its incompetent chief from the swamps of the Chickahominy, when the latter was calling for reënforcements "rather over than under one hundred thousand men." There is probably not an instance in the annals of war where a forlorn hope was organized and sent forth on an expedition of self-immolation under such circumstances as that which surrounded the "Army of Virginia." From the beginning its leader was thoroughly aware that the future had in store for him no success in deeds of arms. Gladly would he have avoided the duty imposed upon him, but the sacrifice was demanded, and the victim did not shrink. At no time did he entertain a thought of victory, and yet it was necessary for him to assume the role of prospective conqueror, to deceive if possible the enemy opposed to him. The game of "bluff " was adopted with premeditation as a regular part of the programme, with an entire knowledge of the obloquy that such a course must entail. It was loudly given out that an advance on Richmond was in instant contemplation, and that nothing could stay the onward progress of a force altogether adequate to the occasion. It was a ruse de guerre, and it succeeded; for the rebel authorities were alarmed, the hosts of the Peninsula were forgotten, and the new foe occupied the entire field of vision.

Those who choose to examine the Northern papers of July and August, 1862, can not fail to observe how the trumpets were sounded and the cymbals were clashed, with prodigious fury, in regard to the great events about to transpire. The extent of General Pope's army was forty-three thousand men, and he set forth to overwhelm Lee, whom McClellan was telegraphing as having two hundred thousand. The actual truth, as it was understood at the time, is stated in the report of the General of the Army of Virginia: "I well understood, as does every military man, how difficult and how thankless was the duty devolved upon me, and I am not ashamed to say that I would have gladly avoided it, if I could have done so consistently with my sense of duty to the Government. To confront with a small army vastly superior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only to gain time, and to embarrass and delay the forward movement of the enemy is, of all duties, the most hazardous and most difficult that can be imposed upon any general or any army. While such operations require the highest courage and endurance on the part of the troops, they are, perhaps, unlikely to be understood or appreciated, and the results, however successful, have little in them to attract popular attention and applause. At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the im

mensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army to the dust. It was only by constant movement, by incessant watchfulness, and hazardous skirmishes and battles, that the forces under my command were not overwhelmed, while at the same time the enemy was embarrassed and delayed in his advance upon Washington, until at length the forces from the Peninsula were assembled for the defense of the city. I did hope that, in the course of these operations, the enemy might commit some imprudence, or leave some opening of which I could take such advantage as at least to gain a partial victory over his forces. This opportunity was presented by the advance of Jackson upon Manassas Junction; but, although the best dispositions possible under the circumstances were ordered, the object was frustrated in a manner and by causes which are now well understood."

That General Pope fulfilled the requirements of his position is shown by the correspondence between himself and the authorities. His sole mission was to delay the advance of the enemy, and so early as August 25th he says to Halleck: "You wished forty-eight hours to assemble the forces from the Peninsula behind the Rappahannock, and four days have passed without the enemy yet being permitted to cross. . . . I understood that the army was to maintain the line of the Rappahannock, until all the forces from the Peninsula had united behind that river. I have done so. I understood distinctly that I was not to hazard anything except for this purpose, as delay was what was wanted." In his reply to this, Halleck states: "Not the slightest dissatisfaction has been felt in regard to your operations on the Rappahannock. The main object has been accomplished, in getting up troops from the Peninsula." Upon the termination of the campaign, General Halleck expressed his acknowledgments of its results in terms of the highest praise.

To Pope, in his dispatch of August 31st, Halleck says: "You have done nobly. . . . I am doing all I can for you and your noble army. God bless you and it!"

Upon his return to Washington, the President, General Halleck, and the Secretary of War signified to General Pope their high appreciation of the vigor and skill with which he had conducted the campaign, and their entire satisfaction with its results. Nor did they hesitate to express their indignation at the treacherous conduct which, by withholding aid and refusing to act at the opportune

moment, had converted the promise of victory into disaster. The authorities demanded of this officer an instant official report of his operations, which was at once prepared. But in twenty-four hours the Government had changed its tone. President Lincoln would at once have decapitated McClellan, even if he had not summoned a court-martial, as was afterward done with regard to Porter, who was a mere tool. But Stanton was afraid. With all his bluster, the great War Secretary was a great coward. He was afraid that the arrest of McClellan would cause a revolt in the Army of the Potomac. And so he temporized; McClellan was restored to the command, and Pope was left to endure an undeserved obloquy.

The first collision was at Cedar Mountain upon the 9th of August. From that time until the 31st every day witnessed a series of skirmishes, battles, and marches without cessation. Hardly an hour passed without the roar of cannon and the rattle of small-arms. The enemy was flushed with victory. They had hunted McClellan to his hole upon James River, and, in the full pride of success, had turned to crush a new foe. The Army of Virginia sullenly retired, presenting at all times an undaunted front, for it was the only shield between confident rebellion and the capital of the nation.

Its leader was animated by one spirit only. Upon the last day of his fight, when pressed by the enemy in front, and in rear surrounded by those upon whom he knew he could not depend, yet game to the last, he dispatched to Halleck: "You may rely on my giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work." This shows nothing of the white feather.

There is now no complaining of what had been done or what had not been done. There is but one thought, but one purpose. He proposed to do his duty.

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army."

This was what the other man said; and it is plain, as stated in the April article, that Pope and McClellan ought not to be named in the same century. Of course not!

The Army of Virginia is consigned to the realms of history, with the brief eulogy pronounced upon it by competent authority,

who, after reviewing the events which have been narrated, speaks thus:

"The Army of Virginia appears to have nobly performed the arduous and perilous work committed to its hands. Its campaign was brief, but marked by signal vigor and ability, and animated by a spirit which, shrinking from neither toil, exposure, nor danger, bravely struck the enemy whenever and wherever he could be found."

D. THEW WRIGHT.

THE TAXATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY.

A QUESTION of great local interest, as connected with this subject, has just been settled by a unanimous vote of both Houses of the Congress of the United States. The principles involved, however, in the local question have universal application, and are therefore of general interest.

The general tax law for the District of Columbia, passed by Congress in the year 1874, did not in express terms exempt churches from taxation. The law levied a tax on the present assessed value of all property not exempted, and contained no clause repealing former exemptions.

Under this act the Commissioners of the District created on their authority a board to assess the churches, and proceeded to enforce the tax; and where the churches declined to pay the tax, for reasons hereafter to be stated, the Commissioners advertised and sold and bought in, in the name of the District of Columbia, all of the churches of the District, with three exceptions-the aggregate value of the church property being $1,590,744, and the aggregate tax being in round numbers $46,500.

The grounds upon which the churches declined to pay the tax

were:

1. The churches had no "present assessed value," had never been assessed, but always exempted; and the act imposed a tax on the "present assessed value."

2. The act contained no clause repealing the former exemptions; notably the general exemption of 1870, which "exempted church property from any and all taxes."

3. The act exempted "charitable and educational institutions," and the churches claimed to be both charitable and educational. A committee was appointed, consisting of Rev. Drs. Pitzer, But