Page images
PDF
EPUB
[graphic][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

order for the battle to which I referred was, |
with slight modifications, literally conformed
to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run
in the manner proposed, and put into action as
before arranged, and that up to late in the
afternoon every movement ordered was carry-
ing us successfully to the object we had pro-
posed before starting-that of getting to the
railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of
Virginia, and going on it far enough to break
up and destroy the communication and inter-
views between the forces under Beauregard
and those under Johnston. And could we have
fought a day or a few hours sooner, there is
every thing to show how we could have con-
tinued successful even against the odds with
which we contended.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
Your most obedient servant,
IRWIN MODOWELL,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

[blocks in formation]

and bridge approaches, on which both Ayers and Carlisle at different times tried the effect of their guns without success; and a careful examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying me that they were impracticable for the purpose of artillery, these batteries had to remain comparatively useless until such time as Hunter's column might clear the approach by a movement on the opposite bank. During this period of waiting the thirty-pounder was occasionally used with considerable effect against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's column, and out of the range of ordinary guns. Using a high tree as an observatory, we could constantly see the operations of Hunter's and Heintzelman's column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieut. O'Rourke, of the engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy reinforcements to support their troops. At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run, and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his reports, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and directions, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman's report, which you will find herewith.

GENERAL: In obedience to order No. 22, dated Centreville, July 20, Sherman's, Schenck's, and Keyes's brigades, of this division-Richardson's brigade having been left in front of Blackburn's Ford-moved at half-past two A. M., on the 21st inst., to threaten the passage of the Warrenton turnpike bridge, on Bull Run. I arrived in front of the bridge with Schenck's and Sherman's brigades, and Ayres's and Carlisle's batteries, about six A. M., Keyes's brigade having been halted by your order to watch the road coming up from Manassas, and about two So soon as it was discovered that Hunter's miles from the run. After examining the posi- division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes's tion, and posting Sherman's and Schenck's bri- brigade, which arrived just as the left of Shergades and artillery, I fired the first gun at half-man's was crossing the run, and having satisfied past six A. M., as agreed upon, to show that we were in position. As my orders were to threaten the passage of the bridge, I caused Schenck's brigade to be formed into line, its left resting in the direction of the bridge, and the battery which the enemy had established to sweep the bridge and its approach, so as to threaten both. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right of the Warrenton turnpike, so as to be in position to sustain Schenck, or to move across Bull Run in the direction of Hunter's column.

The thirty-pounder gun attached to the Carlisle battery was posted on the Warrenton turnpike, with Ayres's battery considerably in its rear, Carlisle's battery was posted on the left of Sherman's brigade. In this position we awaited the appearance of Hunter's and Heintzleman's columns as ordered, until such time as the approach to the bridge should be carried, and the bridge rebuilt by Capt. Alexander, of the engineers, who had on the spot the necessary structure for that purpose.

Soon after getting into position we discovered that the enemy had a heavy battery, with infantry in support, commanding both the road

myself that the enemy had not the force nor the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes's brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the move in person, as I saw it must necessarily place me on the left of our line, and in the best possible position, when we should have driven the enemy off, to join Schenck's brigade and the two batteries left on the opposite side. I ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of his column a little to the right of the line of march taken by Sherman's brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings

In closing this report, it gives me great pleasure to express my admiration of the manner in which Colonel Keyes handled his brigade, completely covering it by every possible accident of the ground, while changing his positions, and leading it bravely and skilfully to the attack at the right moment, to which the brigade responded in every instance in a manner highly creditable to itself and satisfactory to its commanding officers. At no time during the conflict was this brigade disorganized, and it was the last off the field, and in good order.

standing on the heights above the road leading | General Schenck's brigade, intending, as it was to Bull Run. The charge was here ordered, fresh, to have it cover the retreat. I did not and the Second Maine and Third Connecticut find it in the position in which I had left it, and regiments, which were opposed to this part of supposed it had moved forward and joined the the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of retreating column. I did not see General the hill until they reached the buildings which | Schenck_again until near Cub Run, where he were held by the enemy, drove them out, and appeared active in rallying his own or some for a moment had them in possession. At this other regiments. General Schenck reports that point, finding the brigade under the fire of a the two Ohio Regiments left Bull Run after the strong force behind breast works, the order was cavalry charge, and arrived at Centreville in given to march by the left flank across an open good order. field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Run, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the stone bridge, causing the enemy to retire, and giving Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abatis which had been placed there, and prepared the way for Schenck's brigade and the two batteries to pass over. Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy's battery it was removed and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of the bill, and was on the point of ascending it in time to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that, unless a rapid movement to the rear was made, we should be cut off, and through my aid, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating column in good order. When this junction was made I left Keyes's brigade and rode forward to ascertain the condition of Schenck's brigade and the artillery left this side of Bull Run, and on arriving there found Ayers's battery and Lieutenant Haines's 30-pounder waiting orders. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Haines to limber up and move forward as soon as possible. This was promptly done, and the piece moved on towards Centreville. I then went into the wood where the ammunition wagon of this piece had been placed, out of the reach of the fire, and found that the driver had deserted and taken away part of the horses, which made it impossible to move it. I then returned to Ayers's battery, which I found limbered up, and ordered it to move forward and cover the re-ing our losses at Bull Run. treat, which was promptly done by its gallant officers, and when the cavalry charge was made, shortly afterward, they repulsed it promptly and effectually. I then collected a guard, mainly from the Second Maine regiment, and put it under the command of Colonel Jameson, with orders to sustain Captain Ayers during the retreat, which was done gallantly and successfully, until the battery reached Centreville. Before ordering Colonel Jameson to cover Ayers's battery, I passed to the rear to find

Colonel Keyes says:-"The gallantry with which the Second Maine and Third Connecticut regiments charged up the hill upon the enemy's artillery and infantry, was never, in my opinion, surpassed, and the conduct of Colonels Jameson and Chatfield in this instance and throughout the day merits the highest commendation. Colonel Terry rendered great assistance by his gallantry and excellent conduct. Lieutenant Hascall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Lieutenants Walter and Ely, rendered gallant and effective assistance." It gives me pleasure to be able to confirm the above from personal observation, and to express my personal satisfaction with the conduct of this brigade. For further particulars as to gallant conduct of individuals, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of commanders of brigades, hereunto attached. Colonel Sherman speaks highly of Colonel McCoon, of Wisconsin, and Lieutenants Piper and McQuester-all on his personal staff.

From my own personal staff I received, in every instance, prompt and gallant assistance, and my thanks are due to Captains Baird and Merrill, Lieutenants Houston, Abbott, Upton, O'Rourke, and Audenreid, for gallant conduct and the prompt and valuable assistance they rendered me. Lieutenants Abbott and Upton were both wounded, and each had a horse killed under him, as also had Lieutenant O'Rourke.

I enclose herewith a table of casualties show

I have the honor to be, with great_respect, your most obedient servant, DANIEL TYLER, Brigadier-General Commanding Division. Brig.-Gen. McDowell, Commanding Depart ment North-eastern Virginia.

CASUALTIES.

First Brigade. Killed. Wounded, Missing. Slightly Wd.
Col. E. D. Keyes.....19
118
18
Second Brigade.

50

21

16

...120

208

253

Gen. Schenck.......21
Third Brigade.
Col. Sherman.

First brigade had four officers wounded, none | ridge and wood in front, and partly by the edge killed, and five missing.

Second brigade had three officers killed, none wounded, and one missing.

Third brigade had three officers killed, fifteen wounded, and three missing, which are included in above average.

Grand Total-Killed, 160; wounded, 279; missing, 423.

Fourth brigade was not at Bull Run, being left at Blackburn's Ford.

of the timber lying between us and the run. Here we lay, in pursuance of your orders, for perhaps two and a half or three hours, with no evidence of our nearness to the enemy except the occasional firing of musketry by our skirmishers in the wood in front, answered by the muskets or rifles of the enemy, to whom our presence and position were thus indicated, with a view to distract his attention from the approach of Col. Hunter's force from above and in his rear. At this time I received your notice and order, announcing that Hunter was heard

Col. Tompkins reports 140 others missing, without giving names. As this regiment did not cross Bull Run, they must have been ac-from-that he had crossed, and was coming curately informed as to their killed and wounded. This, taken in connection with the fact that three of their officers are reported as deserters, known to be in New York City, leads to the belief that, their officers having set the example, the men were not slow to follow.

REPORT OF GENERAL SCHENOK.

SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT N. E. VIRGINIA, July 23, 1861. To Brig.-Gen. TYLER, Commanding First Di

vision:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit this report of the movements and service of my brigade in the battle at Bull Run off the Gainesville road on the 21st inst.

Leaving my camp, one mile south of Centreville, at 24 o'clock A. M. of that day, I marched at the head of your division, as ordered, with my command in column, in the following order: the First Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, Col. McCook; the Second Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Mason; the Second New York State Militia, Col. Tompkins; and Capt. Carlisle's Battery of Light Artillery, six (6) brass guns. To Capt. Carlisle's command was also attached the large Parrott gun, 30-pounder, under direction of Lieut. Haines, of the artillery corps.

Proceeding slowly and carefully, preceded by five companies of skirmishers of the First and Second Ohio, which I threw out on either side of the road, we approached the bridge over Bull Run, beyond which the rebels were understood to be posted and intrenched, and to within a distance of perhaps three-fourths of a mile of their batteries, on the other side of the

stream.

In obedience to your command, on first discovery of the presence of the enemy's infantry forming into line on the hill-side beyond the run, I deployed my three regiments of infantry to the left of the road, and formed them in line of battle in front of his right. Thus my command was constituted the left wing of our division, Col. Sherman's brigade coming up and taking position to the right of the road.

After the fire had been opened by discharge of the large Parrott gun from the centre in the direction of the enemy's works, I moved my extended line gradually forward at intervals, taking advantage of the ground until I had my force sheltered partly in a hollow covered by a

down about two miles above us, and directing that if I saw any signs of a stampede of the enemy in front, I should make a dash with the two Ohio regiments, keeping the New York regiment in reserve. For this movement I immediately formed and prepared.

Soon after, and when, by the firing of artillery and musketry in front at the right, it ap peared that the rebels were actively engaged in their position by our forces on the other side of the stream, I received your order to extend my line still further to the left, sending forward Col. McCook's regiment to feel the battery of the enemy, which was ascertained to be on the hill covering the ford, half a mile below the bridge, and supporting him with my two other regiments. This was immediately done. Col. McCook advanced in that direction along the road, which we found to be a narrow track through a pine wood, thick and close with undergrowth, and flanked on either side by ambuscades of brush work, which were now, however, abandoned. Reaching the head of this narrow road, where it opened upon the stream, Col. McCook found the battery to be a strong earthwork immediately opposite, mounted with at least four heavy guns, and commanding the outlet from the wood. An open space of low ground lay between, with a cornfield to the left, the direct distance across the enemy's battery being 350 yards.

Behind the battery, and supporting it, were discovered some four regiments of the rebel troops, while rifle pits were seen directly in front of it. The First regiment was then deployed to the left in the edge of the woods, and into the cornfield; one company, Captain Kells's, being thrown forward towards the run, up to within, perhaps, twenty yards of the battery. While this was done, I advanced the Second Ohio, followed by the Second New York, towards the head of the road, in supporting distance from the First Ohio, Lieut.Col. Mason's regiment filing also to the left. Receiving Col. McCook's report of the battery, and that it would be impossible to turn it with any force we had, I immediately despatched a message to the centre to bring up some pieces of artillery to engage the enemy from the head of the road. In the mean time the enemy, discovering our presence and position in the woods, and evidently having the exact range of the

« PreviousContinue »