No. LXI.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Objection that there should be a provision that all elections should

be held within the counties where the electors live-Such a provision
harmless and offers no security-This provision compared with those
of State constitutions-The probability that the power of Congress to
fix a uniform day for elections will be very important-The want of
any provision in the Constitution fixing such a day considered-Con-
cluding remarks on the general subject.

Qualifications of senators-Appointment of senators by State

legislatures-Equality of representation in Senate-Mixed character

of federal government requires a mixed representation-Equal rep-

resentation in Senate a recognition of sovereignty in the States—

The number of senators and the term for which they are elected-

Need of such an upper house as a security against improper legisla-

tion, against the infirmity of faction, against ignorant legislation,

against mutability in its councils from frequent changes of members

-Dangers of such mutability enumerated.

No. LXIII. THE SENATE CONTINUED

Prevents a want of a due sense of national character, of a due

responsibility, and of a defence against temporary errors and delusions

-History shows no long-lived republic without a Senate-Difference

between the ancient republics and the United States-Athens, Car-

thage, Sparta, Rome, Crete-Objection that the Senate will acquire

a dangerous preeminence considered-Such a result impossible-

Senate of Maryland-British Parliament-Sparta, Rome, Carthage-

The controlling influence of the House of Representatives.

No. LXIV. THE POWERS OF THE SENATE

The treaty-making power-Importance of this power-Property

vested in the Senate-A popular body not fit for this power-Reasons

-Objections to this power in the Senate considered, and reasons for

their rejection enumerated-The responsibility of senators.

No. LXV.-THE POWERS OF THE SENATE CONTINUED

The appointment of public officers-The authority to sit as a court in

the trial of impeachments-Difficulty of forming such a court-The

Senate most fit for such a trust-The plan of delegating this authority

to the Supreme Court considered and rejected-The propriety of unit-

ing the Supreme Court in this power with the Senate considered and

denied―The propriety of giving this authority to other persons dis-

connected with any department of the government considered and

denied-Even if this power in the Senate is not desirable the Constitu-

tion should not be rejected.

PAGE

380

384

391

400

407

No. LXVI.

OBJECTIONS TO THE POWER OF THE SEN-

ATE TO SIT AS A COURT FOR IMPEACHMENTS FUR-

THER CONSIDERED

Objection that it unites legislative and judicial functions-This
same provision in constitution of New York which opposition admire
-That it unduly accumulates power in the Senate, and tends to the
establishment of an aristocracy-That the Senate will judge too
leniently officers for whose confirmation it has voted-That the sena-
tors may be called upon to try themselves for a corrupt use of the
treaty-making power.

No. LXVII.-THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Misrepresentations on this point considered and answered.

No. LXVIII.-The Mode oF ELECTING THE PRESIDENT

The only part of the Constitution not condemned by its opponents

-It is well guarded-Desirable to have the sense of the people
in the choice-Desirable that the choice should be made by competent
persons, as in the Electoral College: to avoid tumult and disorder;
to avoid intrigue and corruption; to maintain the President in-
dependent of all but the people-All these advantages here com-
bined-Choice will seldom fall on one not qualified-The choice of a
Vice-President by the people considered and approved.

No. LXIX. THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE

A single person-Compared with the king of Great Britain and the

governor of New York-Elected for four years, and is reëligible—
Further comparison with the same executives-Liable to impeach-
ment, removal from office, and punishment by civil law-Compared
again as above, and also with governors of Maryland and Delaware
-Veto power-Compared again as above, and also with governor of
Massachusetts-Commander-in-chief of militia in federal service-
Compared again as above-Commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States-Compared again as above, and also with
governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts-Pardoning power-
Compared as above-Treaty-making power-Compared as above-
General review and comparison of executive powers.

No. LXX.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FURTHER CON-

SIDERED

A vigorous Executive consistent with republican government-What

constitutes a proper Executive-Unity-Reasons for this-Vesting

executive authority in two or more magistrates-Restraining the

Executive by a council-Objections to plurality and control by coun-

cil enumerated.

PAGE

412

419

423

428

436

PAGE

No. LXXI. THE DURATION IN OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE, 445

It affects his firmness in action-More interest in what is permanent

-The Executive should not be subservient to popular impulses or

to those of the legislature-Independence of departments of govern-

ment necessary-Shortness of term will lessen independence-The

proposed term of four years considered.

No. LXXII.-THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND REËLI-

GIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERED

Duration in office affects stability of administration-Heads of de-

partment dependent on Executive and will change with him-Reëli-

gibility of Executive-The opposition to it considered—A limit of a

single term would diminish inducements to good behavior, increase

temptations to misconduct, prevent experience in the office, deprive

the country in emergencies of the services of the best men, and act as

a constitutional barrier to stability of administration-The supposed

advantages of a single term considered-The people should not be

prevented from choosing men of experience.

No. LXXIII.-THE PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE

EXECUTIVE, AND THE VETO POWER .

Without suitable provision the Executive will be at the mercy of the

legislature, and the independence of the Executive should not be im-

paired-The veto power-Reasons for and against enumerated and

considered-The veto power not absolute-It already exists in New

York and Massachusetts.

No. LXXIV.-THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY AND

NAVAL FORCES, AND THE PARDONING POWER OF

THE EXECUTIVE

No. LXXV.-THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EXECU-

450

456

462

€465

One of the best features of the Constitution-Objection that it

combines the executive and legislative departments considered-It is a

proper combination-Reasons for this-House of Representatives can-

not properly be admitted-Objection to requiring only two thirds of

senators present.

No. LXXVI.

THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE, 471

This an excellent feature-This power cannot be exercised by the
people at large-It will cause a livelier sense of duty in the Executive
-Objection to its being intrusted to the President alone-He may be
overruled by Senate-Concurrence of Senate a check on favoritism-

Objection that the President may thus control Senate considered

-Whole body of Senate cannot be corrupted-Protection of Con-

stitution.

No. LXXVII.-THE APPOINTING POWER CONTINUED AND

OTHER POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE Considered

The concurrence of the Senate necessary to displace as well as to ap-

point-Objections as to undue control of the Senate by the President,

or the reverse, considered—Compared with system of appointment in

New York-Appointing power should be delegated to a council or

shared in by the House-Power to communicate information to Con-

gress; to recommend measures to Congress; to convene one or both

branches of Congress; to adjourn Congress; to receive ambassadors

and other public ministers; to execute the laws of the Union; to

commission all officers of the United States-Concluding remarks on

the Executive.

No. LXXVIII.-THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT .

Mode of appointment-Tenure-Need of complete independence-

Authority pronounced on the constitutionality of the laws-The legis-

lature should be the judge of its own powers-Interpretation of the

laws the peculiar province of the judiciary-Need of independence on

this account-Independence required for judiciary as guardians of the

Constitution and of private rights as well-Wisdom of requiring good

behavior as the tenure.

No. LXXIX. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED

A fixed provision for the support of the judiciary necessary to their
independence Responsibility of the judiciary-Judges liable to im-
peachment-Cannot be made removable for inability-Reasons for
this-Comparison with constitution of New York.

To what cases the judicial authority ought to extend-To all cases

which arise from duly enacted laws of the Union; which concern the

execution of the provisions of the Constitution; in which the United

States is a party; which involve the peace of the Union in foreign

relations, or when two States, or a State and the citizens of another

State, or the citizens of different States, are parties; which originate

on the high seas or are of admiralty jurisdiction; in which State tri-

bunals cannot be supposed to be implicated-To what cases authority

of judiciary will extend under proposed Constitution-Statement of

constitutional provisions-These provisions conform to what the pow-

ers of the judiciary ought to be-Propriety of delegating equity

jurisdiction.

PAGE

476

482

491

494

No. LXXXI. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED, AND THE DIS-

TRIBUTION OF THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Propriety of establishing one court of final and supreme jurisdiction
-Propriety of delegating judicial authority to a distinct department—
Objections to this considered-This delegation of authority secures
more completely the separation of the judiciary from the legislature,
recognizes more fully the principle of good behavior as a tenure,
secures greater legal ability, and removes the judiciary from party
strife. The example of certain of the States-That no legislature can
rectify judicial mistakes except as to future action, and the danger of
encroachments by the judiciary on the legislature, considered-Pro-
priety of constituting inferior courts-Relief to Supreme Court-State
courts not fit for this—Advantage of dividing United States into judi-
cial districts-Manner in which authority should be distributed-
Original jurisdiction of Supreme Court-Original jurisdiction of in-
ferior courts-Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court.

No. LXXXII.-THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED

The jurisdiction of the State courts on federal questions-The State

courts will retain all that is not exclusively delegated—Decision of

causes arising from a particular regulation may be delegated by Con-

gress exclusively to Supreme Court-Relation between State and fed-

eral courts when they have concurrent jurisdiction-An appeal will

lie from State courts to the Supreme Court―The appellate jurisdiction

of the inferior federal courts.

No. LXXXIII. THE JUDICIARY CONTINUED IN RELATION

TO TRIAL BY JURY

Objection that there is no provision in the proposed Constitution
for trial by jury in civil cases considered-True meaning of maxims on
which this objection rests—Importance of right of trial by jury consid-
ered-Criminal and civil cases-Jury system in different States-Diffi-
culty of establishing a general rule-Impropriety of such a general rule
in certain cases-The proposition of Massachusetts-The provisions of
the New York constitution-The proposition that the jury system should
be established in all cases whatever-Concluding remarks.

No. LXXXIV.-CERTAIN GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

OBJECTIONS TO THE

AND ANSWERED

CONSTITUTION

PAGE

501

512

516

CONSIDERED

Bill of rights-Liberty of the press-Seat of government too re-
mote-No provision for debts due to the United States—Additional
expenses of new system-Concluding remarks.