ship of the opposite party, or upon the subject-matter of the controversy. The equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is the same in all the states, and depends upon the principles of general equity jurisprudence. It cannot, therefore, be affected by any local statute, or any local legal remedy, unless such remedy has been adopted for the courts of the United States by virtue of some Act of Congress. It has accordingly been held that the equity jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, to maintain a bill for the redemption of mortgaged premises, is not ousted by the existence of a local statute remedy at law; that it is not ousted of a suit in favor of legatees or distributees for their portions of the estate of a deceased, by the existence of a local remedy at law on the administration bond; and that a bill in equity may be maintained in the Circuit Court against the debtor of the plaintiff's debtor, notwithstanding a local statute gives a peculiar remedy to a creditor against the debtor of his debtor.3

§ 28. The test to be applied, therefore, to determine, whether a particular case falls within the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, is, whether there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law in the same courts.“

1 Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sumner, 401.

2 Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95.

United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108. As to foreign creditors of deceased persons suing in the courts of the United States, see Williams v. Benedict, 8 Howard, 107.

Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheaton, 212, 221. In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States, said: "By the laws of the United States, the Circuit Courts have cognizance of all suits of a civil nature at common law and in equity, in cases which fall within the limits prescribed by those laws. By the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is provided, that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply. The act of May, 1792, confirms the mode of proceeding in suits at common law in the courts of the United States, and declares that the modes of pro

§ 29. That the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is the same in all the states, and that it is not affected by the existence or non-existence of an equity jurisdiction in the state tribunals, has been settled by a series of interesting decisions, which will be examined in a subsequent part of this work.1

ceeding in suits of equity shall be, according to the principles, rules, and usages, which belong to courts of equity, as contradistinguished from courts of common law," except so far as may have been provided for by the act to establish the judicial courts of the United States. It is material to consider whether it was the intention of Congress, by these provisions, to confine the courts of the United States in their mode of administering relief to the same remedies, and those only, with all their incidents, which existed in the courts of the respective states. In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party relief in equity only, when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and complete remedy could not be had at law. In some states in the Union, no court of chancery exists to administer equitable relief. In some of those states, courts of law recognise and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would recognise and enforce; in others all relief is denied, and such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as mere nuliities at law.

"A construction, therefore, that would adopt the state practice in all its extent, would at once extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equi table jurisdiction. The Acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction would confound them. The court, therefore, thinks, that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles. Consistently with this construction, it may be admitted, that where by the statutes of a state, a title which would otherwise be deemed merely equitable, is recognised as a legal title, or a title which would be good at law is under circumstances of an equitable nature declared by such statutes to be void, the rights of the parties, in such case, may be as fully considered in a suit at law in the courts of the United States, as they would be in any state court."

1 These cases are Livingston v. Story, 9 Peters, 632, 655, S. C. 13 Peters, 359, 368; Ex parte Poultney v. The City of Lafayette, 12 Peters, 472, 474; Ex parte Whitney, 13 Peters, 404; Gains v. Relf, 15 Peters, 9; Gains v. Chew, 2 Howard, 619.

§ 30. The equity jurisdiction of a court of the United States sitting in a particular district is not affected by the circumstance that lands, situated in another district, will be affected by the decree, unless the question is a naked question of title. A suit in equity by one who has the prior equity against one who has obtained the legal with notice of the equitable title, is in its nature local, and if it be a mere question of title, must be tried in the district where the land lies. But where the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in consequence of contract, or as trustee, or as the holder of a legal title acquired by any species of fraud, a court of equity has jurisdiction wherever the defendant may be found.1

1 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 157. In this case, Mr. Ch. Justice Marshall, said: "This suit having been originally instituted, in the court of Kentucky, for the purpose of obtaining a conveyance for lands lying in the state of Ohio, an objection is made by the plaintiff in error, who was the defendant below, to the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree was rendered. Taking into view the character of the suit in chancery, brought to establish a prior title originating under the land law of Virginia against a person claiming under a senior patent, considering it as a substitute for a caveat introduced by the peculiar circumstances attending those titles, this court is of opinion, that there is much reason for considering it as a local action, and for confining it to the court sitting within the state in which the lands lie.

"Was this cause, therefore, to be considered as involving a naked question of title; was it, for example, a contest between Watts and Powell, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Kentucky would not be sustained. But where the question changes its character; where the defendant in the original action is liable to the plaintiff, either in consequence of contract, or as trustee, or as the holder of a legal title acquired by any species of mala fides practised on the plaintiff, the principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the person may be found, and the circumstance, that a question of title may be involved in the inquiry, and may even constitute the essential point on which the case depends, does not seem sufficient to arrest that jurisdiction.

"In the celebrated case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, the Chancellor of England decreed a specific performance of a contract respecting lands lying in North America. The objection to the jurisdiction of the court, in that case, as reported by Vezey, was not that the lands lay without the jurisdiction of the court, but that, in cases relating to boundaries between provinces, the jurisdiction was exclusively in the king and council. It is in reference to this objection, not to an objection that the

§ 30 a. The topics touched upon in this chapter, relating to the jurisprudence to be administered by the courts of the

lands were without his jurisdiction, that the Chancellor says: "This court, therefore, has no original jurisdiction on the direct question of the original boundaries.' The reason why it had no original jurisdiction on this direct question was, that the decision on the extent of those grants, including dominion and political power, as well as property, was exclusively reserved to the king in council.

"In a subsequent part of the opinion, where he treats of the objection to the jurisdiction of the court, arising from its inability to enforce its decree in rem, he allows no weight to that argument. The strict primary decree of a court of equity is, he says, in personam, and may be enforced in all cases where the person is within its jurisdiction. In confirmation of this position, he cites the practice of the courts to decree respecting lands lying in Ireland and in the colonies, if the person, against whom the decree was prayed, be found in England. In the case of Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vernon, 75, the defendant, residing in England, having fraudulently obtained a rent-charge on lands lying in Ireland, a bill was brought in England to set it aside. To an objection made to the jurisdiction of the court, the Chancellor replied: "This is surely only a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the common lawyers; for when you go about to bind the lands, and grant a sequestration to execute a decree, then they readily tell you that the authority of this court is only to regulate a man's conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that is court must agree in personam only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud, they tell you that you must not intermeddle here, because the fraud, though committed here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local, and so wholly elude the jurisdiction of this court.' The Chancellor, in that case, sustained his jurisdiction on principle, and on the authority of Archer and Preston, in which case a contract made respecting lands in Ireland, the title to which depended on the Act of Settlement, was enforced in England, although the defendant was a resident of Ireland, and had only made a casual visit to England. On a rehearing before Lord Keeper North, this decree was affirmed.

"In the case of the Earl of Kildare v. Sir Morrice Eustace and Fitzgerald, 1 Vern. 419, it was determined that if the trustee live in England, the Chancellor may enforce the trust, although the lands lie in Ireland.

"In the case of Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494, a bill was sustained for the foreclosure of a mortgage of lands lying out of the jurisdiction of the court, the person of the mortgagor being within it.

"Subsequent to these decisions was the case of Penn against Lord Baltimore, 1 Vern. 444, in which the specific performance of a contract for lands lying in North America was decreed in England.

United States, present questions of great difficulty and importance, to some of which we may recur hereafter. At present, we can only remark, that as to the common law,the 34th section of the Judiciary Act having provided that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, where they apply, the common and statute law of the several states is adopted as a rule of decision in civil cases. As to the equity and admiralty systems of law, the question is, whether, since the Constitution confers equity and admiralty jurisdiction, those systems of jurisprudence are not to be considered as parts of the law of the United States, by adoption. The courts of the United States are to administer the equity law in each state, not because the state has such a system, but because the system of equity is, by adoption through the Constitution, made part of the law which the judicial power is to administer. This system is to be administered, not in conflict with, but supplementary to the common and statute law of the several states; as in England, or in the equity courts of the states having a chancery jurisdiction, it is administered supplementary to the common and statute law. Still, notwithstanding this limitation, and perhaps consistently with it, the very difficult question may arise, how far the common or statute law of a state may avail, to abrogate, change, or affect the principles of equity jurisprudence, as they are known and applied in that system, which became by adoption part of the law of the United States, to be administered in the federal courts.

"Upon the authority of these cases, and of others which are to be found in the books, as well as upon general principles, this court is of opinion that, in a case of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is sustainable wherever the person may be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree. The inquiry, therefore, will be, whether this be an unmixed question of title, or a case of fraud, trust, or contract." 1 U. S. v. Reid, 12 Howard, 361.