Italians of other states were bent upon putting | Europe (though with the exception of England an end to this state of things by force and violent measures. "If the government of Sardinia remained passive amid this universal emotion it would place itself in opposition to the nation. The generous outburst which the events of Naples and of Sicily had produced in the masses would degenerate at once into anarchy and disorder. Were he to suffer this, the king would be wanting in his duties towards the Italians and towards Europe. In fulfilment of his obligation to prevent the national movement from so degenerating he had addressed his summons to the court of Rome to disband its mercenaries, and, on this being refused, had ordered his troops to enter Umbria and the Marches, to re-establish order there, and to leave the populations a free field for the manifestation of their sentiments." In conclusion he declared that Rome and the surrounding territory should be scrupulously respected, and adroitly professed his confidence "that the spectacle of the unanimity of the patriotic sentiments which had burst forth throughout the whole of Italy, would remind the Sovereign Pontiff that he had some years before been the sublime inspirer of this great national movement." There was not an hour to lose; but it was necessary at least to communicate with the French emperor before taking an extreme step, and Farini, the Sardinian minister, had already given some hint of Cavour's intentions. The emperor was at Chambéry on his way through his newly acquired territory, and General Cialdini sought him there. The conversation was grave; the emperor could not countenance the course which it was proposed to pursue, but he left it to Sardinia to undertake, at her own risk, a proceeding which she might consider was necessary for her security and for the safety of Italy. This was enough for Cavour. Napoleon III. was known to have entertained the opinion that the real and legitimate authority of the pope would not be diminished by the loss of the territory now in revolt. Let Rome itself be inviolably preserved as a residence for the Sovereign Pontiff and France would not interpose. It was well that the other governments of they expressed disapproval) did not move. It has been truly said by a chronicler of the event1 that the other European powers could not but regard with disfavour the arguments of Count Cavour's circular, based as they were on the right of the people to depose their hereditary sovereign, and to choose for themselves by whom they should be governed. But in what direction could they move to stay the course of events in Italy? One of two results was by this time inevitable - the triumph of the extreme revolutionary party, with the consequent dangers to Italy and to Europe, or the establishment of orderly government under a monarch whose interests would be identical with their own in arresting the spread of revolutionary doctrines. attended the movement of the Sardinian army, it could scarcely be doubtful which of these alternatives would be most acceptable to the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin. At anyrate remonstrance was of little avail. The army of Victor Emmanuel emulated the followers of Garibaldi himself by the rapidity and decision with which they took possession of the Papal States. General Fanti, the commander-in-chief, had concentrated his forces on the frontiers by the 10th of September; General Cialdini commanded the division which was to operate in the Marches, and General Della Rocca that destined for Umbria. Two days afterwards Cialdini took the fortress of Pesaro and 1200 men of the garrison. Fano and Urbino were next taken by assault, and meanwhile General Della Rocca had invested Perugia, which its garrison of 1700 men surrendered without much resistance. So the campaign went on. Lamoricière, with an army of between eight and nine thousand men, fell back on Loretto, intending to find safety in the citadel of Ancona. The Italian commanders joined their forces, hemmed him in till he was obliged to give them battle, and defeated him in an obstinate engagement, after which he left the field followed by a few horsemen and entered the fortress. This was on the 18th, and next day all that were left 1 Sir Theodore Martin. MEETING OF VICTOR EMMANUEL AND GARIBALDI. of his army laid down their arms, and not a soldier of the Papal forces remained in Umbria and the Marches beyond the few who were shut up in Ancona. That place was immediately invested, and bombarded both by sea and land. On the 28th of the month it surrendered, the garrison becoming prisoners of war. In this brief campaign the Papal government lost nearly all its war material, while from 17,000 to 18,000 of their troops, with all their generals, were made prisoners of war. Garibaldi had taken Naples. It was necessary to prevent him from completing the work alone by the capture of Gaeta, which would have left him free to make an attempt on Venetia. For a short time the troops of Francis II. had made a stand on the Volturno, where the Garibaldians won a brilliant victory. Before any attempt could be made upon Capua and Gaeta the Piedmontese troops had taken possession of the Marches, had beaten Lamoricière, and were now ready by another rapid movement to march with King Victor Emmanuel to Naples, and to endorse the campaign of Garibaldi by reducing Capua and Gaeta, and so completing the union of Northern and Southern Italy in one kingdom. It was a master stroke of policy, and though some of the means adopted by Cavour, such as the employment of secret agents both in Italy and in Hungary, and the manner in which he had played fast and loose with the heroic leader who had saved Italy for the king, must be deplored, the interposition between Garibaldi and Rome, and the prevention of a march upon Venetia, were absolutely necessary for the preservation of the country and the fulfilment of its struggles for liberty and a place among nations. But there was still one important, if not the greatest, element in the ultimate success of this policy which Cavour had not counted on. Not only Italy, but all Europe, had been astonished by the rapid and brilliant successes of the leader who carried all before him on his victorious march to liberty, and whose fervour and simplicity of purpose had roused the country, and served to make insurgents into soldiers and soldiers into veterans during a few months' campaign; but Garibaldi was 79 more of a patriot and more truly heroic than either Italy or the rest of Europe had suspected. Apart from the abstract theories of republican freedom which he had learned from Mazzini-apart from the poetical but vague, confused ideas of the relations of national and social life to which he appeared to give occasional expression somewhat after the manner of Victor Hugo-one might almost say, notwithstanding remarkable episodes in his own social life, Garibaldi was a man who loved righteousness and thought of himself last or not at all. He was no dreamer, and his practical faculty for hard work, which in his case circumstances had so often translated to mean fighting, carried him out of the region of plots and conspiracies into the open field of bold and determined enterprise against the foes of Italy, who alone were foes to himself. His crowning glory was at Naples, for it was an act, not only of splendid loyalty in which he handed another kingdom to his sovereign, but an act of self-renunciation. The Piedmontese troops had quickly crossed the Neapolitan frontier when the troops of Francis II., which had just been severely defeated by Garibaldi on the Volturno, made a sudden rally, and with a courage which, if it had been developed earlier, might at least have deferred the solution of the Italian question, attacked the leading columns of the advancing forces of Victor Emmanuel on the heights of Macerone. The Piedmontese drove them back with considerable loss, and they were compelled to retreat, leaving a large body of troops to occupy Capua. The engagement was on the 21st of October, and on the 26th Victor Emmanuel, advancing at the head of his troops, was met on the line of the Volturno by Garibaldi. An account in the Journal des Débats, written by an eyewitness says, "The officers of the king and those of Garibaldi shouted, "Viva Victor Emmanuel!' Garibaldi made a step in advance, raised his cap, and added in a voice which trembled with emotion, 'King of Italy!' Victor Emmanuel raised his hand to his cap, and then stretched out his hand to Garibaldi, and with equal emotion replied, 'I thank you.'" This grasp of the hands was the signal of an unexpressed compact by which the result of the achievements in Southern Italy were confirmed to the king. Another account of the meeting says: "Garibaldi and the king, still holding each other's hand, followed the troops for about a quarter of an hour. Their suites had mingled together, and followed at a short distance behind them. Passing a group of officers, Garibaldi saluted them. Among them were Farini, minister of war, and General Fanti. The king and Garibaldi were conversing. His majesty was at the head of 30,000 men, and before reaching Teano he halted, and ordered a portion of his army to file off in presence of Garibaldi, that every one might observe the good feeling which existed between him and the chieftain. He then reviewed Bixio's brigade, which was posted a little beyond Calvi. He was received with the enthusiastic and unanimous shout of "Long live the King of Italy!" Garibaldi had 7000 men, divided between different positions. The king remained at Teano; Garibaldi returned to Calvi to give orders. At Teano the people began shouting, "Evviva Garibaldi!" The latter stopped them, and said, "Cry 'Evviva il Rè d'Italia, Vittorio Emanuele!"" pointing to the king. The cry was raised, and after it again Evviva Garibaldi!" on which the king said, "You are right; it is he who is king here." Into Naples the general and the sovereign went together in triumph, and on that occasion another English legion of Garibaldians, a force chiefly recruited in London, was conspicuous. They had but recently arrived and were too late to take any active part in the fighting, but their will was good, and some of their countrymen had helped to bear the brunt of the campaign. The procession through the streets was a singular spectacle; many of the houses were decorated with flags, drapery, and evergreens, and the equestrian statues of the Bourbons had been covered up with sheets. There was a touch of Italian humour there. It was a wet day, but the reception of the king was enthusiastic, especially at the cathedral, where he and Garibaldi with their suites went to hear the Te Deum, and where the vast crowd, in defiance of decorum, burst into cries of "Viva il Re Galantuomo!" and so crowded around their elected sovereign that way could scarcely be made for him to reach the royal seat. Garibaldi followed, and the enthusiasm reached a pitch which almost endangered the safety of the popular hero, the people pressing about him, seeking to embrace him, to touch him, to kiss his hands. Reference has already been made to Garibaldi's striking appearance. Here is another picture of him as he appeared at that time : "Garibaldi was a middle-sized man and not of an athletic build, though gifted with uncommon strength and surprising agility. He looked to the greatest advantage on horseback, as he sat on the saddle with such perfect ease and yet with such calm serenity as if he were grown to it, having had, though originally a sailor, the benefit of a long experience in taming the wild mustangs of the Pampas. But his chief beauty was the head and the unique dignity with which it rose on the shoulders. The features were cast in the old classic mould; the forehead was high and broad, a perpendicular line from the roots of the hair to the eyebrows. His mass of tawny hair and full red beard gave the countenance its peculiar lion-like character. The brow was open, genial, sunny; the eyes dark gray, deep, shining with a steady reddish light; the nose, mouth, and chin exquisitely chiselled, the countenance habitually at rest, but at sight of those dear to him beaming with a caressing smile, revealing all the innate strength and grace of his loving nature." A plebiscite gave Victor Emmanuel the sovereignty of the Two Sicilies, and Garibaldi resigned the dictatorship, bade an affectionate farewell to his comrades, and in an address to the brave men who had rallied round him, in which he specially referred to the English and the Hungarian contingents (the latter under General Türr), spoke with enthusiasm of Italy, and referred in no obscure manner to the probability of the country being made altogether free, and of his meeting a host of his companions in arms in the following year. He then quietly retired to Caprera after being received with honour by the royal staff and having THE ENGLISH DESPATCH TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. his title of general confirmed, which in his case meant a special and distinctive military rank. All pecuniary grants or other emoluments he declined to accept, and it was said that on resigning his dictatorship he was possessed of just £30, with which he retired to his primitive island to live on the produce of his farm. The opinions of the French, Russian, and Prussian governments had, of course, not supported the action of Victor Emmanuel and of Count Cavour, and (perhaps to save appearances) Napoleon III. had recalled his representative from the court of Turin. There could be little doubt what England would say, if she spoke at all; but many statesmen abroad and some at home were much opposed to any word being said that would seem to favour the intervention of Sardinia in what they were pleased to assume were foreign states, or to her accepting the allegiance of those states after they had abandoned their previous rulers. Doubtless the case of Italy was peculiar, and perhaps the Times was right in saying that the only actual justification for upholding the action of Victor Emmanuel would be that which had supported the assumptions of William of Orange in regard to England. The English government referred to this example as a precedent when the events in Italy had, so to speak, been justified by results. We might have issued a despatch earlier, but that Lord Palmerston was jealous of France and had just succeeded in obtaining a vote for nine millions for British defences, whereof two millions only, could be at once asked for by Mr. Gladstone, who reluctantly consented to abide by the vote. There was a suspicion that Victor Emmanuel might allow Sardinia itself to follow Savoy and Nice to buy the support of France, or that he might join Garibaldi in invading Venetia. Cavour hastened to give, through Sir James Hudson, the strongest assurances that Garibaldi would not be suffered to attack Venetia, and that, if that attack were ever made, it would be by an Italiau army, and when events were ripe for the movement. Never, moreover, he added, would he be accessory to bringing the French again into Italy, and so to making his country the slave of France. As for the surrender of VOL. IV. 81 Sardinia to France, it was a proposal which no Italian dared to entertain. Then (on the 27th of October) a despatch was sent to Sir J. Hudson by Lord John Russell saying:— "Sir,--It appears that the late proceedings of the King of Sardinia have been strongly disapproved of by several of the principal courts of Europe. The Emperor of the French, on hearing of the invasion of the Papal States by the army of General Cialdini, withdrew his minister from Turin, expressing at the same time the opinion of the imperial government in condemnation of the invasion of the Roman territory. "The Emperor of Russia has, we are told, declared in strong terms his indignation at the entrance of the army of the King of Sardinia into the Neapolitan territory, and has withdrawn his entire mission from Turin. "The Prince Regent of Prussia has also thought it necessary to convey to Sardinia a sense of his displeasure, but he has not thought it necessary to remove the Prussian minister from Turin. "After these diplomatic acts it would scarcely be just to Italy, or respectful to the other great powers of Europe, were the government of her majesty any longer to withhold the expression of their opinions. "In so doing, however, her majesty's government have no intention to raise a dispute upon the reasons which have been given, in the name of the King of Sardinia, for the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan states. Whether or no the pope was justified in defending his authority by means of foreign levies; whether the King of the Two Sicilies, while still maintaining his flag at Capua and Gaeta, can be said to have abdicated-a -are not the arguments upon which her majesty's government propose to dilate. "The large questions which appear to them to be at issue are these: Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from governments with which they are discontented, and was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan states? 69 "There appear to have been two motives not feel justified in declaring that the people which have induced the people of the Roman of Southern Italy had not good reasons for and Neapolitan states to have joined willingly throwing off their allegiance to their former in the subversion of their governments. The governments; her majesty's government canfirst of these was, that the governments of the not, therefore, pretend to blame the King of Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies pro- Sardinia for assisting them. There remains, vided so ill for the administration of justice, however, a question of fact. It is asserted by the protection of personal liberty, and the the partisans of the fallen governments that general welfare of their people, that their sub- the people of the Roman States were attached jects looked forward to the overthrow of their to the pope, and the people of the Kingdom of rulers as a necessary preliminary to all im- Naples to the dynasty of Francis II., but that provements in their condition. Sardinian agents and foreign adventurers Lave by force and intrigue subverted the thrones of those sovereigns. It is difficult, however, to believe, after the astounding events that have been seen, that the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies possessed the love of their people. How was it, one must ask, that the pope found it impossible to levy a Roman army, and that he was forced to rely almost entirely upon foreign mercenaries? How did it happen again that Garibaldi conquered nearly all Sicily with 2000 men, and marched from Reggio to Naples with 5000? How but from the universal disaffection of the people of the Two Sicilies? "The second motive was, that a conviction had spread since the year 1849 that the only manner in which Italians could secure their independence of foreign control was by forming one strong government for the whole of Italy. "The struggle of Charles Albert in 1848, and the sympathy which the present King of Sardinia has shown for the Italian cause, have naturally caused the association of the name of Victor Emmanuel with the single authority under which the Italians aspire to live. "Looking at the question in this view, her majesty's government must admit that the Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests. "That eminent jurist Vattel, when discussing the lawfulness of the assistance given by the United Provinces to the Prince of Orange when he invaded England and overturned the throne of James II., says: "The authority of the Prince of Orange had doubtless an influence on the deliberation of the States-general, but it did not lead them to the commission of an act of injustice; for when a people, from good reasons, take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties.' "Therefore, according to Vattel, the question resolves itself into this: Did the people of Naples and of the Roman States take up arms against their governments for good reasons? "Upon this grave matter her majesty's government hold that the people in question are themselves the best judges of their own affairs. Her majesty's government do "Neither can it be said that this testimony of the popular will was capricious or causeless. Forty years ago the Neapolitan people made an attempt regularly and temperately to reform their government under the reigning dynasty. The powers of Europe assembled at Laybach resolved, with the exception of England, to put down this attempt by force. It was put down, and a large foreign army of occupation was left in the Two Sicilies to maintain social order. In 1848 the Neapolitan people again attempted to secure liberty under the Bourbon dynasty, but their best patriots atoned, by an imprisonment of ten years, for the offence of endeavouring to free their country. What wonder, then, that in 1860 the Neapolitan mistrust and resentment should throw off the Bourbons, as in 1688 England had thrown off the Stuarts? "It must be admitted, undoubtedly, that the severance of the ties which bind together a sovereign and his subjects is in itself a misfortune. Notions of allegiance become confused, the succession to the throne is disputed, |