1812] British Defeat at New Orleans 337 that the British prosecuted the war but feebly during the years 1812 and 1813. 241. Campaigns of 1812-14. -The invasion of Canada Invasion of was begun with an ignorance and contempt of the necessi- Canada, ties of the campaign that augured ill for success. It ended Winsor's 1812-13. 387-392; in failure (1812). On the other hand, the victory of the America, Americans under Commodore Oliver H. Perry, on Lake VII, 382-385. Erie (1813), made impossible an English occupation of Maclay's American territory, and left the combatants practically Navy, 1, where they were at the outbreak of hostilities. 492-520. British invasion, 1814. Winsor's VII, 393 400; United States, II, 397. 446. The campaign of 1814 was much more vigorously man- Failure of aged by both combatants. On the American side abler men came to the front. One of them was Jacob Brown, a New York militia general, who had been bred a Quaker, as had Nathanael Greene. He had never seen service in the field, but possessed energy and courage; and he was ably assisted by his subordinates, Winfield Scott and Eleazer Schouler's Ripley. He accomplished nothing in the way of conquest, but repelled all attempts at invasion in his part of the field. Indeed, one of the battles of his campaign, Lundy's Lane, where a small body of Americans withstood the onslaught of a body of British veterans, was a most creditable affair, especially as it occurred in the darkness, which is peculiarly Winsor's trying to soldiers who have not had years of experience. America, The British undertook a counter invasion of the United States by way of Lake Champlain; but McDonough's victory gave the control of the lake to the Americans, and the British retired to Canada (1814). The summer that saw this victory witnessed also the disgraceful flight of the Americans from Bladensburg, and the unjustifiable burning of the public buildings at Washington by the British under General Ross and Admiral Cochrane. A subsequent attack on Baltimore was gallantly repelled by its American defenders, with considerable loss to the assailants. 242. The British Defeat at New Orleans, 1814, 1815. By this time it had become evident that British success in VII, 396; Maclay's Navy, II, 27-39. Burning of Washington, 1814. Winsor's America, New Orleans, 457, 485-491. New The navy. Winsor's America, VII, 378; Roosevelt's Naval War of 1812; Maclay's Navy, I, 317-575, II, 1-82. the interior of the North was uncertain until the control either of the Great Lakes or of Lake Champlain was in their hands. The capture of New Orleans offered the best chance of permanent conquest: it was within reach of the sea, was far removed from the thickly settled part of the United States; and its possession would give the British important and far-reaching influence in the whole Mississippi valley. Pakenham, one of Wellington's Peninsular commanders, was given a formidable body of troops and ordered to attempt its capture; with him co-operated a large naval force. The command of the defense of the lower Mississippi and neighboring regions was confided to Andrew Jackson of Tennessee. At first he seems to have misjudged Pakenham's purpose, and delayed preparations for defense until it was almost too late. At last, when he was convinced that the British general designed to seize New Orleans, he made every possible preparation to repel the attack; in this he was greatly aided by the peculiarities of the country around New Orleans, which will be described when we reach Farragut's capture of that city (p. 503). Pakenham attacked vigorously, though with small military skill; he was repulsed with great loss to his army. The last assault on the defenses of New Orleans was made on January 8, 1815, two weeks after the signing of the treaty of peace at Ghent. A month later (February 11, 1815), the British captured an American fort on Mobile Bay, their only success during this arduous campaign. 243. The War on the Sea, 1812-15. - On the land, where their numbers gave them an advantage, the Americans were on the whole unsuccessful; on the water, where their guns were outnumbered one hundred to one, they won successes which still render the War of 1812 memorable in naval annals. At the beginning of the conflict, the British navy comprised over one thousand vessels, of which two hundred were line of battle ships of two or three decks; there was not even one two-decker in the United States navy. 1812] The War on the Sea 339 Moreover, the American vessels were not merely inferior in size to the British, there were very few of them, seventeen vessels in all. Three of them, the United States, Constitution, and President, were large, heavy frigates rated as "forty-fours," and there were also four smaller frigates and several sloops of war and brigs. conflicts. America, 386. The government deemed it unwise to send these vessels Naval to sea to be captured by the fleets of Great Britain, and decided to use them as guard ships at the principal ports. A difficulty at once presented itself, however, for the vessels were not in the ports designed for them; and it was necessary to send them to sea to enable them to perform even this limited duty. Among the first to leave port was the Constitution, commanded by Captain Hull. On her way from the Chesapeake to New York harbor, her designated place of duty, she was sighted by a British squadron of five ships and chased from July 17 to July 20. In the end, Hull saved his ship and found refuge at Boston. Sailing thence, with no new orders, he cruised about for two weeks, until August 19, when he sighted the British frigate Guerrière in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The combat which followed has been made the subject of so much apology on the part of British writers that it is well to bear in mind the comparative size of the two ships. Mr. Henry Adams thus states the facts in his authoritative History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison. The American frigate was one hundred and seventy-three feet long and forty-four feet wide; she carried thirty-two "long 24's" and twenty "32 lb." carronades, or fifty-two guns in all. Her sides were very solid for a ship of her class, but notwithstanding the extra weight she was very fast. The Guerrière was one hundred and fiftysix feet long and forty feet wide; she carried thirty "long 18's," two "long 12's," and sixteen "32 lb." carronades, or forty-eight guns in all. She was not so strongly built as her opponent, nor so fast, and she threw a much lighter broadside. Both Captain Hull of the Constitution and Effects of these victo ries. Captain Dacres of the Guerrière were skillful, brave men, and the crews of both ships were well trained, although the Guerrière's crew had been longer together. In thirty minutes after the first gun was fired, the British frigate lay helpless on the water, with seventy-nine of her crew killed or wounded. The Constitution, on the other hand, suffered trifling loss or damage, and was ready for another combat. On October 17 the American sloop of war Wasp met the British brig Frolic. The Wasp threw a lighter broadside than the Frolic, and, although rigged as a ship, was only six feet longer. In forty-three minutes after the beginning of the combat, the Frolic was a wreck, with ninety of her crew of one hundred and ten killed and wounded. In both cases the result was due to the superior practice of the American gunners and to the fact that the charges of powder used by the British were less than those used by the Americans for guns of the same caliber. It is said that shot from the Guerrière rebounded harmlessly from the sides of the Constitution, and the guns of the Frolic, more than equal in weight to those of the Wasp, produced, comparatively speaking, no impression on her antagonist. For a The effect of these victories was tremendous. century and a half the British had enjoyed undisputed supremacy on the ocean; ship for ship, they had encountered the navies of France and Spain, and had been almost uniformly successful. Instead of seeking the true cause for these defeats, in the light armaments of their vessels and in the character of their impressed crews, the British public magnified the Constitution into a "line of battle ship in disguise," and suggested that in future it would be best for British frigates to sail in company. There were many other naval actions during the contest which are described at length in the histories of the war and need not be mentioned here. As the conflict progressed, the blockade of the American ports became closer and closer; few of the national vessels gained the open sea, and those that did were gradually captured. In the later years, the privateers 1814] The Privateers 341 almost alone displayed the flag of the United States on the ocean. commerce destroyers. 244. The Privateers. Mr. Henry Adams has suggested The that it would have been better policy for the United States to have used the national vessels to destroy the merchant vessels of England. Men-of-war capturing British merchantmen would have destroyed them; the privateers, whose interest was to make money from the sale of prizes, sent them home, and about one half were recaptured. As it was, the privateersmen dealt a terrible blow to Britain's commerce. In the course of the war they captured more than two thousand five hundred British vessels, some of them within sight of the coast of England. Rates of insurance on British vessels rose to almost prohibitory figures, even for the shortest voyages. English merchants and shipowners whose self-seeking had largely contributed to bring on the war, now besought the government to conclude peace; to this end McDonough's victory on Lake Champlain powerfully contributed. 245. Negotiations for Peace, 1812-14. From an inter- Mistaken policy of national point of view, the War of 1812 was a terrible mis- England. fortune. Great Britain was then engaged in a deadly struggle with the military despotism that threatened to overwhelm popular freedom wherever it existed in the world. No doubt Napoleon had dealt a beneficial blow to feudal institutions, but he had already done all the good that he was likely to do in that way. In 1812 the cause of humanity and civilization demanded his overthrow. True policy dictated the alliance of Great Britain and the United States to destroy the master despot of the age. Instead of joining together against the common enemy, they came to blows, but this was the fault of Britain's rulers, not of the American people. Winsor's Four days after the declaration of war against Great The Czar Britain, Napoleon and the Czar renewed their former intervenes. enmity, because Russia would no longer close the Baltic ports to neutral commerce. The Czar at once offered to mediate between Great Britain and the United States, whose America, VII, 483. |