convey her chattel real, or slave, in the same mode as the land of the wite may be sold and conveyed, and that "the proceeds shall be his, unless otherwise expressly provided in the conveyance or the obligation of the purchaser” does not apply, nor is there any similar provision applying to a wife's real estate. But where the wife joins with the husband in selling her slaves in order to give him the proceeds, and for that consideration he gave her his note, such a provision is not necessary in order to give her an equitable claim on the husband for the value of the slaves in accordance with his agreement. Ib............................ 85 14. That the husband was dealt with and obtained credit upon the faith that the proceeds of land and slaves of the wife belonged to him, does not, so far as he and bis rrpresentatives are concerned, constitute a defense against a recovery by her upon a note executed by him to her in consideration of her conveyance of the prop- erty for his benefit.-Ib..... ...... 83
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