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and confusing for all parties; we support the joint UN/AU leadership in this regard.

• Attacks on international aid agencies have increased in recent months with more than a dozen local Sudanese staff killed, one expatriate woman sexually assaulted, and approximately 113 aid vehicles stolen in 2006. We also know that the rebel movements have been responsible for at least some of this theft and violence and we insist that it stop now. The United States government pays for much of the assistance and we view this as tantamount to stealing taxpayer-funded U.S. government resources. Moreover, if the abuse on aid agencies continues, they will leave and the people of Darfur will suffer on an even greater scale. The rebels are as responsible as the Government of Sudan in ensuring the security of those delivering humanitarian assistance.

• I urged them to be flexible and practical about their demands in any upcoming negotiations; they will not get everything they ask for. They must be willing to compromise.

• While the DPA has weaknesses, it can not be abandoned; it should be the basis of future negotiations; and addendums to address some of the DPA's weaknesses should be offered, not a negotiation of a new agreement. Finally, the U.S. will support the implementation of a peace agreement, along with other international donors, by providing significant reconstruction assistance to both African and Arab tribes in Darfur so that people are able to return home and re-establish their lives and livelihoods successfully.

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In return, we heard several consistent messages from the rebels:

• They agreed on the need to unify politically and all wanted a peaceful end to the conflict. They are skeptical that the Government of Sudan will seek a negotiated peace and that it can it be trusted to implement what it signs. They are prepared to continue fighting if unable to negotiate a just peace.

• While none of the rebels took responsibility for the vehicle hijackings, this message was clearly heard.

• The rebels welcome UN participation in a new process to negotiate peace once they have unified politically. They seem to be making some progress in forming a coalition or umbrella group from which they would choose a leader to represent them in negotiations with the central government.

• While not a strong declaration, the group agreed verbally to consider putting aside their objective of regime change in favor of a just and peaceful resolution to the conflict. They understand that the Khartoum government will ultimately not concede to regime change in any negotiations. Their primary objectives seem to be to ensure their own representation in the national government, to achieve and maintain security for their people through the dismantling of the institutions of violence that have oppressed them for too long, and to share in the benefits of the country's economic growth.

Having covered the recent past, I now want to focus on the present and future and the Administration's policy on a solution to the Darfur crisis:

• Our first objective in Darfur is to achieve a durable peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all parties voluntarily, and then actually implemented. If we achieve an agreement that is not supported by all sides, we will see war again in a few years. Each recurrence of war puts civilian lives in danger and causes a decline in the already chaotic economic situation in Darfur, further destabilizing the vulnerable populations. The Sudanese government policy of divide and conquer can not succeed, and will only prolong the war. The strategy of the Khartoum government to negotiate individually with each rebel leader to buy their support will not create a cohesive and lasting peace.

• The second objective of the U.S. Government is to ensure the protection of non-combatants as well as the protection of the humanitarian aid effort managed by thousands of aid workers for more than two and a half million people. Both the Sudanese government and the rebel factions that are not observing the cease-fire bear responsibility for the deteriorating security situation. Efforts by the Sudanese government to target civilians militarily or shut down the refugee camps in Chad or the IDP camps in Darfur using the Janjiweed militias will result in heavy political and economic consequences for Sudan by the U.S. government.

• And finally, we must see the full implementation of the November 16, 2006 Addis Ababa three-phase plan for Darfur mentioned earlier and endorsed in

Abuja by the AU. Approximately twenty-nine of 33 civilian police agreed to under the light support package have deployed to Darfur, as has much of the equipment. However, less than 40 percent of the military personnel stipulated in the light support package have arrived because of a dearth of troop contributors, and just three of the 48 civilian personnel are now on the ground due to recruitment lags resulting from security concerns, the harsh conditions in the region, and the bureaucratic processes at the UN.

These are our objectives: we are using all diplomatic means at our disposal to achieve them. Our view remains that a negotiated way out of the crisis in Darfur and the paralysis in the implementation of the CPA is the most desirable alternative and the option most likely to yield success. However, if we find the Sudanese government is obstructing progress on these objectives, the United States government will change its policy of negotiation and will pursue more coercive measures. The burden is on the Sudanese government to show the world that it can meet the commitments it has already made and negotiate rather than fight its way to a resolution of the political crisis facing the country. The Sudan Armed Forces and the Janjaweed militias that they support must stop attacking civilians, burning villages, and intimidating and expelling NGOs and UN agencies.

I would like to add a word about international pressure on Khartoum. We are pleased with the emergence of broad international support for the humanitarian needs of citizens in Darfur. Many countries in Africa and around the world have echoed UNSCR 1706 and called publicly for Khartoum to admit UN peacekeepers and abandon its futile effort to impose a solution on Darfur by force. Despite all this, the regime in Khartoum continues to find the weapons it needs for conflict, to find markets for its products, and to find investors. So while I have conveyed a real appreciation here today for many international efforts to push Sudan in the right direction, I also want to be quite clear: the world needs to do more. Congress, individual activists, and the huge array of committed non-governmental organizations can and should continue to shine a spotlight on Khartoum's enablers.

We expect the Government of Sudan and neighboring countries to create an enabling environment for non-signatory rebel groups to organize politically. Bombing locations used for the political unification of the rebels, which the Sudanese government has done twice now, is not acceptable. The rebels must be allowed to reach a political consensus without interference or intimidation, and the international community must remind the rebels that they cannot achieve their objectives of a secure and prosperous Darfur through violence and continued factionalism.

Finally, we are pleased that the Government of Sudan has accepted the three phases of the Addis_agreement. We expect that they will move expeditiously to implement all three phases of this agreement, including facilitation of the establishment of a vigorous joint AU-UN peacekeeping force. Failure to implement the Addis framework will send a message that they are not serious about resolving the situation in Darfur peacefully and will force us to move to a more confrontational approach.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for your time and interest in this important matter.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much for that comprehensive report. I just wonder if you could deal with a little bit more with Plan B. We did hear a bit about it from the Post yesterday about the Treasury Department and the oil revenues transactions. Is there anything else that you could tell us about Plan B at this time, and how will it affect the situation on the ground?

Mr. NATSIOS. Plan B is classified. I am not sure how the Washington Post got that story. That is what they do in a democracy. I understand that. We are indeed looking at what the paper said, which is true, and the other things in the article are accurate. This is not the only part of Plan B, but since it is classified, in order to go in more depth on this I would certainly be glad to come back, Mr. Chairman, and speak to you in a classified session. But there are sensitivities about the other options that are being considered now. But what was in the newspaper was accurate. However, it is not complete.

Mr. PAYNE. Would it be classified to mention about the four Army colonels on the Sudan-Chad border and whether they are assessing the situation there in Chad and in the Darfur region?

Mr. NATSIOS. Mr. Chairman, let me say first there is a disturbing event or disturbing trend in this event that internalizes the war. There are now 100,000 Chadians that are displaced by fighting in Chad and there have been two attempts to unseat the government, and the charge has been made that the Sudanese Government is behind that instability. Those people in the displaced camps are not on the front page of the newspapers around the world. So Secretary Rice and the President asked us to send in a DART team with people from USAID, the PRM office, American diplomats and military officers to assess what can be done to support the displaced people in Chad. Because this instability is very dangerous. Very dangerous. It is also destabilizing the Central African Republic at this point. So we did have a military office there, and they did do this assessment, and there is going to be a follow-up to the findings for humanitarian purposes. And so let me just leave it at that, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the things that I can discuss publicly.

Mr. PAYNE. On my last trip to Chad there was a strain on the border and some of the infrastructure with a quarter-million people over the border. What is the fragile situation? Is it getting worse? Mr. NATSIOS. It is getting worse. As a result of this cross-border war, you know, some tribes-like there is the Zaghawa tribe, which is part of the rebel movement in Chad. In Darfur, some of their tribes also live in Chad. In fact, President Deby is a Zaghawa himself. I think the Masalit, there are some Masalit people who also live on the Chadian side. The largest tribe in Darfur would live only in Darfur. There are none of them except those who are displaced, who are in refugee camps but in terms of just living there. So part of this conflict is cross-border because tribal lines and ethnic lines are cross-border, but the stress, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, on the environment, on limited water resources with all of these displaced people is very severe. That is why the United Nations High Commissioner has gone in along with some NGOs, funded by both USAID and the State Department, to provide assistance. I believe we are looking at ways to strengthen that assist

ance now.

Mr. PAYNE. The new Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, in his meetings with us here in Washington, he said that Darfur is going to be his number one issue. Have you had an opportunity to meet with him and have you seen any new initiatives on the part of the U.N.?

Mr. NATSIOS. I meet Ban Ki-Moon a week before he actually took office. So he had not actually become the Secretary General, but we had a good discussion in his offices in New York. I go quite often to New York now to talk with senior people in the U.N., and particularly with Jean Guehenno, who is the Secretary General of peacekeeping Options, who is in charge of getting these troops working with the African nation in Darfur. I believe Ban Ki-Moon is not only focused on this, but the member states want to be focused on it. I think he is committed to it. I think he is very disturbed by the human rights abuses that have taken place, the

atrocities that have taken place, and he has told me that I could call him personally, directly, if I needed to at any point. I haven't done that quite yet because I have been traveling the last month around the world. But the appointment of Jan Eliasson by both Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon as a Special Envoy means we have a very senior, experienced international diplomat to help with the mediation process, on the political process. That is critically important and Ban Ki-Moon did say to me that Jan Eliasson has his full support, and we have seen every evidence that that is the case since he took office.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. My final question, if plan B for Darfur does not work, would you support the deployment of the peacekeeping force without the consent of Bashir? What is the policy of that?

Mr. NATSIOS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make the thing work. A negotiated approach to this is the best approach. If that does not work, we are going to have to reassess our policy. Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Now we will hear from our ranking member, Representative RosLehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your long-time leadership on this humanitarian crisis.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. It is a pleasure to see you again. I wanted to ask you three questions regarding China. You have indicated that the United States and China, we hope, may have more in common in terms of policy toward Sudan than it would appear. If you could elaborate on where we might come to terms, and given their vast commercial interest in Sudan, are the Chinese truly ready do you believe to take a firm stand alongside the United States and press for a resolution in Darfur? And secondly, now that China has apparently changed its posture, would Beijing be willing to support the expansion of sanctions against individuals imposed by the U.N. Security Council? And thirdly, if you could detail the nature of China's relationship with the Sudanese military establishment, is China a major source of weapons for the Sudanese armed forces? Is it cash? In what way are they a problem there? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is nice to see you again. The first thing I should say is that it is not in the Chinese national interest in a country where they are getting 5 to 7 percent of their oil to be in unstable political circumstances with insurgencies going on. It is not in their interest. I might add that some things have taken place in the last 2 months which also are changing Chinese interests. Chad had for many years recognized Taiwan, not the People's Republic of China. You know there is a sensitivity about that with many countries. In the last 2 months, the Chinese Government had broken relations with Taiwan and established them formally with the People's Republic of China. And the Chinese oil and gas company, which is owned by the Government of China, has now bought a large interest in the oil wells of Chad. And so the war that is going on between Chad and Sudan is not in the Chinese interest because the Chinese now have oil in

terests in both countries, and so it is in their interest commercially for this conflict to end and not to spread.

So I think that is very important because people in all countries operate based on national interest, and I think that is one of the things that was clear from my conversations with the Chinese when I went to Beijing last month. Two, I think the Chinese recognize that our friends in Africa-despite what they rhetorically may say or not say at the human rights commission-they are very upset in Africa about what is happening in Darfur. I have foreign ministers and prime ministers and presidents who I have known for many years, they are furious at what is happening. We saw evidence of this with the election of John Kufuor one of the great new leaders of Africa, in my view one of the greatest leaders in Africa as the new president of the African Union instead of President Bashir who wanted to take that job. That didn't happen as an accident. It happened because Africans are upset about this.

I think how the Chinese react to the crisis in Sudan will affect their relations with the rest of Africa, and the Chinese know that. The Chinese told us that they are concerned about that, and they understand the sensitivity among African states about what is happening in Darfur. The African Union has 7,000 troops there. If they weren't concerned about it, they wouldn't have done something that they have actually only done once before in the history of sending African Union peacekeeping troops there. So I think the Chinese understand they have an interest in resolving this in a political negotiated settlement so we don't have another war.

That is another thing. We have had three wars in 20 years, three wars in 20 years. I think the people of Darfur have suffered enough. We need a final peace agreement that will, in fact, resolve the issues that led to the first three wars. Now the government made it much worse, as I said in my formal testimony, by arming one tribe to slaughter other tribes, which is what they did in the south, but the fact of the matter is, there are real development issues that have to be resolved in Darfur in order for the whole place to be put back together again. And it is in the Chinese interest, I believe, for that to happen.

So I think we can work together. I was a little disappointed with what happened recently in terms of the visit. I just have to be very candid with you. I was hoping for a little bit more diplomatic pressure from the Chinese, but we don't have a good readout in detail on what happened privately. You can't always, you know, public statements are one thing, what happens privately is quite another, and we are still waiting to hear in more detail in fact what happened in those meetings.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Ms. Woolsey.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Natsios, for being here, and I like your energy and passion behind all of this. I particularly want to thank

Mr. NATSIOS. Sometimes it gets a little out of control.

Ms. WOOLSEY. I want to thank Chairman Payne for not giving up and members of this committee on calling the situation in Darfur what it is, genocide, and I think that has made a difference

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