The Commander-in-Chief has the right, during war, to treat focal laws as inoperative, or to adopt some and reject others; to permit the holding of courts by local authorities acting under military power of the conqueror, or to forbid them, and to substitute military courts of his own. Having all the rights of war over the subjugated inhabitants, he has all the powers of a government de facto and de jure, and can therefore impose upon them whatever laws or regulations may suit his pleasure, in accordance with the laws of war. The LAWS OF WAR are the only laws required by the Constitution to be laid by military power upon public enemies in time of civil war. Congress may modify by legislation the hardship of belligerent rights. But whatever may be done or omitted by the Presi.dent or by Congress, the laws and municipal institutions of the conquered inhabitants are "swept by the board." Whatever law is rightfully administered, is law expressly declared or tacitly permitted by the will of the conqueror. JUDICIAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. The courts judicial, as established by laws of Congress in the seceded States, having been closed by civil war, may be reëstablished whenever the districts over which they have jurisdiction shall be permanently reduced under the power of the United States. When the officers of such courts, either by engaging in rebellion or otherwise, have become in law public enemies, their right to exercise judicial or other functions under authority of the United States ceased, and their offices were vacated. If new appointments were to be made now, it is obvious that the authority of courts would be enforced only by military power; their jurisdiction would be very limited; such juries as they could summon would probably be hostile to the Union, and the powers of judges, under present laws, would be be totally inadequate to meet the demands of these turbulent times. Hence it would be worse than useless to erect judicial courts before peace is completely restored. It would tend to bring the judiciary into contempt. Therefore it can hardly be deemed advisable to interfere with the stern, effective, but necessary government of hostile people by military power, until Congress shall by legislative act recognize a state of peace. APPENDIX. THE most important cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in relation to the subjects discussed in the foregoing pages, are: -— Fleming vs. Page, 9 How. 614. Dynes vs. Hoover, 20 How. 79. Leitensdorfer vs. Webb, 20 How. 177. Vallandigham's case. Appendix, 88. From these cases, for more convenient reference, the following passages have been extracted. Tampico to the soV U.S. FLEMING US. PAGE, 9 Howard's S. C. Rep. 614. Mr. Chief-Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court: The question certified by the Circuit Court turns upon the construction of the Act of Congress of July 30, 1846. The duties levied upon the cargo of the schooner Catharine were the duties imposed by this law upon goods imported from a foreign country. And if at the time of this shipment Tampico was not a foreign port, within the meaning of the Act of Congress, then the duties were illegally charged, and, having been paid under protest, the plaintiff's would be entitled to recover in this action the amount exacted by the collector. The port of Tampico, at which the goods were shipped, and the was subject Mexican State of Tamaulipas, in which it is situated, were un ereignty doubtedly, at the time of the shipment, subject to the sovereignty and and domin- dominion of the United States. The Mexican authorities had been ion of the driven out, or had submitted to our army and navy, and the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States, Tampico and governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of was govern- the President. But it does not follow that it was a part of the ed by our military au- United States, or that it ceased to be a foreign country, in the sense in which these words are used in the Acts of Congress. The country in question had been conquered in war. But the genius and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general gov thorities. ernment to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the rights of its citizens. A war, therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest, or the acquisition of territory: nor does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States by subjugating the enemy's country. The United States, it is true, may extend its boundaries by conquest or treaty, and may demand the cession of territory as the condition of peace, in order to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they have suffered, or to reimburse the Government for the expenses of the war. But this can be done only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority, and is not a part of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war. His duty and his power are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the move- Powers ments of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, dentasComand to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to har-mander-inass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile Chief to country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United over the States. But his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this employ it, Union, nor extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond invade, to the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power. of the Presi army and to subjugate, It is true that, when Tampico had been captured, and the State not to extend the of Tamaulipas subjugated, other nations were bound to regard the limits of country, while our possession continued, as the territory of the Union. United States, and to respect it as such. For, by the laws and usages of nations, conquest is a valid title, while the victor main- Tampico tains the exclusive possession of the conquered country. The cit- ours, as against for izens of no other nation, therefore, had a right to enter it without eign counthe permission of the American authorities, nor to hold inter- tries. course with its inhabitants, nor to trade with them. As regarded all other nations, it was a part of the United States, and belonged to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries. But yet it was not a part of this Union. For every nation which acquires territory by treaty or conquest holds it according to its own institutions and laws. And the relation in which the port of Tampico stood to the United States while it was occupied by their arms, did not depend upon the laws of nations, but upon our own Constitution and Acts of Congress. The power of the President, under which Tampico and the State of Tamaulipas were conquered and held in subjection, was simply that of a military commander prosecuting a war waged against a public enemy by the authority of his government. And the country from which these goods were imported was invaded and subdued, and occupied as the territory of a foreign hostile nation, as a portion of Mexico, and was held in possession in order to distress and harass the enemy. While it was occupied by our troops, they were in an enemy's country, and not their own: the inhabitants were still foreigners and enemies, and owed to the United States nothing more than the submission and obedience, sometimes called temporary allegiance, which is due from a conquered enemy when he surrenders to a force which he is unable resist. But the boundaries of the United States, as they existed when war was declared against Mexico, were not extended by the conquest; nor could they be regulated by the varying incidents of war, and be enlarged or diminished as the armies on either side advanced or retreated. They remained unchanged. And every place which was out of the limits of the United States, as previously established by the political authorities of the government, was still foreign, nor did our laws extend over it. Tampico was therefore a foreign port when this shipment was made. Again, there was no Act of Congress establishing a customhouse at Tampico, nor authorizing the appointment of a collector; and, consequently, there was no officer of the United States authorized by law to grant the clearance and authenticate the coasting manifest of the cargo, in the manner directed by law, where the voyage is from one port of the United States to another. The Collection person who acted in the character of collector in this instance, acted of duties by as such under the authority of the military commander, and in obedimilitary authority. ence to his orders; and the duties he exacted and the regulations he adopted were not those prescribed by law, but by the President in his character of commander-in-chief. The custom-house was established in an enemy's country, as one of the weapons of war. It was established, not for the purpose of giving to the people of Tamaulipas the benefits of commerce with the United States, or with of other countries, but as a measure of hostility, and as a part of the hostility. military operations in Mexico; it was a mode of exacting contributions from the enemy to support our army, and intended also to cripple the resources of Mexico, and make it feel the evils and burdens of the war. The duties required to be paid were regulated with this view, and were nothing more than contributions levtions may ied upon the enemy, which the usages of war justify when an army is operating in the enemy's country. The permit and coasting manifest granted by an officer thus appointed, and thus controlled by military authority, could not be recognized in any port of the United States as the documents required by the Acts of Congress, when the vessel is engaged in the coasting trade, nor could they exempt the cargo from the payment of duties. An act Contribu be levied. This construction of the revenue laws has been uniformly given by the Administrative Department of the government in all cases that have come before it. And it has, indeed, been given in cases where there appears to have been stronger ground for regarding the place of shipment as a domestic port. For after Florida had been ceded to the United States, and the forces of the United States had taken possession of Pensacola, it was decided by the Treasury Department, that goods imported from Pensacola before an Act of Congress was passed erecting it into a collection district, and authorizing the appointment of a collector, were liable to duty. That is, that, although Florida had by cession actually become a part of the United States, and was in our possession, yet, under our revenue laws, its ports must be regarded as foreign until they were established as domestic by an Act of Congress, and it appears that this decision was sanctioned at the time by the AttorneyGeneral of the United States, the law officer of the Government. And, although not so directly applicable to the case before us, yet the decisions of the Treasury Department in relation to Amelia Island and certain ports in Louisiana after that province had been ceded to the United States, were both made upon the same grounds. And in the latter case, after a custom-house had been established by law at New Orleans, the collector at that place was instructed to regard as foreign ports Baton Rouge and other set |