which, in a free government, is impracticable without the destruction of liberty; the other, by controlling its effects. If a faction be a minority, the majority may apply the proper corrective, by defeating or checking the violence of the minority in the regular course of legislation. In small states, however, this is not always easily attainable, from the difficulty of combining in a permanent form sufficient influence for this purpose. A feeble domestic faction will naturally avail itself, not only of all accidental causes of dissatisfaction at home, but also of all foreign aid and influence to carry its projects. And, indeed, in the gradual operations of factions, so many combinations are formed and dissolved, so many private resentments become embodied in public measures, and success and triumph so often follow after defeat, that the remnants of different factions, which have had a brief sway, however hostile to each other, have an interest to unite in order to put down their rivals. But if the faction be a majority, and stand unchecked, except by its own sense of duty, or its own fears, the dangers are imminent to all those, whose principles, or interests, or characters stand in the way of their supreme dominion.1

§ 492. These evils are felt in great states; but it has been justly observed, that in small states they are far more aggravated, bitter, cruel, and permanent. The most effectual means to control such effects seem to be in the formation of a confederate republic, consisting of It will be rare, under such circumstances, if proper powers are confided to the general government, that the state line does not form the natural, as it will the jurisdictional boundary of the opera

several states.2

1 The Federalist, No. 10.

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60

2 Id. No. 9.

tions of factions. The authority of the general government will have a natural tendency to suppress the violence of faction, by diminishing the chances of ultimate success; and the example of the neighbouring states, who will rarely, at the same time, partake of the same feelings, or have the same causes to excite them into action, will mitigate, if it does not wholly disarm, the violence of the predominant faction.1

§ 493. One of the ordinary results of disunion among neighbouring states is the necessity of creating and keeping up standing armies, and other institutions unfavourable to liberty. The immediate dangers from sudden inroads and invasions, and the perpetual jealousies and discords incident to their local position, compel them to resort to the establishment of armed forces, either disproportionate to their means, or inadequate for their defence. Either alternative is fraught with public mischiefs. If they do not possess an adequate military force to repel invasion, they have no security against aggression and insult. If they possess an adequate military force, there is much reason to dread, that it may, in the hands of aspiring or corrupt men, become the means of their subjugation. There is no other refuge in such cases, but to seek an alliance always unequal, and to be obtained only by important concessions to some powerful nation, or to form a confederacy with other states, and thus to secure the co-operation and the terror of numbers. Nothing has so strong a tendency to suppress hostile enterprises, as the consciousness, that they will not be easily successful. Nothing is so sure to produce moderation, as the consciousness, that resistance will steadily maintain the

The Federalist, No. 9, 10.

2 Id. No. 41.

dictates of justice. Summary, nay, even arbitrary authority, must be granted, where the safety of a state cannot await the slow measures of ordinary legislation. to protect it. That government is, therefore, most safe in its liberties, as well as in its domestic peace, whose numbers constitute a preventive guard against all internal, as well as external attacks.

§ 494. We now proceed to the next clause in the preamble, to "provide for the common defence." And many of the considerations already stated apply with still greater force under this head. One of the surest means of preserving peace is said to be, by being always prepared for war. But a still more sure means is the power to repel, with effect, every aggression. That power can scarcely be attained without a wide extent of population, and at least a moderate extent of territory. A country, which is large in its limits, even if thinly peopled, is not easily subdued. Its variety of soil and climate, its natural and artificial defences, nay, its very poverty and scantiness of supplies, make it difficult to gain, or to secure a permanent conquest. It is far easier to overrun, than to subdue it. Armies must be divided, distant posts must be maintained, and channels of supplies kept constantly open. But where the territory is not only large, but populous, permanent conquest can rarely occur, unless (which is not our case) there are very powerful neighbours on every side, having a common interest to assist each other, and to subjugate their enemy. It is far otherwise, where there are many rival and independent states, having no common union of government or interests. They are half subdued by their own dissensions, jealousies, and resentments before the conflict is begun. They are easily made to act a part in the destruction of each other, or

easily fall a prey for want of proper concert and energy of operations.

$495. Besides; -The resources of a confederacy must be far greater than those of any single state belonging to it, both for peace and war. It can command a wider range of revenue, of military power, of naval armaments, and of productive industry. It is more independent in its employments, in its capacities, and in its influences. In the present state of the world, a few great powers possess the command of commerce, both on land and at sea. In war, they trample upon the rights of neutrals who are feeble; for their weakness furnishes an excuse both for servility and disdain. In peace, they control the pursuits of the rest of the world, and force their trade into every channel by the activity of their enterprise, their extensive navigation, and their flourishing manufactures, They little regard the complaints of those, who are subvided into petty states with varying interests; and use them only as instruments to annoy or check the enterprise of each other. Such states are not formidable in peace or in war. To secure their rights and maintain their independence they must become a confederated nation, and speak with the force of numbers, as well as the eloquence of truth.1 The navy or army, which could be maintained by any single state in the Union, would be scarcely formidable to any second rate power in Europe. It would be a grievous public burthen, and exhaust the whole resources of the state. But a navy or army for all the purposes of home defence, or protection upon the ocean, is within the compass of the resources of the general government, without any severe exaction. And

1 The Federalist, No. 11.

with the growing strength of the Union must be at once more safe for us, and more formidable to foreign nations. The means, therefore, to provide for the common defence are ample; and they can only be rendered inert and inadequate by a division among the states, and a want of unity of operations.1

496. We pass, in the next place, to the clause to promote the general welfare." And it may be asked, as the state governments are formed for the same purpose by the people, why should this be set forth, as a peculiar or prominent object of the constitution of the United States? To such an inquiry two general answers may be given. The states, separately, would not possess the means. If they did possess the means, they would not possess the power to carry the appropriate measures into operation.

§ 497. First, in respect to means. It is obvious, that from the local position and size of several of the states, they must for ever possess but a moderate revenue, not more than what is indispensable for their own wants, and, in the strictest sense, for domestic improvements. In relation to others more favourably situated for commerce and navigation, the revenues from taxation may be larger; but the main reliance must be placed upon the taxation by way of imposts upon importations. Now, it is obvious, from the remarks already made, that no permanent revenue can be raised from this source, when the states are separated. The evasions of the laws, which will constantly take place from the rivalries, and various interests of the neighbouring states; the facilities afforded by the numerous harbours, rivers, and bays, which indent and intersect our coasts; the strong

1 The Federalist, No. 24, 25.