modern educational and ecclesiastical machines demands the executive, with the result that in too many instances we have the careful educational administrator where we need the creative educational leader, and we find only the faithful shepherd where we need the flaming prophet.

The plain fact is, although it may be a thankless task to record it, that the average modern college president is not a creative educational leader, and the average modern pastor is not a creative and inspiring religious leader. This is not merely a fault-finding comment by an outsider; it is only a restatement of what forward-looking college presidents and ministers are themselves saying with even greater emphasis. This regrettable fact is not due primarily to the shortcomings of individual college presidents and ministers; it is the inevitable outcome of a system that, in the church, has united the offices of prophet and executive. Under the present system of church organization, two factors constantly work against the minister's power and opportunity to become the creative ethical and spiritual leader of his parish or community. These two things are, first, the increasing grind of administrative duties that the modern church throws upon his shoulders, and, second, the fact that he is expected to speak with the accent of authority and inspiration once or twice every Sunday to the same audience. These two facts of distraction and routine will in time kill any prophet who is not an exception proving the rule.

It would be difficult to imagine a Milton writing a "Paradise Lost" or a Bunyan producing a "Pilgrim's Progress" while carrying the responsibilities of the executive head of the United States Steel Corporation. Yet that is, on a smaller scale, what we are asking of the American minister. The prophet and poet are at least half-brothers in the conditions required for their best work.

It would be equally difficult to visualize the Founder of Christianity speaking on schedule time, twice every Sunday, to the same group of listeners. The greatest religious leaders, the prophets who have stirred the world and changed the

current of affairs, have always been something of free-lances, itinerants, speaking when they were moved, not when they must. Even when they have spoken almost constantly, as John Wesley, they have not been tied to the schedule of one pulpit, obliged to prepare one or two distinct themes every Sunday for the same audience. The routine of the pulpit inevitably begets a measure of artificiality in mood and moral passion save in the highly exceptional case. The very fact that the audience knows the minister is speaking at eleven o'clock on Sunday morning, just as the Twentieth Century Limited leaves the Grand Central Station at two-forty-five o'clock in the afternoon, because the schedule is so arranged, dulls the alertness of attention that the spontaneous or occasional message secures.

It is interesting to note that the keenest students of the place of the minister in modern life invariably comment upon the fact that much of the best preaching is to-day done outside the pulpit in spontaneous and un-scheduled fashion. President Faunce of Brown University, in his illuminating Yale lectures in 1908, made the following observation:

Preaching is at last getting outside the churches, as it always has done in ages of great moral advance. The preacher is not always or usually an ordained official. He is a college professor, a political leader, a judge of the Supreme Court, a diplomat, or the governor of a state. . . . This modern preaching has shaken off the shackles of the homiletic "firstly" and "secondly"; it has escaped from surplice and pulpit and dim religious light; it has ceased to care for metaphysical formula, and girding itself with the weapons of the time, it sallies forth in broad daylight into market-place and mill and legislature and court, to do battle for the moral ideals of the race. And the multitudes throng and crowd to hear it. Preaching out of date? There is more eagerness to hear a worthy appeal to the sense of duty than ever before since Miles Standish stepped on Plymouth Rock. . . . The labor leaders, speaking in dingy halls or on the public square, often show as much love for humanity and devotion to its uplifting as can be easily discerned in our "masterpieces of pulpit eloquence." Indeed, our

pulpits are sometimes put to blush by the fervor and conviction of men who breathe an ampler ether and speak in more convincing tones.

Mr. Booth's proposal seems to be based upon a frank recognition of the importance of this non-ecclesiastical preaching and an attempt to harness it to the service of the church itself.

To stand before the same audience twice, or even once, every Sunday and say things that interest, inspire, and lead is a challenge that might well tax a superman. Now and then a great man arises who can do that, but the pulpit system makes that demand of every minister, mediocre or brilliant, educated or uneducated. May not Mr. Booth be suggesting how a church can be organized so that there will be an intelligent division of labor between a settled pastor, the man who will shepherd the flock and administer the collective religious, charitable and civic undertakings of the parish, and a succession of prophet-preachers who will revive the great itinerant-tradition? With these itinerant preachers may be joined a great body of laymen who may speak with authority and helpfulness on the issues of our times. It will be a matter of regret if Mr. Booth's church becomes merely another "forum" and fails to rise to the dignity and importance of a real experiment in creative church organization.

ing with interest British statesmen as they again shuffle the cards in the Irish game, is a good time to follow Mr. Birmingham's lead and try to clear our minds about what has happened in Ireland to bring about the present state of affairs.

Foreign affairs have not been a regular diet with the rank and file of Americans. Our geographical isolation accounts for much of the provincialism of American information on foreign affairs. Some one has said that at the beginning of the war the average American was not quite certain whether the Ukraine was a nation or a musical instrument. Certain it is that on most foreign questions, whether the Ukraine, Czecho-Slovakia, Esthonia, Latvia, Bessarabia, or Thrace, most of us find it necessary to fill in a background of elementary information before we can follow with ease and understanding the daily news of these territories.

The familiar problem of Ireland is no exception to this rule. It might be thought that the wide-spread enthusiastic interest in Ireland displayed throughout the United States would mean an equally wide-spread knowledge of Irish affairs. That this is not true is doubtless due to the fact that Irish affairs bulk large in American discussion not entirely because there is a greater intellectual interest in Irish than in other foreign affairs, but chiefly because the very large Irish vote in the United States leads every politician to manifest a peculiar interest in the Irish question. The unvarnished fact is that the average American politician is interested in Ireland's political future not so much as an Irish question, but as an American question. In sketching the background of the Irish problem, we cannot do better than to follow the simple sequence of Mr. Birmingham in the earlier papers of his series.

Under the medley of group opinions in Ireland, back of the divers proposed solutions for the political status of the island, there are two grand divisions of political thought. These two divisions are represented by the Nationalists and the Unionists. Thinking of these terms as representing political ideals rather than political parties, all political

thought in Ireland can roughly be classified under one or the other of the two. Under such classification, each group would of course contain many variations of views. Ignoring for the time these variations, let us broadly visualize these two camps of political conviction.

I. THE NATIONALISTS

The Irish Nationalists, even considered strictly as a party, have never enjoyed any deep-going unity. Here again ignoring the many shades of variation, it may be said that the Nationalists fall into two quite distinct types or groups. Their difference does not lie primarily between moderation and excess in their demands, nor yet in relative emphasis upon political action and physical force as means to their ends. Both groups of Nationalists have arrived at the conclusion that the union between Ireland and England should be broken, but they have arrived at this conclusion by different routes of reason. They agree in their aim; they differ in the reason for their aim. A good way of defining their difference is to call one group the practical Nationalists, the other group the idealistic Nationalists.

The practical Nationalists want the union between Ireland and England broken for the practical reason that it has not worked or, if it may be said to have worked, that it has worked to the ill of Ireland. At bottom this is a Nationalism of expediency, and if it ran true to form and really represented the major Irish opinion, there would be grounds of hope for British statesmen that a wise and constructive and thoroughly sincere policy of conciliation could effect a solution of the Irish problem without severing the ties between Ireland and England. That is to say, if British statesmen so administered the union that it worked, removing one by one Ireland's specific grievances, bringing a popularly enjoyed prosperity, settling Ireland's economic problems in justice, basing the union upon a deal square beyond the critic's assault, the ground would be cut from under a Nationalism that based its claim upon the failure and injustice of the union. But, unfortunately for British optimism, the

practical Nationalist does not tell the whole story. The second type of Nationalist must be reckoned with, although many students of the Irish situation contend that under the skin most Irishmen are practical Nationalists; that even the Sinn Feiners will in the end accept a workable compromise. Whether this be true or false, the second type of Nationalist has been a stubborn factor in the situation.

The idealistic Nationalists want the union between Ireland and England broken for the idealistic reason that Ireland is a nation and is, therefore, entitled to the imprescriptible right to be the captain of its own soul. This group bases its claim not so much upon Ireland's hapless present as upon Ireland's distinctive past. The idealistic Nationalist is inspired by pride in the civilization, the language, and the jurisprudence of ancient Ireland. He is impatient at peacemeal reforms granted by England, for he fears that such reforms might bribe the Irish soul into content with a union based upon conquest rather than upon consent. Plainly this reason for their Nationalism gives the idealistic Nationalists a greater firmness and consistency of attitude than the practical Nationalists. The practical Nationalist is out for what will work best for the practical good of the Irish people. If some form of Home Rule did this, he might support Home Rule. If the status of a self-governing dominion did this, he might support that plan. nothing short of an independent Irish Republic will fill the bill, he will be for that. But the idealistic Nationalist apparently is for a completely independent Ireland first, last, and all the time.

If

We have here discussed the Nationalists not in the sense of the old Nationalist party, but as one general type of political mind in Ireland. We have used the term broadly enough to cover all the new insurgent ideas making for a break with England. We shall a little later trace the recent developments of Irish Nationalism in the Sinn Fein party and in the contradictory nationalistic leanings of Irish labor, but for the moment we are concerned only with a type of mind.

II. THE UNIONISTS

The second grand division of the political mind of Ireland is represented by the Irish Unionists. The Unionist attitude is not so wide-spread, but that its discussion must deal rather definitely with the Unionist party as such. The Unionist group falls into two distinct classifications. On the one hand we have the Northern Unionists, and on the other hand, the Southern Unionists. For still clearer distinction, we might refer to the strong Unionists of northeast Ulster, and the weak Unionists of the rest of Ireland. The Unionist mind in Ireland has been all for a continuance of the union between Ireland and England. The Southern Unionists, essentially a party of gentlemen, are a more tractable group than the Ulster Unionists. But they cut little figure in the larger affairs of Irish destiny, and we are justified in confining our examination of the Unionist attitude to an analysis of the Unionists in Ulster, who have so long been able to impose their absolute will on the Irish situation, despite the fact that they are only a small minority. Let us see upon what grounds these Unionists of Ulster have based their inflexible opposition to Home Rule, to independence, or, in fact, to any weakening of the ties that bind Ireland to England.

III. THE THREE FEARS OF ULSTER

There is a loose popular conception among many American supporters of the Unionist point of view that Ulster is Protestant, industrial, and hardworking, while the rest of Ireland is Catholic, agricultural, and happy-golucky; that this Protestant minority does not want to get into the clutches of the Catholic majority, this industrial minority into the hands of the agricultural majority, this hard-working minority into the hands of the happy-golucky majority. The case is not so simple as that. The province of Ulster is not completely Protestant and industrial, comprising one-third of the Irish population, with its back to the wall, opposed by the three other provinces. completely Catholic and agricultural. In

some of the Ulster counties there are strong Catholic and Nationalist groups. In fact, the 1911 census recorded about 700,000 Catholics as against 900,000 Protestants in Ulster.

But the Unionist Ulster we are here studying, in an effort to get at the mind of the Ulster devotion to union with England, is the section centering around Belfast and Londonderry, which is predominantly Protestant, industrial, and hard-working. It is there that Ulster Unionism is found in its greatest purity and greatest strength. These Ulster Unionists entertain the three fears just mentioned.

The men of northeast Ulster fear that Home Rule would mean "Rome Rule" to the extent of decided discrimination against and persecution of Ulster Protestants by the Catholics who would predominate in any Parliament of a homeruled or independent Ireland. For this reason they dread withdrawal of the protecting arm of Protestant England. As a corollary to this religious domination, they fear that the Catholic majority would, through its control of any Irish Parliament, throw the educational system into the hands of the Jesuits and its other teaching orders.

They also fear that Home Rule would mean "Farm Rule" in the sense that the agricultural masses throughout the rest of Ireland, through their majority representation in the Parliament of a home-ruled or independent Ireland, would discriminate in legislation against prosperous industrial Ulster. They fear that the representatives of the agricultural majority, inspired by the old dislike of Ulster and envy of Ulster's rapid strides in prosperity, would make Ulster hold the bag in the matter of taxation.

And finally they fear that Home Rule would mean the "Rule of Incompetence," because the agricultural majority would have neither the experience nor the knowledge that would enable them wisely to legislate for an industrial region like Ulster. They have long feared what they regard as the sinister political tactics of the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the United Irish League.

Here then are the three fears of Ulster: (1) The fear that Catholic Ire

land would discriminate against Protestant Ulster; (2) the fear that agricultural Ireland would over-tax and otherwise unfairly legislate against industrial Ulster; (3) the fear that an Irish Parliament would be packed with members unqualified to handle the problems of a modern industrial community. It has been said that the men of Ulster know that they have had the best end of the bargain to date, that they simply do not want to change from a position of superiority to one of equality with the rest of Ireland, and that their fears are trumped-up fears to lend the look of logic to their intransient attitude. There is little to support this charge. Although many of their fears might prove groundless in the end, the men of Ulster undoubtedly believe that independence would not mean real self-government for them. Were these fears dissipated, tens of thousands of Ulster Unionists would probably go over to the camp of the Nationalists.

IV. WHY ULSTER WINS

But the thing that has bothered American readers has been the difficulty in seeing how such a small minority, whatever their fears and however good their reasons, could absolutely dominate the entire Irish situation. The plain fact that the union with England still stands is the sign of Ulster's successful opposition. There are those who say it is not so much that Ulster is strong as it is that England has never really intended to extend any marked measure of Home Rule, that her movements in that direction have been merely opportunist gestures, that it has been with relieved gladness rather than reluctance that she has made Ulster the excuse for repeated postponements of Home Rule. One big factor that has ministered to the success of the Ulster opposition to Home Rule has been the unwillingness upon the part of many Nationalist leaders to permit the exclusion of any part of Ulster from Home Rule, fearing that the exclusion of such a wealthy, even though small, part of Ireland from an Irish government might mean the failure of the experiment. Thus the old contest between state rights and secession, which

we knew in the Civil War period, operates in Ireland. But Ulster Unionists have succeeded not only because of these factors, but also because Ulster Unionism is a party of unusual strength through the fact that it has united all classes of its people on its program of opposition. The composition of Ulster Unionism is a unique story.

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Ulster Unionism has united three classes that are normally at one another's throats, the aristocracy, the trading class, and the laboring class. These three classes are alike in their almost fanatical devotion to the union with England, but each favors the union from a different motive. The Ulster aristocrat favors union England for imperial reasons. This Irish aristocracy has, by long tradition, a knowledge of large affairs and marked qualities of leadership. These Irish aristocrats in Ulster have an undying pride in the British Empire and are inveterate imperialists. It is not Catholic Ireland or agricultural Ireland or incompetent Ireland that they fear primarily. They fear a Nationalist Ireland that would disrupt the British Empire. The leadership of this group gives marked strength to Ulster Unionism. Yoked with these aristocrats are the business and manufacturing classes of Belfast. These men of trade favor union with England more from economic than imperial reasons. They think profits and prosperity safer under British guidance than under the guidance of an inexperienced Irish Parliament. To these men of aristocracy and industry are joined the Protestant laboring men of Ulster. They favor union with England not from imperial or economic motives, but from a religious motive. Their basic fear is of Catholic domination. Simply as working-men they are independent and radical, but their fear of the pope is so much stronger than their fear of the capitalist that they are unswerving in their coöperation with the aristocrats and the business men.

It will now be of interest to trace the developments that have resulted in the present wide-spread unrest and virulent passion that has of late swept Ireland in the interest of separation from England.