and the shoe statute will be wholly unable to find them.

Every man has an inherent right to follow any lawful calling. The bake-shop and the shoe-store are both lawful callings, therefore, they are both inherent rights. The saloon is always and everywhere attended with injury to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community and is, for that reason, unlawful, and consequently has no inherent right to exist.

CHAPTER XI

THE SALOON IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT

"To sell intoxicating liquor at retail is not a natural right to pursue an ordinary calling."

The writer can not be consistently charged with entertaining delusions in making this statement, because the language is copied from the opinions of the Supreme Court of Indiana, and this court is perfectly sane at all times-or otherwise. An analysis of the statement undeniably discloses that it is the view of the court that ordinary callings are natural rights, and, as it asserts that the saloon is not a natural right, it thereby affirms that the saloon is not an ordinary calling. If the saloon is not a natural right, it is certainly some other kind of a right, if it can be a right at all. Those rights, which are not natural, are surely created rights. The saloon is not a natural right, because it is not an ordinary calling, and it is not an ordinary calling, because it is harmful and dangerous to society, consequently an unlawful business. As it is not a natural right, because it is unlawful, it can not become a right at all unless it be made lawful, that is, unless it be legalized. The Supreme Court of Arkansas says:

"All rights which appertain to men are of one or the other of two classes, that is to say: 1. Natural rights; or 2. Acquired rights. The former are such as appertain originally and essentially to men, such as are inherent in his nature, and which he enjoys as a man independent of any particular act on his side. The latter, on the contrary, are those which

he does not naturally enjoy, but are owing to his own procurement. The right of providing for one's preservation is of the first class."

Then, the saloon is not one of those rights inherent in the nature of man; it is not a right of providing for one's preservation; but it belongs to the class designated as procured or acquired rights. And from whence acquired? From the saloon license statute. So, that the effect of the position of the Supreme Court of Indiana, is to affirm that the saloon is a legalized pursuit.

Discussing natural rights, Blackstone says: "This doctrine, which before. was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties receive any stronger sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land."

The United States District Court, of Arkansas says: "Every citizen and freeman is endowed with certain rights and privileges, to enjoy which no written law or statute is required. These are fundamental or natural rights, recognized among all free people."

The saloon is not one of these fundamental or

natural rights, therefore, to enjoy the privilege of keeping a saloon, a law or statute is required.

From all this two propositions are logically deducible:

First-That, in the absence of legislative approval, the saloon is unlawful.

Second-That, the saloon license statute, instead of restricting or limiting a natural and lawful right, is the means of legalizing a natural wrong.