District of Columbia vs. Humason. amount." (Act of assembly of August 23, 1871.) By this provision, the "license-tax imposed" on the defendant on November 1, 1873, would have been $83.33, which, added to the maximum fine, would be $133.33. 2d. But the words, "in addition to license-tax imposed," preclude the idea that the amount of the fine is to be arrived at by adding that tax to the fine. It is a tax, and not a fine or penalty. If a person is fined, he may have to take out a license to prosecute the business he has undertaken to pursue, but it is not the business of the police court to collect licensetaxes, nor can the District compel a man to take out a license. If the view of the court below were correct, how often can the "license-tax imposed" be added to the fine in any one year? Moreover, would not the fine of $250, if collected, go into the treasury of the District, and, therefore, the defendant could be sued by the District for the license-tax in addi tion to the fine thus increased. 3d. But we contend further that the defendant does not come within the definition of a "commercial agent." He is not a "person whose business it is as agent to offer for sale goods, wares, or merchandise," &c. He was not here on his own business; he had no interest in it whatever. Whether he sold or not made no difference in his compensation. He was no more a "commercial agent" in any just meaning of those words than the horse that he might use to haul his goods around the city for sale. It was not his business, but the business of the Humason & Beckley Manufacturing Company. 4th. No tax is imposed upon manufacturers in the District of Columbia, except in the single instance of manufacturers of gas. Any attempt to require the manufacturers of the States to take out a license for the sale of their goods within the District, when none is required of resident manufacturers, would be a discrimination against the citizens of the State, and would be void under article IV, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States. Ward vs. Maryland, 12 Wal lace, 418. 5th. Such a tax upon mere resident manufacturers would be in violation of the right of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, conferred by art. I, sec. 8, of the District of Columbia vs. Humason. Constitution of the United States. Brown vs. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; City of New York vs. Miln, 11 Pet., 192; Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35; Gilman vs. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 730; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232; Steamboat Co. vs. Livingston, 3 Cow., 736; 2 Story on Const., secs. 1065 to 1073. Mr. Justice WYLIE anounced the decision of the court to the following effect: An argu The question in this case is whether the legislative assembly can impose a fine upon parties coming into the District from any of the States to sell goods or merchandise by sample, and without having taken out a license. The law imposing the fine is very clear, and its language is not to be mistaken, and we think it is applicable to this case. ment is, however, presented as to whether the assembly had any right to enact the law, as it is claimed that it has a tendency to interfere with the trade and commerce between the District and the States; but we think it has not that effect any more than any of the other licenses for which the law provides. A license is not required to be taken out only by persons coming here, but by all persons engaging in the same business, whether residents or non-residents. In this respect there is no discrimination. The local merchants and traders, carrying on this same kind of business, are required to pay for a license to contribute to the support of the government, and if persons from abroad can compete with them without the imposition of this tax, they are placed at a great disadvantage in their business. By subjecting all to the same tax, the rule of equality and fairness is arrived at. We, therefore, are of opinion that as the law imposes no greater burden upon non-residents or their agents here than it does upon the residents engaged in the same business, it is liable to no constitutional objection. We think the judgment was also right in being for the amount of the licensetax for one year added to the fine imposed by the court. Judgment affirmed. OLIN, J., dissenting. Painter vs. Drane et al. URIAH H. PAINTER vs. J. W. DRANE ET AL. IN EQUITY-No. 3989. A master-builder agreed to erect two dwelling-houses and complete them in six months. The houses were not finished at the time agreed upon, and the owner notified the contractor that his contract was at an end, and he finished them himself, and, for this purpose, he employed several of the defendants to furnish work and material, and paid them. The owner paid a large amount to the original contractor and the subcontractors, and claims damages for the breach of contract. The contractor and various subcontractors have filed liens on the property and commenced actions to enforce such liens. Under these circumstances the owner can maintain a bill in equity, bringing all the parties into one suit, to enjoin the proceedings at law, and have all the claims settled in chancery. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. The bill of complaint states substantially as follows: The plaintiff, on the 15th day of May, 1873, entered into a contract in writing with the defendant, Drane, by which the said Drane, in consideration of the sum of $19,148, agreed to erect, within six months from the signing of the contract, two brick dwelling-houses, to the entire satisfaction of the owner and architect, who was to have power to stop all work when it should appear to him to be to the interest of the owner so to do, on account of the weather or other cause. Drane failed to complete them within the specified time, and the complainant, on the 20th of November, 1873, notified Drane that his contract was at an end, and that he, the complainant, would finish the houses himself, to which Drane assented after some objections. The complainant then employed, among others, the defendants, Hannan, a plumber, Jackson, a plasterer, Nolan, a worker in concrete, and Miller, a bricklayer, to finish said houses, expressly notifying each of them that he would not be responsible for work done or material furnished to said Drane prior to that date; and the complainant has paid each of the above-named persons, so employed by him, all that is due him. The defendant Veihmeyer furnished certain stone to said Drane before the 20th of November, 1873, to be used Painter vs. Drane et al. in said building. Said Drane claimed to have paid said Veihmeyer for all the stones to be used in the buildings. The plaintiff has paid Drane, on account of his contract, $9,200. To complete the houses after Drane gave up the work, he has paid Drane's codefendants and other mechanics and materialmen, $8,879.76. By reason of Drane's failure to have said houses completed at the time agreed, and the consequent delay in their being made ready for occupancy, the plaintiff sustained a loss greater than the difference between the contract-price of said houses and their actual cost, and for the excess said Drane is justly indebted to the plaintiff. The defendant Hannan, on the 30th of December, 1873, filed notice of lien against complainant for $1,408.45; and July 17, 1874, filed his bill in equity, No. 3840, for $744.25. Defendant Veihmeyer filed notice of lien January 31, 1874, for $667.62, and brought suit at law, No. 11901, for $660. On 2d of February, 1874, defendant French filed notice of lien, and commenced suit at law, No. 12054, for $193.20, February 23, 1874. Defendants Nolan and Miller have also filed notices of lien and brought suits at law, No 12245 and 3054; Nolan for $120 and Miller for $300. Defendants Draper & Co. have brought suit at law, No. 12115, for $217.30, and defendant Drane, suit No. 12,347, for $19,643.16. Defendant Jackson filed notice of lien, March 6, 1874, for $410. These defendants in their said suits pretend either that the plaintiff in this suit is personally responsible to them for work and material done for and furnished to said Drane, prior to November 20, 1873, or that the work done and material furnished after that date, under special contract with said Drane, was furnished and done for the plaintiff. And the said Drane, in his said suit, claims, among other things, compensation for the identical labor and material included in the suits brought against the plaintiff by the subcontractors, who are made parties defendant thereto. The plaintiff prays for an account, an injunction against the several suits at law, and that the liens be declared void, &c. To this bill the defendant Veihmeyer demurred, and the court overruled the demurrer, with leave to said defendant to answer. From this decree the defendant Veihmeyer appealed. Painter vs. Drane et al. Edwin L. Stanton, for plaintiff, argued that: On the facts, it is clear that the settlement of the account between Painter and Drane necessarily involves the settlement of those between Painter and the subcontractors. Painter, of course, in his suit with Drane, is entitled to credit for the respective amounts which he has properly paid the several subcontractors, or which he is bound to pay them; and as there is a controversy between him and them as to the amount of these several payments or debts, the suit between Painter and Drane can never be settled until the final determination of each of the subcontractors' suits. Again: If these numerous suits are allowed to go on, Veihmeyer, for instance, may, after a trial, recover judgment against the plaintiff for, say, the amount of his claim, $660. When the case of Drane vs. Painter shall be reached, Painter will then claim a credit of $660, the amount paid Veihmeyer. But as Drane is not a party to the suit of Veihmeyer against Painter, he will not be bound by the judgment, and will, of course, require Painter to prove the credit, and the case of Veihmeyer will have to be tried over again. The same reasoning will apply to each of the subcontractors. But this is not all. At the trials of the subcontractors' suit against Painter, the evidence may tend to show that Painter is bound to pay them only in case he was indebted to Drane on account of the houses when they were finished. Then, in each of these suits, in order to determine whether Painter owes Drane anything, it would be necessary to go over their account. The result in each suit might be different, and Drane would not be bound by any of the judg ments. That under such circumstances a court of equity ought to settle all the intermingled accounts in one suit is plain; for in no other way can justice be done. Story's Eq. Plead., sec. 271a; Id., sec. 278a; Fitch vs. Creighton, 24 How., 163; The Attorney General vs. Corporation of Poole, 4 Mylne & Craig, 31. This is not a bill of interpleader. It is a bill for an account and to enjoin proceedings in other suits. The prayer for an order to interplead is collateral to the principal relief |