THE UNITED STATES REVIEW. JULY, 1855. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. GEOGRAPHICALLY, the United States are differently situated from any other great continental power now in existence. Every other state is surrounded by states of equal or superior power, and exposed to invasion and conquest from enemies or rivals at their very doors. The United States, on the contrary, are everywhere bordered on their interior frontier by insignificant hordes of savages confining themselves to predatory incursions, never aspiring to conquest or occupation; and though dangerous to the lives and property of individuals, do not menace the safety of the state. In other directions they are surrounded by States and colonies so intrinsically weak as to preclude all apprehension of invasion from these quarters until some great radical change takes place in the relative position of the powers now occupying this continent. It is only in their maritime frontier they require to be defended, and the question presents itself, whether this can best be done by fortifications, by a navy, or by both combined. The impossibility of protecting a sea-coast of several thousand miles, accessible in almost as many points, by fortifications is sufficiently obvious. It would exhaust the entire resources of the country, and at the same time require a force to defend them so numerous as justly to excite the jealousy of the people of the United States, who are well aware that great armies placed on a permanent footing, have at all times, and everywhere been, sooner or later, converted from means of defense to instruments of tyranny and oppression. It is, therefore, only the great commercial cities and the naval stations that can be adequately fortified. The secondary towns and. the remainder of the coast, though equally entitled to protection, would be left defenseless, or be obliged to defend themselves. The militia, though, when properly trained and animated by the spirit of patriotism, the best defense of nations, are under our present system-or rather absence of all system-totally inadequate to the defense of fortifications, being unskilled in the management of artillery, and ignorant of the science of defense. In their hands, these fortifications might threaten, but could not strike, and only invite the enemy they could not repel. It is, we think, much to be regretted that this most important arm of the national defense is now so much neglected, and that in most if not all the States they are, we believe, seldom, if ever, mustered, even for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are furnished with the most simple military equipments; or if called together, the fine for non-attendance is so insignificant that it is little less than a premium for absence. Whatever vestige of the martial vigor of our ancestors may have survived the Revolution, seems gradually dying away among the rural population, at least of the "Old Thirteen." The spirit of trade has, in a great measure, superseded that of patriotism, and the people now rely entirely on a standing army to protect their persons and property. This we fear is a bad sign. A free people should be their own defenders, and never lose sight of the great lesson of experience which teaches that an army which can protect, can also subjugate them if they have not the spirit to defend themselves. But be this as it may, fortifications in the hands of a raw militia, would be of little aid. They might bristle with cannon and bombs, but would be incapable of striking, and only invite the enemy they could not repel. There are other serious objections to depending on fortifications for the national defense. They are a sort of two-edged sword that cuts both ways. They may pass into the hands of the enemy and be turned against ourselves. A country depending altogether on fortified posts for protection is conquered when they are subdued, and they become chains to hold it in subjection. Fortifications are also immovable, and can only f |