fect in it, 125; the nugatory power
of raising armies, another, 127;
the right of equal suffrage among
the States, another, 128; anti-re-
publican character of the requisi-
tion, in certain cases, of a vote ex-
ceeding a majority, 129; want of
a judiciary power, a crowning de-
fect of the Confederation, 132; the
organization of Congress, another;
perilous tendency of a single legisla-
tive house, 134; want of popular
consent to it, another defect in it,
135; it acknowledges the necessity
of strength in the federal power,
135; impracticable character of
certain provisions under it, 230;
necessary usurpations of Congress
under it, 230; answer to the ques-
tion, on what principle is it to be
superseded, without the unanimous
consent of the parties to it, 275;
articles of (appendix) 555-560.
Congress (see "Constitution,"
"States," Public Debt "): Ex-
tracts from the recommendatory
act of Congress, in February, 1787,
240; power of, under the federal
Constitution, over a district of ter-
ritory not exceeding ten miles
square, 267; its power concerning
territory, etc., belonging to the
United States, 270.

Connecticut: Provision in her Consti-

tution concerning elections, 333;
one branch of her legislature so
constituted that each member of it
is elected by the whole State, 361;
has no constitutional provision for
jury trial, in either criminal or civil
cases, 525.
Consolidation: The plan of the Union
aims only at a partial consolidation,
186; desire of the States to guard
against improper consolidation of
themselves into one simple republic,
386.

Constitution of the United States
(see "Union," "Confederation,"
'Standing Armies," States,"
"House of Representatives,'
"Slaves"): Its economy, 73; an-
swer to an objection drawn from
the extent of the country, 76; its
guaranty to the States of a republi-
can form of government, 191-270;
necessity for strength in the feder-

al government, 135; wisdom of
the provision in the Constitution
concerning the military force, 138,
141, 150, 155, 196, 250; answer to
the objection, that it cannot operate
without the aid of a military force
to execute its laws, 159, 168; rea-
son why the execution of it will
probably be popular, 163; laws
under it, as to the enumerated and
legitimate objects of its jurisdiction,
will be the supreme law of the land,
164-192; number and inconsistency
of the objections to it, 226; most
of the capital objections to it lie
with tenfold weight against the Con-
federation, 229; its conformity to re-
publican principles, 232; analogy
between the mode of appointments
under it, and under the State govern-
ments, 233; neither a national nor a
federal constitution, but a compo-
sition of both, 236, 239; general
view of the powers which it pro-
poses to vest in the Union, 249; the
power of declaring war, 250; the
power of providing a navy, 254; the
power of making treaties, etc., 259;
the power of defining and punish-
ing offences on the high seas, 260;
prohibition of the importation of
slaves after 1808, 261; power of
regulating commerce, 262; powers
to coin money, to punish counter-
feiters, and to regulate weights and
measures, 264; power to establish a
uniform mode of naturalization,
264; power to establish uniform
laws of bankruptcy, 266; power
concerning public acts, records, etc.,
266; power of establishing post-
roads, 266; power of granting copy-
rights, 267; power to exercise ex-
clusive legislation over a district
not exceeding ten miles square, if
ceded to the United States, 267;
power concerning treason, 269
power of admitting new States, 269;
power concerning territory, etc.,
belonging to the United States,
270; obligation to guarantee a re-
publican form of government to
every State of the Union, 270; ob-
ligation concerning public debts
prior to the adoption of the Consti-
tution, 274; provision concerning
amendments, 274; provision con-

cerning the ratification by nine
States, 275; question, what relation
is to exist between the nine or more
ratifying States, and the non-ratify-
ing States? 275; disabilities of the
States created by the Constitution,
277; power given by it to Congress,
to make all laws necessary and
proper for executing its enumerated
powers, 280; four other possible
alternatives, which the Constitution
might have adopted, 281; provision
that the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States shall
be the supreme law of the land,
.283; oath, etc., of officers, etc., to
support the Constitution, 284;
consists much less in the addition
of new powers to the Union, than
in the invigoration of its original
powers, 291; its provisions concern-
ing the proper degree of separation
between the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, 299; peculiar
division under it, of the power sur-
rendered by the people, 308, 314,
322; its mode of protecting the
minority from usurpations by the
majority, 325; three characteristics
of the federal legislature, 332; an-
swer to the objection that it con-
tains no bill of rights, 533 et seq.;
in the sense, and to the extent con-
tended for, bills of rights are un-
necessary and would be dangerous
to the Constitution, 537; omission
of a provision concerning the lib-
erty of the press defended, 537; the
Constitution itself is a bill of rights,
538; answer to an objection to the
Constitution, founded on the re-
moteness of the seat of government
from many of the States. 539, 540;
answer to the objection that it wants
a provision concerning debts due to
the United States, 541; answer to
the objection as to expense, 541;
Federal Constitution as agreed upon
by the Convention (appendix), 561-
570; signers, 569; amendments,
572-575.

Construction, two rules of, 241.
Contracts: Laws in violation of pri-
vate contracts a source of collision
between the separate States or Con-
federacies, 38; provision of the
Constitution concerning them, 279,

Convention at Philadelphia in 1787,
10 et seq.; the difficulties it must
have experienced in the formation
of a proper plan, 216 et seq.; one
difficulty, that of combining the
requisite degree of stability and en-
ergy in government with the invio-
lable attention due to liberty and
the republican form, 217; another,
making the partition between the
authority of the general govern-
ment and that of the State govern-
ments, 218; its authority to propose
a mixed Constitution, 239; its duties
under existing circumstances, 245;
its plan only recommendatory, 247;
one particular in which it has de-
parted from the tenor of its com-
mission, 244; members of (appen-
dix), 571.

Conventions for correcting breaches
of a Constitution, 318; dangers and
inconveniences of frequent appeals
to the people, 321.
Copyrights: Power of the Constitution
concerning them, 267.
Crete, Cosmi of, 396.

Delaware (see "States"): Provision
in her constitution concerning the
separation of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary powers, 305;
number of representatives in the
more numerous branch of her legis-
lature, 345.

Democracy: A pure one defined, 56;
its disadvantages, 56.
Departments of Power (see "States,"
under their several titles): Meaning
of the maxim which requires a sepa-
ration of them, 279, 307; principles
of the British Constitution on this
subject, 300, 301; provisions of the
State constitutions concerning it,
302, 307; the partition among them
to be maintained, not by exterior
provisions, but by the interior struct-
ure of the government, 322.
District: Exclusive legislation of
Congress over one not exceeding
ten miles square, 267.

Economy: "The money saved from
one object may be usefully applied
to another," 73.

Elections: Frequency of them in the
choice of the Senate would be in-

Georgia Provision in her constitu-
tion, concerning the separation of
the legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary powers, 307; number of rep-
resentatives in the more numerous
branch of her legislature, 345.
Germanic Empire: Its origin, consti-
tution, and disadvantages, 109.
Gold and Silver: Principle on which
the States are inhibited to make
any thing else a tender in payment
of debts, 277.
Government (see "Minorities "): A
government, the constitution of
which renders it unfit to be en-
trusted with all the powers which a
free people ought to delegate to
any government, would be an un-
safe and improper depositary of the
national interests, 139; the danger
of fettering it with restrictions which
cannot be observed, 152; examples
among the States of impracticable
restrictions, 153; remarkable fea-
ture of every government reported
by ancient history which was estab-
lished by deliberation and consent,
223; the reason of it, 224; ought
to control the passions, and to be
controlled by the reason of the pub-
lic, 309, 315, 323; the greatest of
all reflections on human nature, 323;

wise kings will always be served by
able ministers,.,or; the true test of
a good government is its aptitude
and tendency to produce a good ad-
ministration, 427; definition of a
limited constitution, 484; the gen-
eral genius of a government is all
that can be substantially relied on
for permanent effects, 532.
Great Britain (see Standing Ar-
mies") Her government, 233;
the House of Commons, 329, 354,
360; the House of Lords, 408;
why the king's power of an absolute
negative on bills has been long dis-
used, 429; Constitution of Great
Britain, concerning a separation of
the departments of power, 300.
Grotius Cited, 116, 541.

High Seas: The power under the
Constitution of defining and punish-
ing offences on them, 260.
Holland: Not a republic, 233.
House of Representatives see "Con-
stitution,' "Treaties "): Qualifica-
tions of the electors and the elected,
327; term of a member's service,
329, 333, 339; biennial elections
defended, 335, 338; argument in
their favor derived from the time
they afford a representative for
acquiring the requisite information,
335, 337. 345; the ratio of repre-
sentation, 339, 344; its proposed
number of members defended, 345,
355; provision of the Constitution
concerning the ineligibility of its
members under certain circum-
stances, to civil offices, 350; im-
puted tendency of the plan for the
House of Representatives, to elevate
the few above the many, 356; pro-
vision for the future augmentation
of its members considered, 362;
economy consulted by the provision
for its temporary number, 366;
dangers of a multitudinous repre-
sentative assembly, 365; maxim as
to the proper number of representa-
tives, 367; why more than a major-
ity ought not to be required for a
quorum, 367; provision for regu-
lating elections to it, 368; less
likely than local legislatures to be
partial to particular interests, 375;
advantage of uniformity in the time

of elections, 383; why it ought to
have no power in the formation of
treaties, 469; why it ought to have
no power in the appointment of
federal officers, 480.

Human Nature: Its fair side, 350;

A power over a man's support is a
power over his will, 456, 491.
Hume, David: Citation from his
essays, 551.

Impeachments (see "Senate," "Judi-
ciary," "States," under their several
titles).

Indians: Difficulties concerning them
when residing within a State, 262.
Innovation: Its dangers exaggerated,
some of its beneficial results, 81.
Ireland, Elections in, 330.

Jefferson, Thomas: Cited to show the
evils in the constitution of Virginia,
arising from the want of a barrier
between the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, 310; his
draft of a Constitution cited, 313;
his idea of a convention for correct-
ing breaches of it, 314; defects of
this plan, 314-18.
Jenkinson, Charles: His remarks in-
troductory to his bill for regulating
the commerce between Great Britain
and the United States, 126.
Judiciary (see "Jury Trial "): Want
of, 132; objections to constituting
the Supreme Court a tribunal, either
singly or jointly with the Senate,
for trying impeachments, 409 et seq.;
mode of appointing the Judges,
their tenure of office during good
behavior, 482-494; the weakest
of the three departments of power,
484; vindication of its power
to pronounce legislative acts void,
because contrary to the Con-
stitution, 485; the independence
of the judges essential, and why,
487; peculiar advantages of the
provision in the Constitution for
their support, 492; precautions for
their responsibility, 492; omission
of a provision for removing them on
account of inability, defended, 493;
six classes of cases, to which the
judicial power of the federal
government ought to extend, 494
et seq.; these classes of cases com-

pared with the particular powers
given by the Constitution to
the judiciary, 498; distribution of
authority in the judicial depart-
ment, 501; statement of objections
to the Supreme Court having un-
divided power of final jurisdiction,
501; these objections answered,
502; the power in Congress of con-
stituting inferior courts considered,
505; why the objects of these courts
would not be accomplished by the
instrumentality of the State courts,
506; the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court confined to two
classes of causes, 507, 509; whether
the Supreme Court ought to have
appellate jurisdiction as to matters
of fact, 509, 512; such jurisdiction
does not abolish trial by jury, 512;
summary view of the authority of
the Supreme Court, 512; whether
the State courts are to have con-
current jurisdiction in regard to
causes submitted to the federal
jurisdiction, 512; in instances of
concurrent jurisdiction between the
national and State courts an appeal
would lie from the State courts to the
Supreme Court of the United States,
514; whether an appeal would lie
from the State courts to subordi-
nate federal judicatories, 515.
Jurisdiction: Literal meaning of the
word noticed, 510, note.
Jury Trial: Answer to the objection
that the Constitution contains no
provision for the trial by jury in
civil cases, 516 et seq.; in no case
abolished by the Constitution, 518,
520; examination of the remark
that trial by jury is a safeguard
against an oppressive exercise of the
power of taxation, 521; the strong-
est argument in its favor, in civil
cases, is, that it is a security against
corruption, 522; difference be-
tween the limits of the jury trial
in the different States of the Union,
523; ineligible in many cases, 526;
proposition concerning it made by
the minority of Pennsylvania, 525;
proposition from Massachusetts,
528.

Legislation: Evils of a mutable, 389
et seq.

Legislature: Danger of its usurpa-
tions in a representative republic,
308, 313. 316.

Louis XIV., Anecdote of, 16.
Lycian Confederacy, 52, 92, 287.
Lycurgus, 223.

Mably, Abbé de.

On a confederate
republic, 32; on Achæan League,
106; on United Netherlands, 118.
Maintenon, Madame de, 28.
Marlborough, John, Duke of, 31;
Sarah, Duchess of, 28.
Maryland, 128; provision in her con-
stitution concerning the separation
of the legislative, executive, and
judiciary power, 306; concerning
her Senate, 398.

Massachusetts: Insurrections and re-
bellions in Massachusetts, 32, 121;
provision in her constitution, con-
cerning the separation of the legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary
powers, 303; number of represen-
tatives in the more numerous branch
of her legislature, 345; size of her
senatorial districts compared with
that of the districts proposed by the
convention. 361; provision concern-
ing impeachments, 414. note,

proposition from, in regard to jury
trial, 528.

Maxims: Certain maxims in geometry,
ethics, and politics, carrying inter-
nal evidence, 180.

Military Force (see "Constitution,"
Standing Armies ").

Militia: Its disadvantages and merits,
150; power of regulating it, 168.
Minorities: Two modes of protecting
them from usurpations by majorities,
325 et seq.; to give a minority a
negative upon a majority which is
always the case where more than a
majority is requisite to a decision,
is, in its tendency, to subject the
sense of the greater number to that
of the lesser, 129.
Minos, 223.

Mississippi, Navigation of the, 18, 64.
Money Power, under the Constitu-

tion, of coining it, 264, 277.
Montesquieu Refutation of the er-
roneous opinion that he considered
the republican polity unsuited to a
large extent of country, and his
praise of a confederate republic, 47,

48, 51, 270, 274; true extent of his
doctrine, requiring a separation of
the legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary powers, 300, 302; his remarks
concerning the judiciary, 484, note.

Naturalization: Provision of the Con-
stitution concerning it, 264.
Navigation of the lakes, 64.
Navy Practicability of creating a
federal navy, 65; its advantages,
67; the Southern States the nursery
of wood, and the Northern of men,
for ships, 65; importance of estab-
lishing a navy as early as possible,
146; power in the federal Consti-
tution of erecting one, 254.

Negative on bills (see "Great Britain,"
President")

Netherlands: Their government, 115;
an evil attending the constitution
of the States-General, 469.
New Hampshire: Provision in her
constitution, concerning the separa-
tion of the legislative, executive,
and judiciary powers, 303; the size
of her senatorial districts, compared
with the size of the districts pro-
posed by the convention, 361;
provision concerning impeachment,
414. note.

New Jersey: Provision in her Consti-
tution, concerning the separation of
the legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary powers, 305; concerning im-
peachments, 414; her provisions con-
cerning the unity of the Executive
and a council of appointment, 438.
New York: Her controversy with the
district of Vermont, 35; alleged
excellence of her constitution, 144,
154; provision in her constitution,
concerning the separation of the
legislative, executive, and judiciary
powers, 304; number of repre-
sentatives in the more numerous
branch of her legislature, 345; size
of her senatorial districts compared
with that of the districts proposed
by the convention, 361; her con-
stitution makes no provision con-
cerning the locality of elections,
381; provision concerning impeach-
ments, 413; provision concerning
the unity of her Executive, 438 and
note; where, by her constitution,
the qualified power of negativing