And now, it only remains for me to say that it is a very grave question for the people of this Union to consider whether, in view of the fact that this slavery question has been the only one that has ever endangered our Republican institutions-the only one that has ever threatened or menaced a dissolution of the Union-that has ever disturbed us in such a way as to make us fear for the perpetuity of our liberty-in view of these facts, I think it is an exceedingly interesting, and important question for this people to consider whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while obtaining new territory, the question how it may affect us in regard to this, the only endangering element to our liberties and national greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answers to his question, have expressed mine. I think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are before the public. I am willing and anxious that they should consider them fully-that they should turn it about, and consider the importance of the question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether it is, or is not, wise in the people of this Union, in the acquisition of new territory, to consider whether it will add to the disturb ance that is existing among us-whether it will add to the one only danger that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union, or of our own liberties.

I think it is extremely important that they shall decide, and rightly decide, that question before entering upon that policy.

I

LOVE Abraham Lincoln so ardently, that I scarcely dare write my opinion of him. His obscure parentage, his humble birth, his lack of childhood's joys, his exalted attainments, his peculiar talents, his natural gifts, his sympathy for the oppressed, his patriotism for his country, his loyalty to truth, his pure life, and his having had all these excellencies crowned with a martyr's death, renders him beyond doubt, one of the most illustrious men that ever labored to make goodness triumphant, and brotherly charity universal.

SPRINGFIELD, 1881.

M.B. Affleck

EXTRACT FROM MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH,

AT QUINCY, ILLINOIS, OCTOBER 13, 1858.

I was aware, when it was first agreed that Judge Douglas and I were to have these seven joint discussions, that they were the successive acts of a drama-perhaps I should say, to be enacted not mearly in the face of audiences like this, but in the face of the nation, and to some extent, by my relation to him, and not from anything in myself, in the face of the world-and I am anxious that they should be conducted with dignity and in good temper, which would be befitting the vast audiences before which it was conducted.

I was not entirely sure that I should be able to hold my own with him, but I at least had the purpose made to do as well as I could upon him; and now I say that I will not be the first to cry "hold." I think it originated with the Judge, and when he quits, I probably will. But I shall not ask any favors at all. He asks me, or he asks the audiences, if I wish to push this matter to the point of personal difficulty? I tell him, No. He did not make a mistake, in one of his early speeches, when he called me an amiable man, though perhaps he did when he called me an "intelligent" man. It really hurts me very much to suppose that I have wronged anybody on earth. I again tell him No! I very much prefer, when this canvass shall be over, however it may result, that we at least part without any bitter recollections of personal difficulties.

EXTRACT FROM MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH. 125

We have in this nation this element of domestic slavery. It is a matter of absolute certainty that it is a disturbing element. It is the opinion of all the great men who have expressed an opinion upon it, that it is a dangerous element. We keep up a controversy in regard to it. That controversy necessarily springs from difference of opinion, and if we can learn exactly-can reduce to the lowest elements-what that difference of opinion is, we perhaps shall be better prepared for discussing the different system of policy that we would propose in regard to that disturbing element. I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms, is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong. We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong in its tendency, to say the least, that extends itself to the existence of the whole nation. Because we think it wrong. we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong. We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it. We have a due regard to the actual presence of it among us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and all the constitutional obligations thrown about it. I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the nation, and to our constitutional obligations, we have no right at all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it. We go farther than that; we don't pro

pose to disturb it where, in one instance, we think the Constitution would permit us. We think the constitution would permit us to disturb it in the District of Columbia. Still, we do not propose to do that, unless it should be in terms which I don't suppose the nations is very likely soon to agree to the terms of making the emancipation gradual and compensating the unwilling owners. Where we suppose we have the constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about it. We also oppose it as an evil so far as it seeks to spread itself. We insist on the policy that shall restrict it to its present limits. We don't suppose that in doing this we violate anything due to the actual presence of the institution, or anything due to the constitutional guaranties thrown around it.