credit to a party politically controlled by and dependent upon the South will seem to all the world little less than a public proclamation that the people of the United States are weary of protecting its credit and paying its debts. E. D. MORGAN. J. J. ASTOR. ROBERT LENOX KENNEDY. J. PIERPONT MORGAN. E. P. FABBRI. CHAS. H. RUSSELL. BENJ. B. SHERMAN. DAVID Dows. WM. H. MACY. SAM. SLOAN. LEVI P. MORTON. GEORGE BLISS. JESSE SELIGMAN. GEO. T. ADEE. CYRUS W. FIELD. JOHN W. ELLIS. ISAAC SHERMAN. I. N. PHELPS. NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. No. CCLXXXIX. DECEMBER, 1880. · THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. THE existence of a party in power for the term of twenty-four years, against an active, persistent, and capable opposition, is an unexampled circumstance in American politics. To be sure, the party of Mr. Jefferson administered the Government for the same period of time, but Mr. Monroe was supported in 1820 by the entire body of the people. There was then no party; the opposition had disappeared; the Administration represented the country. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in 1854 caused the first serious division in the modern Democratic party. The course of Mr. Douglas in 1857, and thenceforward to 1860, resulted in the election of Mr. Lincoln. The popular vote given to Mr. Lincoln was much less than a majority, however, and the Republican party accepted power under circumstances that even in a time of peace would have been fraught with peril. The election of 1862, although eleven Democratic States took no part in it, was so disastrous to the Republicans, that the majority in the House of Representatives of the Thirty-eighth Congress was less than twenty. At every Presidential election from 1864 to 1880 the contest has been severe, bitter, and always doubtful. In several of these contests the Democrats have gained much by their crimes, and often they have lost much by their stupidity. In the contest just ended, both of these statements have been veriVOL. CXXXI.-NO. 289. 33 fied. By their crimes they conquered, they subjugated Mississippi, Louisiana, and other States of the South that, upon a free vote, would have been Republican; by their blunder they lost New York, Connecticut, and other States of the North, that, except for the tariff issue, might and probably would have sustained the Democratic party. Had that party been wise, a plain way was open by which they could have made the tariff question a source of strength instead of an element of weakness, as it became by the unskillful management of leaders at Cincinnati. Senator Eaton, a Democrat, had proposed a commission, to be clothed with power to examine and report upon the entire revenue system of the country. As far as the Senate was concerned, the commission had been created, and nothing was wanting but the concurrent action of a Democratic House. If the party at Cincinnati had abstained from the declaration in favor of a tariff for revenue only, and had announced its purpose to await the report of the commission, and then to so adjust the rates of duty as to furnish revenue and give incidental protection to our industries, the Republican party would have been compelled to accept the position as a reasonable one under the circumstances. To be sure, the doctrine would have been inconsistent with the traditions and history of the Democratic party, and inconsistent, especially, with the platform of 1876, but it is doubtful whether upon argument the business men and laboring men of the manufacturing States could have been aroused, and except for their active efforts this election would have been lost to the Republican party. It might have been argued, it would have been argued, that it was the purpose of the Democratic party to frame a tariff system for revenue only; but such arguments would have been fruitless of results in presence of counterarguments made by Democratic presses and orators, and based upon the most recent declaration of the party. In human affairs blunders are often closely allied to crimes, and the Democratic party has now lost by a blunder what it otherwise would have gained by crime. Possibly, it may be urged that the declaration at Cincinnati was but the honest expression of party opinion, and that the declaration would have been made at the cost even of the Presidential election. This theory is refuted by the anxiety exhibited by Senator Randolph, and by General Hancock himself, to escape the political consequences of the declaration made at Cincinnati. Ostensibly General Garfield has been elected upon the tariff issue, but in reality the tariff became an issue upon the declaration made at Cincinnati, only in consequence of the outrages in the South by which the majorities in Congress had been transferred from the Republican to the Democratic side. Except for this circumstance, the preponderance in favor of Republicans in Congress and in the States would have been such that all anxiety for the protective system would have been quieted. As the tariff, however, has been in the popular mind a leading issue in the canvass now closed, it must be a leading topic of thought and of legislation by the incoming Administration, until the system is perfected and firmly established in the policy of the country. But it is to be said that the present tariff, as a system, was not at issue. The principle of protection, however, was at issue, and the verdict was in favor of the principle. No one contends that the system is perfect. The first duty of the Republican party, then, is to perfect the system, so as to provide revenue and furnish protection to our industries. The principle found in the existing system is to rule in any new bill that may be framed. The present law provides revenue and furnishes protection. The two purposes are not inconsistent, as the experience of the country for eighteen years demonstrates, and, with Republicans, protection is not the least important of the two features of the system. It is not enough, however, to maintain the present system, or to provide an improved system based upon the same principle. Whatever peril may menace the existing tariff is due to a solid South, and a solid South will be a continuing menace to any system designed to protect American industry. The South-that is, the dominant party in the South-is opposed to a protective tariff upon two grounds: First, the ancient doctrine of State rights is a denial to the General Government of any power under the Constitution to promote industry, encourage development, or stimulate prosperity in the States. In the opinion of the South, the duty and the power of the Government are limited to the enactment of those laws necessary to its existence. The support of the army, the navy, the judiciary, and the Post-Office, and the collection of the revenues necessary therefor, are the chief if not the only duties of the General Government. The South therefore is opposed, upon principle, to a revenue system designed to protect and encourage the industry of the States, or which in any way recognizes such aid and protection. Secondly, the advanced industries of the country are in the North, and to the ancient sectional hostility existing in the South is added the bitter recollection of the recent contest and its disastrous results. The prosperity of the North, its rapidly increasing numbers, its wealth augmenting beyond the dreams of avarice, its diversified and growing industries, are but so many evidences to them of Northern greatness and of Southern inferiority. Educated in the dismal doctrines of State rights, they find no satisfaction in any prosperity except that of and by the State. It is not enough, then, to secure the passage of another bill which shall be more perfect as a system than the present law; for, as long as the statutes of the country recognize the doctrine of protection to domestic industry, those statutes will be assailed by the Democratic party, and as long as the South remains solid those statutes will be menaced by uplifted, hostile hands. If, then, the Republican party is not moved to break the solid South by any higher motive than that of self-interest, it is under an imperative necessity to do so in its capacity as preserver and guardian of the industries of the North. How can this be done? It is to be said, first of all, that whatever is undertaken must be undertaken as an Administration measure; and, being an Administration measure, it will be accepted and treated as a party measure. This is not a misfortune. Non-party measures have proved, usu ally, unwise measures. Mr. Clay's compromise tariff of 1833 and the slavery compromises of 1850 are memorable instances of ill fortune waiting upon non-party legislation touching great public interests. Of the policy of the Administrations of Jackson and Van Buren, the Independent Treasury system is the only remaining monument, and this from first to last was advocated on one side and resisted on the other as a party measure. As party measures, the Republicans may claim the prosecution of the war to a successful termination, the emancipation of the slaves, the constitutional amendments, the tariff system, the issue of greenbacks, the funding of the public debt, the establishment of the national banking system, the resumption of specie payments, and many other measures of secondary importance. In fine, all or nearly all the measures which now contribute to the public prosperity were introduced, advocated, and defended as party measures. Usually, what is done by a party is done under a |