batteries of Port Hudson, where they within 400 yards of her antagonist, but anchored. was prevented from approaching nearer, in consequence of a strong raft which spanned the river and separated them. A vigorous fight now began. As Admiral Farragut was thus, by his position between the batteries of Vicksburg, Warrenton, and Grand Gulf above, and those of Port Hudson below, cut off from his communications by water, and unable to restore them without a fight, there was great inquietude felt in regard to his safety. The enemy affected to be sure of catching him. The Admiral, while trusting confidently in the power of his good ships and himself to force their way past the enemy's cannon, wherever the object would justify the risk, contented himself, in the mean time, with such com munications as he could hold through an occasional adventurous messenger. On the 7th of April, his secretary boldly faced the dangers of passing the enemy's position, and succeeded in reaching Baton Rouge. "Almost the first shots from the rebel steamers," says an eye-witness, "demolished the pilot-house of the Albatross, killing one of her pilots and carrying away a hand of the other. They rigged relieving tackles aft, and thus steered the steamer during the remainder of the action. Her mainmast was also cut nearly in two; a ball passed through her hull, near the water line, injuring her machinery, but not so seriously as to prevent its use. "The first broadside of the Albatross carried away the steam connection-pipe of the Mary T., killing and wounding thirty persons. The Grand Duke was also struck several times, her cotton flying at every shot, or our well-aimed broadsides taking effect in different parts of her works. The action continued about forty minutes, without interruption of firing on either side. The Grand Duke then finding it too hot for them, backed up stream under cover Admiral Farragut continued to blockade the Red River, occasionally sending out the Albatross to reconnoitre, while the Switzerland joined Admiral Porter's fleet, which had come down from above and was co-operating with General Grant's movements by land. of the woods, leaving the Mary T. disThe Albatross, in the course of an ex-abled. pedition up the Red River, had a severe fight with two of the enemy's boats near April Gordon's Landing, the Mary T. 27. and the Grand Duke. Though the Estrella and Arizona, two Union gun-boats, followed the Albatross, they engaged the enemy only at long range, since they had been ordered not to advance. The Albatross moved up to The Albatross then dropped down and communicated with Captain Cook, of the Estrella, as to the practicability of capturing the disabled steamer. The raft across the river, however, was still intact, and interposed an impassable barrier between our own and the rebel steamers. Meantime, the Grand Duke hitched on to her crippled N. Y. Tribune. companion and towed her out of range. The fight-one of the fiercest and most desperately contested naval engagements yet witnessed on the Western waters-was over. Throughout the action the Albatross fought with most unflinching gallantry, and her officers and crew deserve well of their country. She had seven men killed and wounded at her guns-three killed and four wounded, as near as I can ascertain. The Grand Duke and Mary T., according to the statement of two deserters, had sixty persons killed and wounded on the two boats." The Hartford and the Albatross remained above Port Hudson until the surrender of that place, having, in the mean time, taken part in the bombardment of the batteries, during the unsuccessful attempts of General Banks to carry the enemy's works by assault. On the 11th of July, the two steamers arrived at New Orleans, where, after their adventurous cruise and long absence, they were received with acclamation. Hudson was the greatest blow yet in- The enemy, notwithstanding the capture of their strongholds at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the consequent loss of the command of the Mississippi, strove by every effort to obstruct its navigation. The tortuous course of the great river, its length, and the formation of its banks, whose alternate marshes, cane-brakes, and bluffs offered ready means of offence and shelter, were favorable for skulking guerrilla parties, who continued to infest the Mississippi and seriously impede the passage of vessels. The Union fleet was constantly on the alert, but notwithstanding its vigilance, many lives Admiral Farragut, after aiding in completing the victory at Port Hudson, by clearing the banks of the Mississippi at Donaldsonville and elsewhere, of the lingering enemy, returned to the North, where he met a triumphant reception. The capture of Vicksburg and Port and much property were destroyed. CHAPTER IV. General Rosecrans, after the Battle of Stone River.-His Advance Checked.--Delay in establishing a Basis of Opera tions and securing Communications-Rosecrans prepared to Advance.-Rosecrans' Movements in Middle Tennessee. His Report.-The Operations of the Enemy's Cavalry and Detached Parties.-The Enterprise of General Van Dorn.-His Attack on Franklin.-His Repulse.-General Morgan on the Move.-His Rout at Snow Hill.-Success of Union Cavalry.-Woodward Recaptured.-Wheeler's Raids.-Destruction of Railroad.-Raid on the River.Gun-boats Destroyed.-McMinnville Surprised by the Unionists.-Mrs. General John Morgan a Prisoner. --Escape of the General.-Unionists Capture Tuscumbia and Spring Hill.-The Success of Union Cavalry.-Death of Van Dorn.-Streight's Expedition.-Streight overtaken by Forrest, and forced to Surrender. 1863. AFTER the battle of Stone River and the occupation of Murfreesboro', General Rosecrans found it impracticable to advance through Tennessee immediately. The necessity of securing his communications, constantly threatened by an enterprising cavalry, and the strong positions easily assumed by the enemy in a region of mountain and forest, with rare spaces of settlement and culture, prevented a rapid campaign. He was obliged first to establish and secure a dépôt of supplies, and to organize an adequate cavalry force to protect his line of communication and take advantage of the enemy should they retreat or be beaten. "The dépôt was established and in a defensible condition," reported Rosecrans, "by the 1st of May, but," he added, "the inferior numbers of our cavalry and the scarcity of long forage wore out our cavalry horses faster than we could replace them, and it was not before the 15th of June that we had brought what we had into available condition." to Columbia and Spring Hill, where Forrest was concentrated, and threatening Franklin. "The position of Bragg's infantry was covered by a range of high, rough, rocky hills, the principal routes passing southward from Murfreesboro' toward Tullahoma and the line of the enemy's communications. "1. By McMinnville it is seventy-five miles to Tullahoma. Its length precludes it, while the intermediate by-roads between that and Manchester were so difficult as to be regarded as unsuited for the movement of an army; and "2. The Manchester pike passing these hills through Hoover's Gap, and ascending to the barrens' through a long, difficult canon called Matt's Hollow. "3. The Wartrace road through Liberty Gap, which passes into the one along the railroad by Bellbuckle Gap. "4. The Shelbyville turnpike running through Guy's Gap. "5. The Middleton dirt road. "6. The road by Versailles, into the Shelbyville and Triune roads, both of which avoid passes and have few defiles. "The enemy held all these passes, and his main position in front of Shelbyville was strengthened by a redan line extending from Horse Mountain on the east to Duck River on the west, covered by a line of abattis. and Union men at about 18,000, infantry and artillery; Hardee's at 12,000, infantry and artillery-making a total of 30,000 of these arms, and probably 8,000 effective cavalry." After describing the position of the enemy, General Rosecrans thus narrates his own movements and their result : "Positive information from various sources concurred to show the enemy intended to fight us in his intrenchments. at Shelbyville, should we advance by that route, and that he would be in good position to retreat if beaten, and so retard our pursuit through the narrow winding roads from that place which lead up to the 'barrens,' and thus inflict severe loss without danger to their own line of retreat to the mountains toward their base. I was determined to render useless their intrenchments, and, if possible, secure their line. of retreat by turning their right and moving on the railroad bridge across Elk River. This would compel a battle on our own ground, or drive them on a disadvantageous line of retreat. Το accomplish this it was necessary to make Bragg believe we could advance on him by the Shelbyville route, and to keep up the impression until, if possible, we had reached Manchester with the main body of the army, as this point must be reached over a single practicable road passing through Hoover's Gap, a narrow way three miles in length, between high hills, and then through Matt's Hollow, a gorge two miles long, with scarce room anywhere for wagons to pass each other. These passes were occupied by the enemy, but eight miles from Har-ville, to the vicinity of Bradyville; his dee's headquarters, nor more than six- advance to seize the head of the defile teen miles from their left at Shelbyville. leading up to the 'barrens' by an ob"The plan was, therefore, to move scure road leading them to Manchester General Granger's command to Triune, by Lumley's Station. All the other and thus create the impression of our troops were ordered to be in readiness intention to advance on them by the to march with twelve days' rations of Shelbyville and Triune pikes, while bread, coffee, sugar, and salt; six days' cavalry movements and an infantry meat on hoof, and six days' pork or advance toward Woodbury would seem bacon. General Mitchell accomplished to be feints designed by us to deceive his work after a sharp and gallant fight. Bragg and conceal our supposed real General Granger arrived and took posidesigns on their left, where the topog- tion at Salem in pursuance of orders. raphy and the roads presented comparatively slight obstacles and afforded great facilities for moving in force. "Events proved that this had the desired effect; and accordingly Bragg called forward Buckner and all the spare troops at his command from East Tennessee and the lines of the railroads, the last of them arriving on the very evening they began their retreat from their position in front of Duck River. The operations which followed these successful preliminaries were as follows: "On the 23d of June, Major-General Granger, under orders, sent General Mitchell, with his cavalry division, on the Eagleville and Shelbyville pike, to make a furious attack on the enemy's cavalry and drive in their infantry guards on their main line, while General Granger, with his own troops and Brannan's division, moved, with ten days' rations, to Salem, sending his sick and baggage to the camps at Murfreesboro'. On the same day Palmer's division and a brigade of cavalry were ordered to move, via Cripple Creek and Ready "The corps commanders met at headquarters in the evening, when the plan of the movement was explained to them, and each received written orders for his part, as follows: "Major-General McCook's corps was to advance on the Shelbyville road, turn to the left, move two divisions by Millersburg, and, advancing on the Wartrace road, seize and hold Liberty Gap. The third division was to advance on Fosterville and cover the crossing of General Granger's command from the Middleton road, and then move by Christiana to join the rest of the corps. "General G. Granger was to advance on the Middleton road, threatening that place, and cover the passing of General Brannan's division of the fourteenth corps, which was to pass by Christiana and bivouac with the rear division of the twentieth corps. "The fourteenth corps, Major-General Thomas, was to advance on the Manchester pike, seize and hold with its advance, if practicable, Hoover's Gap, and bivouac so as to command and |