and which lies at the foundation of the cause, is, has this legal entity a right to sue? Has it a right to come, not into this court particularly, but into any court? This depends on a law of the United States. The next question is, has this being a right to make this particular contract? If this question be decided in the negative, the cause is determined against the plaintiff, and this question, too, depends entirely on a law of the United States. These are important questions, and they exist in every possible case. The right to sue, if decided once, is decided for ever; but the power of Congress was exercised antecedently to the first decision on that right, and if it was constitutional then, it cannot cease to be so, because the particular question is decided. It may be revived at the will of the party, and most probably would be renewed, were the tribunal to be changed. But the question respecting the right to make a particular contract, or to acquire a particular property, or to sue on account of a particular injury, belongs to every particular case, and may be renewed in every case. The question forms an original ingredient in every cause. Whether it be relied on or not, in the defence, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on. The right of the plaintiff to sue, cannot depend on the defence which the defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must depend on the state of things when the action is brought. The question which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not.

"The appellants say, that the case arises on the contract; but the validity of the contract depends on a law of the United States, and the plaintiff is compelled in every case to show its validity. The case arises emphatically under the law. The Act of Congress is its foundation. The contract could never have been made, but under the authority of that act. The act itself is the first ingredient in the case, as its origin, is that from which every other part arises. That other questions may also arise, as the execution of the con

tract, or its performance, cannot change the case, or give it any other origin than the charter of incorporation. The action still originates in, and is sustained by, that charter.

"The clause giving the Bank a right to sue in the Circuit Courts of the United States, stands on the same principle with the acts authorizing officers of the United States who sue in their own names, to sue in the courts of the United States. The Postmaster-General, for example, cannot sue under that part of the Constitution which gives jurisdiction to the Federal Courts, in consequence of the character of the party, nor is he authorized to sue by the Judiciary Act. He comes into the courts of the Union under the authority of an Act of Congress, the constitutionality of which can only be sustained by the admission that his suit is a case arising under a law of the United States. If it be said that it is such a case, because a law of the United States authorizes the contract, and authorizes the suit, the same reasons exist with respect to a suit brought by the Bank. That, too, is such a case because that suit, too, is itself authorized, and is brought on a contract authorized by a law of the United States. It depends absolutely on that law, and cannot exist a moment without its authority.

"If it be said, that a suit brought by the Bank may depend in fact altogether on questions unconnected with any law of the United States, it is equally true, with respect to suits brought by the Postmaster-General. The plea in bar may be payment, if the suit be brought on a bond, or non assumpsit, if it be brought on an open account, and no other question may arise than what respects the complete discharge of the demand. Yet the constitutionality of the act authorizing the Postmaster-General to sue in the courts of the United States, has never been drawn into question. It is sustained singly by an Act of Congress, standing on that construction of the Constitution which asserts the right of the Legislature to give original jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts, in cases arising under a law of the United States.

"The clause in the patent law, authorizing suits in the

Circuit Courts, stands, we think, on the same principle. Such a suit is a case arising under a law of the United States. Yet the defendant may not, at the trial, question the validity of the patent, or make any point which requires the construction of an Act of Congress. He may rest his defence exclusively on the fact, that he has not violated the right of the plaintiff. That this fact becomes the sole question made in the cause, cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court, or establish the position, that the case does not arise under a law of the United States.

"It is said, that a clear distinction exists between the party and the cause; that the party may originate under a law with which the cause has no connexion; and that Congress may, with the same propriety, give a naturalized citizen, who is the mere creature of a law, a right to sue in the courts of the United States, as give that right to the Bank.

"This distinction is not denied; and, if the Act of Congress was a simple act of incorporation, and contained nothing more, it might be entitled to great consideration. But the act does not stop with incorporating the Bank. It proceeds to bestow upon the being it has made, all the faculties and capacities which that being possesses. Every act of the Bank grows out of this law, and is tested by it. To use the language of the Constitution, every act of the out of this law.

Bank arises

"A naturalized citizen is indeed made a citizen under an Act of Congress, but the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in view of the Constitution, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual. The Constitution then takes him up, and, among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the United States, precisely under the

same circumstances under which a native might sue. He is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the Constitution makes the distinction. The law makes

none.

"There is, then, no resemblance between the act incorporating the Bank, and the general naturalization law.

"Upon the best consideration we have been able to bestow on this subject, we are of opinion, that the clause in the act of incorporation, enabling the Bank to sue in the courts of the United States, is consistent with the Constitution, and to be obeyed in all courts."

§ 12. The illustrations presented by this discussion of the manner in which a case may arise under a law of the United States, are so ample, as to render it unnecessary here to present other examples of the same principle. The very large class of cases in which the validity of state laws is brought in question, on account of a supposed conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or with a treaty, or a law of the United States enacted in pursuance of the Constitution, will find their appropriate place in treating of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. But there is another class of cases, in reference to which the authority just cited presents several illustrations of the mode in which a question may arise under a law of the United States, so as to be within the scope of the judicial power.

§ 13. This class of cases involves those where a duty is imposed upon an officer of the United States, and protection becomes necessary in the discharge of his functions. If called in question for his official acts in any proceeding in a state court, the case would arise under a law of the United States, and would therefore be reached by the judicial power, because protection of the officer is necessary to the exercise of the powers of government, and such protection is implied in the legislation by which his act is authorized. "It is not unusual," say the court, "for a legis

lative act to involve consequences which are not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order. This security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an Act of Congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from state control, which is said to be so objectionable in this instance. The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those institutions which are public in their nature, are examples in point. It has never been doubted, that all who are employed in them are protected, while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any Act of Congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in the several acts by which these institutions are created, and is secured to the individuals. employed in them by the judicial power alone; that is, the judicial power is the instrument employed by the government in administering this security."

§ 14. It follows necessarily from the principles which have now been stated, that the cognizance of all crimes and offences against the laws of the United States, including suits for penalties and forfeitures, belongs to the judicial power of the United States, as defined by the clause now under consideration; although the locality of the acts done may also bring some of these cases within the clause which confers admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.2

§ 15. We are now to consider the different forms of remedy and sources of jurisprudence which this clause of the Constitution embraces, by the terms "all cases in law and equity." At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, two systems of jurisprudence, besides that peculiar to the admiralty jurisdiction and practice, were known in most of the states of the confederacy, by which the Constitution

1 Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton, 865.

2 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheaton, 336.