the effusive gratefulness of venison and turtle. Meanwhile, Scribblerius felt quizzed-and looked so. "Am I," said he, after a pause, "to construe your apologue for myself?" The alderman nodded acquiescence. "Then," resumed the author, "your honor is the 'good king and just' of the story, and I am the knight who made the good song, and Dunce Demi-John is the cobbler. Very well." Scribblerius took his leave, and that night, on his way home, stopped in Broadway and provided himself with a substantial cowhide. On the following day, as the alderman sat in his office, he was somewhat surprised to see Scribblerius enter, accompanied by an officer, who held him in custody, and a friend, who proposed to give bail for the delinquent author. The charge was assault and battery. The offender briefly stated his case: he had met his rival that morning; and he added, with a spiteful gesture: "I cut his hide for him, according to your honor's advice." "My advice!" exclaimed the puzzled alderman. "Certainly. Don't you remember your apologue? I should have cut him to the soul, but that was morally impossible. As it was, I did what I could, and left him to heal himself as best he might." It is not known to us how Scribblerius was gotten out of his difficulty, nor what reply Grossepoche made. He might, however, have borrowed wisdom from the presiding officer of one of our municipal legislatures, whom we ourself heard one night addressing the following unparliamentary answer to an obstinate member, who had requested the president to explain his explanation. "It is not for me," that worthy said, "FOR to furnish the Board both the argument and the sense FOR to compre hend it." THE CROs s. BY C. G. ROSENBERG. I. HE who through the world would go Like the Christ the cross must bear- II. Hard the riddle is to know- III. Not a flower on earth can blow- IV. He who through the world will go THE NEBRASKA-KANSAS BILL. BY COLONEL EIDOLON. JUDGING by what is spoken and written concerning this measure, it seems evident that it is imperfectly understood. What or how many States held slaves at the passage of the Declaration of Independence, or at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, has really nothing to do with the question. There is a principle underlying the Nebraska bill which was, in its passage, discussed and settled. It is to the discussion of that principle that we shall for a few minutes turn our attention, and we think we can make it plain to the comprehension of every reasoning man that there was not, and could not have been committed any outrage upon either section of the Union by the passage of those famous bills. We believe it is no longer a debatable question whether Congress has power to legislate upon the slavery question within the States or territories belonging to and constituting the Union. We believe that no man whose opinion is worth any thing, in the argument of this great point, contends for any congressional power of legislation. Assuming that point as settled, we shall not go into an argument to prove that Congress has no power under the Constitution to touch with its legislative finger the question of slavery, but proceed at once to show why the Nebraska-Kansas bills are constitutional and proper and right. At the adoption of the Constitution, the existence of slavery as a State institution was acknowledged by that instrument, and in it there is nothing limiting it to places then cherishing it, or in any wise prohibiting its extension. If such had been the intention of its framers, it could very easily have been introduced into the section providing for the admission of new States into this Union; but the very fact that an admission of new States was contemplated without restriction upon that point, seems conclusive as to the limitation or spread of the peculiar institution. However that may be, the Constitution was adopted, the existence of slavery recognized, and provision made for returning to the owner any fugitive from service or labor escaping from one State to another. The word, territory, is not mentioned; but it is clear that if the fugitive went into a territory of the United States, its officers would be equally bound to see the laws executed and the constitutional provisions complied with. That on the 4th of March, 1789, when the government, as it now exists, was duly organized and set in motion, a man could have taken his slaves into any United States territory, and held them there as such, is certain; and that he would be bound by the internal regulation of any State into which he might choose to remove with his chattel property, is equally certain. Here, then, is a starting-point. If the position be correctand we can see no valid or constitutional objection to it-then Congress having no power to legislate upon the subject of slavery, it follows that every act passed upon that question since 1789 was without constitutional authority. The Compromise of 1820, since rendered so famous, was in itself an acknowledgment of the right of American citizens to remove into the territories of the United States with their property, of whatever name or kind; for it is urged by the opponents of the Nebraska bill that the act of 1820 was a solemn agreement to exclude slavery for ever from all territory north of 36° 30'. Now, what constitutional power had the Congress of 1820 to pass any such act? Not the least. This is now conceded, since both parties in their late national conventions resolved that "non-intervention" was the proper doctrine on the slavery question. The compromise measures of 1850 were founded upon the doctrine of non-intervention. All their vitality was received from thence. Those measures were adopted as the sentiment of the two great parties then dividing the country. Did they adopt the measure, and ignore the principle upon which it was founded? That would not seem to be the course of reasonable beings; but the then Whig party seem to have adopted them. for a purpose, and with a mental reservation. At least, every thing they have done since the election of 1852 goes to prove that hypothesis. If, then, the doctrine of non-intervention by Congress be the true one in relation to the slavery agitation, the act of 1820, establishing an artificial geographical division in every respect arbitrary, was wrong and unconstitutional. But must a wrong committed in 1820, and acquiesced in until 1854, never therefore be repealed and corrected? Has it obtained a prescriptive right to remain for ever on our statutebook? Look at the unreasonable inconsistency of the present slavery agitators. Not content with the guarantees of the Constitution of their country, they pursue a course directly in the teeth of its most sacred provisions. The slavery question is now, so far as legislative enactments are concerned, just where in 1798 it was found by the Constitution, and there every good citizen should be content to let it rest. Upon this subject, the people delegated no power to Congress: it remains with them; they can go in and settle the territories, and determine the kind of domestic institutions which shall flourish there. Ought not that to suffice? The Nebraska-Kansas bill only carries out the principle of the compromise measures of 1850, only replaces the slavery question on constitutional grounds; in other words, puts the whole matter where it was in 1798, from which situation it is to be regretted that the good sense of the people ever permitted it to be removed. This much-abused bill does not propose to "legislate slavery into any territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." This is all any one could ask; it is all that could be had in 1798, all that ought to be desired now, all that the Constitution grants, all that it withholds. If slavery then is a local, domestic institution, peculiar to some of the Southern States, and no one State can legislate it into or out of a sister State, and neither the States nor the people gave that right to their representatives under the national Constitution, it follows that every part of the national public domain should be free, while in the shape of a territory, to settlers from every part of the Union, north or south of 36° 30', without let or hindrance; and that to those settlers belongs properly the business of organizing permanently its government and domestic institutions, having respect only to its republican form. If the Constitution gives to Congress no power to legislate on this question, then the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional; if the proper doctrine is "non-intervention," it was so in 1820, and all legislation has been unauthorized and wrong. |