Cornwallis VI, 496-500; The accomplished by Greene with a handful of trained soldiers of the Continental Line and large bodies of militia. leading events of these campaigns in the southernmost colonies were Clinton's attack on Charleston (1776), the capture of Savannah (1779), the capture of Charleston (1780), Gates's defeat at Camden (1780), the battle of King's Mountain (1780), Morgan's remarkable defeat of Tarleton at the Cowpens (1781), the battle of Guilford Court House (1781), Hobkirk's Hill (1781), the siege of Ninety-six (1781), and the battle of Eutaw Springs (1781). 157. The Yorktown Campaign, 1781. After the battle of Guilford Court House, Lord Cornwallis appears to have come to the conclusion that the permanent conquest of the Carolinas was impossible as long as Virginia was in the hands of the Americans and able to send men and supplies to the Southern armies. He may also have regarded the continuous occupation of the Carolinas as impracticable with 'the means at his disposal and may have marched northward to be within easier reach of reinforcements from New York. At all events, he marched northward to Virginia from Wilmington, whither he had repaired after his unavailing contest with Greene. In Virginia he found a small British force under Phillips and Arnold; the former died almost immediately, the latter he sent to New York. Lafayette was also in Virginia with a small but highly efficient body of men, one of the divisions of Light Infantry of the Continental Line. He had originally been ordered to that region in the hope of entrapping Arnold; now, he and Cornwallis marched up and down Virginia until Cornwallis went into quarters at Portsmouth for the summer; later, he removed his army to Yorktown, in obedience, as he supposed, to the orders of Clinton. Up to this time, the co-operation with France had produced slight effect upon the contest beyond diverting the attention of the British from America, and securing the evacuation of Philadelphia. A French force under Rochambeau had reached America in the summer of 1780, but 1781] Yorktown Campaign Yorktown, America, 199 it had been neutralized by the necessity of remaining at Siege and Newport, the place of debarkation, to protect the vessels capture of which brought it over from a British fleet that had immedi- 1781. ately blockaded them. In the summer of 1781, De Grasse, Winsor's the commander of the French fleet in the West Indies, sent VI, 500-507; word that he would sail northward during the hurricane Fiske's season and reach the Chesapeake in September; his stay Revolution, II, 273-290. would be limited to a few weeks, and he hoped that something substantial might be accomplished; he refused to try to cross the bar off New York, and added that he would bring a division of the French army from the West Indies. Washington had long desired to capture New York, but De Grasse's refusal to attempt the entrance of the harbor forbade that; on the other hand, Cornwallis had placed himself in such a situation that his capture would be nearly certain with the overwhelming force at Washington's disposal, should all go well. Everything worked for the American cause: Rodney, the British admiral in the West Indies, on bad terms with Clinton and interested in the plunder of St. Eustatius, instead of following De Grasse, sent a division of his fleet; the French army at Newport joined Washington at New York, and the march was so well managed that Clinton believed the threatened siege of New York to be actually begun, when in reality the allies were crossing the Delaware on their way southward. De Grasse reached the Chesapeake at the appointed time, fought an action with the British fleet which compelled the latter's return to New York, and again entered the Chesapeake, to find the French vessels which had escaped from Newport safely riding at anchor. Besieged by more than twice his own numbers, and cut off from succor from New York, Cornwallis, after a gallant defense, surrendered on October 19, 1781. This royal disaster closed military operations on the continent. 158. Naval Warfare. - An eminent writer has stated that as many Americans were engaged in fighting for their country's independence on the water as on the land. The The war on VI, ch. vii; Revolution, II, ch. xii; Difficulty in Fiske's Period, 101- authority for this statement is not altogether clear; but it is certain that the part played by American seamen in the conflict has been too little studied and appreciated by our historical writers. The navies of the separate states and of the United States performed many most important services in the cause of liberty; but where so much obscurity exists, it is difficult to mention the names of particular individuals without doing injustice to other less well-known but equally deserving sea fighters. Among those whose exploits are recorded with tolerable certainty are Manly, of the Massachusetts navy, Wickes, who first carried the national flag across the Atlantic, Paul Jones, who captured the British ship Serapis after a most gallant fight, Commodore Hopkins, and Commodore Tucker. More important than the achievements of these men of the regular navies, were those of the privateers, who pursued their hazardous calling with great success, and materially affected the rates of insurance on British merchant vessels. 159. Congress and the Army, 1775-82. From the outset there was always great difficulty in securing the requisite number of soldiers and in keeping up a disciplined force: the people were usually ready to turn out for a few weeks at a time; but enlistments for a term of years were hard to obtain, and the new recruits were undisciplined and not to be relied upon in action. One army had been disbanded and another formed while the siege of Boston was in prog Washington was most inadequately supplied with soldiers during the campaign of 1776; but in the closing months of that year Congress reluctantly authorized the formation of a permanent force,- the Continental Line. It most unwisely left the recruiting of the soldiers, and even the appointment of the regimental officers, to the several states. The inevitable result was that the quotas of some states were never filled, and many of the officers were most inefficient, were not "fit to be shoeblacks," to use Washington's own words. Once organized and drilled, the soldiers of the Line became a splendid force, 1782] Congress and the Army 201 able to encounter successfully their own number of the veterans of Great Britain or of Germany. Then began an arduous struggle to see that justice was done to them. The people entertained an unreasonable jealousy of Dislike of a a permanent military force, and the feeling found full regular army. representation in Congress. Washington protested against it with all the arguments suggested to him by the necessities of the situation. "In other countries," he wrote at the soldiers. fered every hardship, were half-starved for long periods Hardships of of time, were ill provided with clothing, and were always inadequately paid, sometimes not paid at all for months. The officers' expenses constantly exceeded their incomes, and their families at home were left in great destitution. At one time they threatened to resign in a body, at another the soldiers broke out into open mutiny. Washington exerted his influence to the utmost and secured from Congress a bounty for the soldiers in the shape of grants of land, and for the officers half pay for life to those who should serve until the close of the war. But the first Congress under the Articles of Confederation annulled these votes upon the unworthy pretext that nine states had not assented to the vote, as the Articles demanded, but only a majority, as had been sufficient under the rules of the Old Congress. The officers then offered to compromise for full pay for seven years. As the conclusion of the war drew near, the anxieties of the soldiers increased; Proposition to make Washington king. for they knew that when once disbanded they would be in no position to enforce their reasonable demands. 160. The Newburg Addresses, 1783. — In this condition of uncertainty, the soldiers turned to Washington, and some of the more unstable among them talked of making him Stedman and king. This proposition was actually suggested to him; he Hutchinson, III, 152. Newburg spurned it in a manner which has separated him from all other successful leaders in civil strife since the days of the Roman republic. "No occurrence," he said, "in the course of the war has given me more painful sensations than your information of there being such ideas existing in the army, as you have expressed, and I must view with abhorrence and reprehend with severity." The officers' and soldiers' pay was now years in arrears; in March, 1783, the matter came to a head. While Fiske's Criti- the army was encamped at Newburg on the Hudson, an cal Period, 1783. 106-112. address was published anonymously, calling a meeting of officers to consider the best means to press their claims on the attention of Congress. It was written in inflammatory language, advising, among other things, that the army should not disband on the conclusion of peace unless their grievances were in the meantime redressed. Fortunately, Washington was at hand. With his customary tact, he summoned a meeting himself. Addressing the assembled officers in the most sympathetic language, he procured the abandonment of the proposed mode of action, and then he used his influence to the utmost to secure justice for those who so fully trusted him. This he was able to do with the greater effect, because he himself had steadfastly refused to receive any remuneration for his services beyond the payment of his necessary expenses. Congress voted full pay for five years in such obligations of the government as other creditors received; how much this really amounted to is not known. The hardships of the soldiers and the insufficiency of the means placed in Washington's hands for carrying on the conflict, were due in great measure to the poverty of Congress. |