then subject to the determination of congress. No state could prevent the removal of any property imported into any state to any other state, of which the owner was an inhabitant. And no imposition, duties, or restriction could be laid by any state on the property of the United States or of either of them. § 241. There was also provision made for the admission of Canada into the union, and of other colonies with the assent of nine states. And it was finally declared, that every state should abide by the determinations of congress on all questions submitted to it by the confederation; that the articles should be inviolably observed by every state; that the union should be perpetual; and that no alterations should be made in any of the articles, unless agreed to by congress, and confirmed by the legislatures of every state. § 242. Such is the substance of this celebrated instrument, under which the treaty of peace, acknowledging our independence, was negotiated, the war of the revolution concluded, and the union of the states maintained until the adoption of the present constitution. CHAPTER IV. DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATION. § 243. Any survey, however slight, of the confederation will impress the mind with the intrinsic difficulties, which attended the formation of its principal features. It is well known, that upon three important points, touching the common rights and interests of the several states, much diversity of opinion prevailed, and many animated discussions took place. The first was, as to the mode of voting in congress, whether it should be by states, or according to wealth, or population. The second, as to the rule, by which the expenses of the Union should be apportioned among the states. And the third, as has been already seen, relative to the disposal of the vacant and unappropriated lands in the western territory.1 244. But that, which strikes us with most force, is the unceasing jealousy and watchfulness everywhere betrayed in respect to the powers to be confided to the general government. For this, several causes may be assigned. The colonies had been long engaged in struggles against the superintending authority of the crown, and had practically felt the inconveniences of the restrictive legislation of the parent country. These struggles had naturally led to a general feeling of resistance of all external authority; and these inconveniences to extreme doubts, if not to dread of any legislation, not exclusively originating in their domestic assemblies. They had, as yet, not felt the importance or necessity of union among themselves, having been hitherto connected with the British sove 12 Pitk. Hist. 16. reignty in all their foreign relations. What would be their fate, as separate and independent communities ; how far their interests would coincide or vary from each other, as such; what would be the effects of the union upon their domestic peace, their territorial interests, their external commerce, their political security, or their civil liberty, were points to them wholly of a speculative character, in regard to which various opinions might be entertained, and various, and even opposite conjectures formed upon grounds, apparently of equal plausibility. They were smarting, too, under the severe sufferings of war; and hardly had time to look forward to the future events of a peace; or if they did, it would be obviously a period for more tranquil discussions, and for a better understanding of their mutual interests. They were suddenly brought together, not so much by any deliberate choice of a permanent union, as by the necessity of mutual co-operation and support in resistance of the measures of Great Britain. They found themselves, after having assembled a general congress for mutual advice and encouragement, compelled by the course of events to clothe that body with sovereign powers in the most irregular and summary manner, and to permit them to assert the general prerogatives of peace and war, without any previous compact, and sanctioned only by the silent acquiescence of the people. Under such circumstances each state felt, that it was the true path of safety to retain all sovereign powers within its own control, the surrender of which was not clearly seen, under existing circumstances, to be demanded by an imperious public necessity.1 1 Dr. Rush, in apologizing for the defects of the confederation, has observed, "The confederation, together with most of our state con § 245. Notwithstanding the declaration of the articles, that the union of the states was to be perpetual, an examination of the powers confided to the general government would easily satisfy us, that they looked principally to the existing revolutionary state of things. The principal powers respected the operations of war, and would be dormant in times of peace. In short, congress in peace was possessed of but a delusive and shadowy sovereignty, with little more, than the empty pageantry of office. They were indeed clothed with the authority of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances, of appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies on the high seas; of regulating the public coin; of fixing the standard of weights and measures; of regulating trade with the Indians; of establishing post-offices; of borrowing money, and emitting bills on the credit of the United States; of ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for defraying the public expenses, and of disposing of the western territory. And most of these powers required for their exercise the assent of nine states. But they possessed not the power to raise any revenue, to levy any tax, to enforce any law, to secure any right, to regulate any trade, or even the poor prerogative of commanding means to pay its own ministers at a foreign court. They could contract debts; but they were without means to discharge them. They could stitutions, was formed under very unfavourable circumstances. We had just emerged from a corrupted monarchy. Although we understood perfectly the principles of liberty, yet most of us were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics. Add to this the British army in the heart of our country, spreading desolation wherever it went."* The North American Review, for Oct. 1827, contains a summary of some of the prominent defects of the confederation. Art. I. p. 249, &c. * 1 Amer. Museum, 8. See also, 1 Amer. Museum, 270. pledge the public faith; but they were incapable of redeeming it. They could enter into treaties; but every state in the union might disobey them with impunity. They could contract alliances; but could not command men or money to give them vigour. They could institute courts for piracies and felonies on the high seas; but they had no means to pay either the judges, or the jurors. In short, all powers, which did not execute themselves, were at the mercy of the states, and might be trampled upon at will with impunity. 246. One of our leading writers addressed the following strong language to the public: "By this political compact the United States in congress have exclusive power for the following purposes, without being able to execute one of them. They may make and conclude treaties; but can only recommend the observance of them. They may appoint ambassadors; but cannot defray even the expenses of their tables. They may borrow money in their own name on the faith of the Union; but cannot pay a dollar. They may coin money; but they cannot purchase an ounce of bullion. They may make war, and determine what number of troops are necessary; but cannot raise a single soldier. In short, they may declare every thing, but do nothing." 2 § 247. Strong as this language may seem, it has no colouring beyond what the naked truth would justify.3 1 1 Amer. Mus. 1786, p. 270. 2 Language equally strong, and almost identical in expression, will be found in Mr. Jay's Letter, addressed to the people of New-York, 1787; 3 Amer. Museum, 554, 556. 3 Mr. Justice Patterson, in Hylton v. The United States,* after remarking, that congress, under the confederation, had no coercive author * 3 Dall. 176; 1 Cond. Rep. 83, 88. |