ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHAPTER I FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE WH HILE Sherman was planning his march to the sea General Hood was devising a counter scheme of invasion. In spite of the rebuffs he had suffered at every encounter of arms since he had attained the object of his ambition by replacing Johnston, his hope and his courage had suffered no diminution. He had come to the West thoroughly imbued, as he says, with the spirit of Lee and Jackson. He thought by persisting in a series of flank attacks he would sooner or later destroy the National army. His courage and energy were equal to any demands that could be made upon them. His mental capacity was so limited that he was unable to see the obstacles in his way. Even now, after all the wasteful defeats which his rashness had inflicted upon his army, he was dreaming of a succession of victories more brilliant than any which had illustrated the career of his great prototype in Virginia. Although he had retreated from the front of Sherman, on the unaniVOL. X.-1 CHAP. I. mous report of all the officers he consulted that his army was in no condition to fight a pitched battle with Sherman's force, yet even while he halted at the Cross Roads he decided, he says, to cross the Tennessee at Guntersville, to destroy Sherman's communications, to move upon Thomas and Schofield, and rout and capture their armies before they could reach Nashville. He intended then we are quoting his own words to march upon that city, where he would supply his army and reënforce it by accessions from Tennessee; he would then march northeast, pass the Cumberland River, move into Kentucky, take position with his left at Richmond and his right at Hazel Green, then, threatening Cincinnati, recruit his army from Kentucky and Tennessee. The dream that had beguiled Kirby Smith still had power with Hood; "the former State," he said, "was reported, at this juncture, to be more aroused and embittered against the Federals than at any period of the war." He was imbued, he said, with the belief that he could accomplish this stupendous feat while Sherman was debating the alternative of following him, or marching through Georgia. But this scheme was merely the prelude to greater achievements; if Sherman should return to confront him or should follow him from Georgia into Tennessee and Kentucky he hoped then to be in condition to offer battle, and if blest with victory, to send reënforcements to General Lee, or to march through the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains and take Grant in rear; even if Sherman should beat him he considered that this enterprise was still open to him. Thus, he says, he believed he СНАР. І. CHAP. I. Hood, "Advance and Retreat," p. 268. Report Committee of the War, 1865-66. Supplement, Vol. I., p. 232. could "defeat Grant, and allow General Lee, in command of our combined armies, to march upon Washington or turn upon and annihilate Sherman." This fantastic vision seemed as easy as "good morning" to the courageous heart and narrow mind of General Hood. แ Eager as Sherman was to march southward, and little as he cared for what damage Hood might do in the rear, he was for a long time uncertain what course he should pursue in reference to him. On on Conduct the 17th of October he had said to Thomas that Hood would not dare to go into Tennessee. If he wants to, "let him go; and then we can all turn on him and he cannot escape"; and on the 26th, after his reconnaissance to Gadsden had revealed the fact that the rebel army had gone, he again said to Thomas, "If it turns up at Guntersville I will be after it; but if it goes, as I believe, to Decatur and beyond, I must leave it to you at present, and push for the heart of Georgia." Even after he was satisfied that Hood had gone towards Decatur, he told Halleck that he would wait a few days to hear what headway Hood was making and that he might yet turn to Tennessee, though it would be a great Halleck, pity to take a step backward. "I think," he adds, Report with his humorous coolness, "it would be better of the War even to let him ravage the State of Tennessee, provided he does not gobble up too many of our troops." Sherman to Oct. 27. Committee on Conduct Supplement, Part I., p. 242. Hood, "Advance and Retreat," p. 274. Hood's intention, as we have seen, was really to cross at Guntersville, in which case he would have had Sherman upon his heels; but he postponed his ruin a few weeks by passing further west. The reason he gives for this course was his lack of cav alry and his desire to effect a junction with General Forrest before crossing. He did not even attempt to cross at Decatur, or, at least, the movement he made in this direction, which was promptly checked by General Granger, in garrison there, with considerable loss to the Confederates, Hood insists was intended merely as a slight demonstration. Sherman, though he sometimes complains of Hood's baffling eccentricities, seems to have read his mind on many occasions like an open book. He telegraphed on the 28th of October, not knowing of the result at Decatur, that Hood would not assault that place and that Granger did not want too many men. The next day he received information of Hood's feeble demonstration against it, and of Granger's successful sortie, in which he killed and wounded a considerable number of Confederates and captured over a hundred. Granger added his belief that Hood would go to Tuscumbia before crossing; he was evidently out of supplies, as the first thing the prisoners asked for was something to eat. Hood continued on his way west and reached Tuscumbia, on the south bank of the Tennessee, on the 31st of October. General Grant's doubts of the wisdom of Sherman's movement southward, which were so strong on the 1st of November that he recommended him to beat Hood before he started, gave way before Sherman's intense eagerness to be off, and on the 2d, as we have seen, he gave his full consent. From that moment there was no question that one of the gravest responsibilities of the war rested upon the broad shoulders of General Thomas. СНАР. І. Hood to 1864. 1864. |