wards had been firing; that he had also ordered the Eighteenth regiment back out of the open field into the woods on the Centreville road as a reserve. The Thirty-second regiment, by Col. Miles's order, remained as a reserve, in column, on the Centreville road, about threequarters of a mile in rear; Col. Miles then ordered me to continue the firing, without regard to ammunition, which I did, until I received an order to stop, about two hours later. As soon as Col. Miles left me again in command, I sent back the brigade corps of pioneers to the back road whence the two regiments had been moved, with instructions to fell trees and to completely block the road, which they effectually did. We had, during the afternoon, unmistakable evidences that a large body of cavalry and infantry had attempted to take us in the rear by means of the road, for when they were return ing, having been stopped by the fallen trees, Maj. Hunt, with his howitzers, Lieut. Green and Lieut. Edwards, with the rifled guns, poured a heavy fire into their column, the effect of which we could not ascertain, but it must have been destructive, as the distance was only from half to three-quarters of a mile. In the course of the day two companies, and later four companies, of the Thirty-first, and two of the Sixteenth were, by Colonel Miles' order, thrown forward to feel the enemy's strength, to the front and left in the direction of Bull Run. They found the enemy posted in the woods, and were recalled. They reported having killed several of the rebel scouts. The afternoon, until about four o'clock, was passed inactively, except firing rifled cannon at moving columns of the enemy at great distances. I had seen unmistakable evidences in the afternoon, by clouds of dust, &c., of the concentration of the enemy's troops on our left, but peremptory orders from Colonel Miles to hold the position, and remain there all night, were received. He then left me in command for the night, and I immediately began to prepare for an attack. I threw out two companies of skirmishers to our rear, and ordered the Thirtysecond forward to support them. About four o'clock we saw the enemy approaching down a gorge, leading into a valley, which lay directly to our left, about 500 yards distant. The field in which I was ordered to remain was enclosed on two sides by dense woods, and covered by light bushes on the side toward the said valley on the left. After the enemy were discovered filing into the valley, no movement was made for some time. When it was supposed, from the appearance of things, that the last of the column was entering the valley, I ordered all the artillery (six pieces) to charge front to the left, but not to fire until the rear of the column was seen. I placed the artillery, with a company of infantry with each piece, and charged the battle front of the two regiments (the 16th and 31st) supporting the artillery to the left, and on a line with them, and ordered every man to lie down and reserve his fire. During the whole time that this order was being carried out, the enemy's troops were still advancing down the hill, four abreast, and at "right shoulder shift." I gave orders to Lieut. Edwards, when I saw the rear of the column, to give it a solid twenty-pound shot, which he did, knocking a horse and his rider into the air, and starting into a double-quick the rear of the column into the valley. I then ordered the whole artillery to pour grape and canister into the valley, and at every fire there went up a tremendous howl from the enemy. During all this time the enemy poured volleys of musketry over the heads of our prostrate men. This firing continued for twenty-five or thirty minutes. A portion of the enemy rushed into a barn, from which well-directed shots brought some out in great haste. The whole force of the enemy consisted, as near as I could estimate, from the time of their passing one point, and from what I can find out, of 3,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. They were utterly dispersed. A small number of them came up into the edge of the field, to the number of about 50, and fired five volleys at our prostrate men, but did not succeed in drawing shot from them in return. It has been ascertained that the enemy had left the field, from their having ceased firing, and from seeing them run through the bushes in every direction, and hearing at the same time that our troops were falling back on Centreville, I received orders by an aid from Col. Miles, who was in Centreville, to fall back also on that place and encamp. I immediately went over to give the same order to Richardson's brigade on the Centreville road, and also to Green's battery, but found they had left some time before, by Col. Miles's orders through an aid. The Thirty-first regiment, under Col. Pratt, filed out of the field in rear of the artillery, and the Sixteenth followed, under Lieut.-Col. Marsh, each in perfect order, not having fired a gun at the enemy. The Eighteenth and Thirty-second regiments were ordered by me to fall back on Centreville, which they did in good order, and my entire brigade, together with Hunt's battery, fell back on Centreville Heights, without the least confusion, and assumed position under the direct command of Gen. McDowell, who sent a major (an aid) to me, directing that my regiments should fall in, in accordance with his expressed orders. The entire left wing was then in complete order, and every man in his place. Having received this order from Gen. McDowell, I left my command and went to Centreville Centre, to look after the sick and wounded, and my own baggage train. I returned immediately to my command and found that Col. Miles had been superseded, and received an order from General McDowell to take command of the left wing, which I did, encamping on the ground. Soon after the or der came to fall back on Fairfax Court House. I formed my brigade, the Sixteenth regiment first, Green's battery next, and the Eighteenth, Thirty-first, and Thirty-second following, and marched them towards Fairfax Court House. I found Blenker's brigade about two miles on the road, on each side of it, and in order, at "parade rest." I communicated with Col. Blenker, and found that he had received direct orders from Gen. McDowell to bring up the rear, and prevent any attack from the enemy. My brigade thus continued its march, and arrived in camp in Alexandria in perfect condition. On Monday, every regiment, as I understand, having an evening parade, and being prepared for any duty, Green's battery went on to Arlington, from which place I recalled it here yesterday, and the brigade now stands complete as before the battle, with the exception of casualties herewith enclosed, amounting to Lieut. Craig, of Hunt's battery, killed, and two privates wounded, (one seriously and one slightly,) and one private taken prisoner. they were supporting the artillery, may be attributed the safety of the latter, and probably the safety of the left wing. Col. Mathewson performed various evolutions during the day, under orders-at one time protecting one road, at another time another, and then, as a reserve column-and the patience of himself and command while so acting within sound of fire, entitles him to great credit. Adjutant Howland, Sixteenth regiment, my acting aide-de-camp, rendered me valuable services in changing the troops from time to time, and in generally doing all of his own duties thoroughly, and much that appertained to others. To Brevet Second Lieut. Bradford, acting brigade-commissary, and to Acting Brigade Quartermaster Woolsey R. Hopkins, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Cowdrey, much praise is due for the gallant manner in which they delivered orders, sometimes under heavy fire. Surgeon Crandall and Surgeon's-mate Moore, Sixteenth regiment, performed their duties with great fidelity and skill, dressing the wounds of many not under my command. Surgeon Hamilton, of the Thirty-first regiment, dressed the wounds of over 200 men at Centreville. To the teamsters of ordnance and baggage wagons credit is due for having returned all the wagons and teams, and public property of every description intrusted to them, safely to camp. I understand from a deserter, now in my camp, that my old class-mate at West Point, Robert E. Lee, commanded the enemy's forces opposed to me at Blackburn's Ford. With respect to the conduct of the officers under my command, on the 21st, I cannot say too much of the practical and industrious perseverance of Col. Richardson, who commanded his brigade on the Centreville road, who made important impromptu defences in felling trees, and making temporary fortifications across the road, which, although they were not required, from the direction of the attack, would have Joseph B. Rodden, Company K, Sixteenth proved of immense value under other circum-regiment, remained on the field at Centreville stances. His persevering energy during the until the morning after the battle, and brought day was untiring, and I am indebted to him for into camp, with the aid of a negro, whom he valuable suggestions as to positions and de- pressed into the service, thirty head of cattle fence. To Major Hunt and Lieut. Edwards, belonging to the Government, and arrived at who commanded the batteries on the left, any Alexandria on Tuesday morning. words that I can use will fall far short of expressing the beauty with which they handled their pieces, and the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was the most surprisingly beautiful display of skill ever witnessed by those present. As to Lieut. Green, who had charge of the rifled guns on the right, and was more immediately under the eyes of Col. Richardson, I can state from my own observation that the cool and deliberate manner in which he commanded his battery on that and on previous occasions, assures me that he is entitled to more praise than his modest report, which I herewith enclose, would indicate. As to Col. Jackson, I can state that during the morning, while he was in the face of the enemy, discharging picket duty, and in line of battle, he and his command behaved with coolness and bravery, and were relied upon in the afternoon with great confidence as a reserve. Col. Pratt, commanding the Thirty-first regiment, and Lieut.-Col. Marsh, commanding the Sixteenth regiment, ordered into battle by Col. Miles, on the field, and in previous picket duty, showed superior drill and discipline, and to their strict obedience of orders in reserving their fire, under the most provoking circumstances, while I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't, THOS. A. DAVIES, Col. Comd'g 2d Brigade, Fifth Division, Army N. E. Virginia. T. H. COWDREY, Acting Assistant AdjutantGeneral. MAJOR BARNARD'S REPORT. WASHINGTON, July 29, 1861. Capt. E. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General: SIR: On the 18th of July, at about 9 A. M., I joined the commanding general about two miles beyond Fairfax Court House, on the road to Centreville. He was then about going to Sangster's, and invited me to attend him. Not understanding his journey to have the character of a reconnoissance, but as simply to communicate with the division of Col. Heintzelman, I preferred accompanying the division of Gen. Tyler at Centreville. Proceeding to Centreville, I joined Captain Alexander (Engineers) a short distance on the road leading to Blackburn's Ford. He was at this time preparing to encamp his pioneer party, It should be borne in mind that the plan of the campaign had been to turn the position of Manassas by the left-that is to say, that from Fairfax Court House and Centreville we were to make a flank movement towards Sangster's and Fairfax station, and thence to Wolf Run Shoals, or in that direction. In my interview with the commanding general, just referred to, he said nothing to indicate any change of plan, but on the contrary, his remarks carried the impression that he was more than ever confirmed in his plan, and spoke of the advance on Centreville as a demonstration." 66 In proposing, therefore, to reconnoitre the enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford, it was not with the slightest idea that this point would be attacked. But a reconnoissance would be the carrying out of a "demonstration." and it was my intention, as soon as the troops | this battery, and Ayres's battery was brought should be fixed in their positions, to propose to up and stationed on the left. The enemy's Gen. Tyler to make a reconnoissance of the batteries soon ceased answering. After ours enemy's position at Blackburn's Ford. had continued playing for about half an hour, I thought it a useless expenditure of ammunition, and so stated to you, (who arrived on the spot shortly before this,) and presume that Gen. Tyler concurred in this opinion, as the firing soon ceased. I supposed that this would be the end of the affair, but perceiving the troops filing down towards the run, I thought it necessary to impress Gen. Tyler with the fact that it was no part of the commanding general's plan to bring on a serious engagement. I directed Capt. Alexander (Engineers) to state this fact to him, which he did in writing, having stated the same verbally before. At the same time, I directed Lieut. Houston to accompany the troops and make such observations of the enemy's position as he could. I remained on the heights, observing as well as I could the movements of the enemy's forces. While I was awaiting Captain Alexander I The affair becoming more serious than I exencountered Matthias C. Mitchell, who was se- pected, I was about to go down to the front, cured as a guide. Representing himself as a when our troops retired, and I returned to CenUnion man and a resident of that vicinity, I treville with yourself, to report to Gen. Mcwas engaged questioning him when intelligence Dowell. It is proper to observe that, before was received that Gen. Tyler had sent back for our artillery practice commenced, movements artillery and infantry, and that the enemy was of troops were observed on the road leading in sight before him. Riding to the front I join- from Manassas to Blackburn's Ford. As the ed Gen. Tyler and Col. Richardson. Proceed-road presented itself to the eye, those not very ing with them a short distance further, we familiar with the locality might feel some doubt emerged from the woods, and found ourselves-judging merely by the eye-whether these at the point at which the road commences its descent to Blackburn's Ford. The run makes here a curve or bow towards us, which the road bisects. The slopes from us towards it were gentle and mostly open. On the other side, the banks of the run rise more abruptly, and are wooded down to the very edge of the run. Higher up a cleared spot could be seen here and there, and still higher-higher than our own point of view, and only visible from its gently sloping towards us-the elevated plateau, comparatively open, in which Manassas Junction is situated. Although, owing to the thickness of the wood, little could be seen along the edge of the run, it was quite evident, from such glimpses as we could obtain, that the enemy was in force behind us. I represented to Gen. Tyler that this point was the enemy's strong position, on the direct road to Manassas Junction; that it was no part of the plan to assail it. I did not, however, object to a demonstration," believing that it would favor what I supposed still to be the commanding general's plan of campaign. The two 20-pounders of Parrott's had been ordered up. They were opened upon the enemy's position, firing in various directions, without our being able to perceive the degree of effect they produced. We had fired perhaps a dozen rounds, when we were answered by a rapid discharge from a battery apparently close down to the run, and at the crossing of the road. The 20-pounders continued their fire, directing at troops were advancing to, or retiring from Blackburn's Ford. The impression seemed to be quite common among us that they were retiring. I was perfectly sure that they were columns moving up to meet us from Manassas. At my interview with the commanding general that evening, he informed me that he had convinced himself that the nature of the country to the left or southward of Manassas was unfit for the operations of a large army; that he had determined to move by the right, turning the enemy's left; that the provision trains were just coming in, and that the troops would require the next day to cook their provisions for another march. I told him I would endeavor, the next day, to obtain such information as would enable him to decide on his future movement. The next most prominent crossing of Bull Run, above Blackburn's Ford, is the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike. Such a point could scarcely be neglected by the enemy. Information from various quarters gave good cause for believing that it was guarded by several thousand men-that at least four cannon were stationed to play upon it and the ford not far below, and moreover that the bridge was mined, and extensive abatis obstructed the road on the opposite shore. Two or three miles above the Warrenton Bridge is a ford laid down on our maps as Sudley's Springs. Reliable information justified the belief that the ford was good, that it was un fortified, that it was watched by only one or | take the road for Sudley's Springs-or, rather, two companies; and, moreover, that the run above it was almost everywhere passable for wheeled vehicles. Midway between the stone bridge and Sudley's Springs, maps indicated another ford which was said to be good. it was provided that (if I mistake not) Hunter's division should proceed to Sudley's Springs, and Heintzelman to take the lower ford. These matters, however, to be regulated by circumstances." It was intended that the head of Hunter's division should be at the turn off at early daylight, or about 4 a. M., and that it should reach Sudley by six or seven. You are aware of the unexpected delay. The two leading brigades of Tyler's had not cleared the road for Hunter to this point until half-past five, and our guide, alleging that a nearer route to the ford would bring our column in sight of the enemy's batteries, led them by so circuitous a way that Hunter did not reach Sudley until half-past nine or thereabouts. Accompanying the commanding general, we, as you are aware, after waiting two or three hours at the turn off, rode on to overtake the front of Hunter's division, when we emerged from the woods, nearly northeast of Sudley, into the open country, from whence the course of the run and the slopes of the opposite shore could be seen; we could perceive the enemy's column in motion to meet us. The loss of time here, in a great measure, thwarted our plan. We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the Notwithstanding our conviction of the practicability of these fords, no known road connected with them from any of the main roads on our side of Bull Run. We had information that a road branched from the Warrenton turnpike, a short distance beyond Cub Run, by which-opening gates and passing through pri- | vate grounds-we might reach the fords. It was desirable to assure ourselves that this route was entirely practicable. In company with Capt. Woodbury (Engineers) and Gov. Sprague, and escorted by a company of cavalry, I, on the 19th, followed up the valley of Cub Run until we reached a point west ten degrees north, and about four miles in an air line from Centreville, near which we struck a road which we believed to lead to the fords. Following it for a short distance we encountered the enemy's patrols. As we were most anxious to avoid attracting the enemy's attention to our designs in this quarter, we did not care to pursue the reconnoissance further. We had seen enough to be convinced of the perfect practi-rear of the enemy's forces at Warrenton stone cability of the route. To make more certain of the fords, however, Capt. Woodbury proposed to return at night, and with a few Michigan woodsmen from Col. Sherman's brigade, to endeavor to find them. On returning to camp it was determined to send Capt. Wright and Lieut. Snyder (Engineers) with Capt. Woodbury. At the same time the commanding general directed Capt. Whipple (Topographical Engineers) and Lieut. Prime (Engineers) to make a night reconnoissance of the run between Warrenton Bridge and Blackburn's Ford. Both these night expeditions failed. It was found the enemy occupied the woods too strongly on our side of the run to permit the reconnoissance to be accomplished. It was not our policy to drive in his pickets until we were in motion to attack. On laying before you the information obtained, the commanding general believed himself justified in adopting the following plan of attack, which was decided upon on the 20th: First-A false attack to be made by Richardson's brigade (temporarily attached to Miles's division) on Blackburn's Ford, the rest of that division remaining in reserve at Centreville. Second-Tyler's division to move from its camp at 3 A. M. (the 21st) towards the stone bridge of the Warrenton turnpike, to feign the main attack upon this point. bridge before he could assemble in sufficient force to cope with us. It now became necessary to have Tyler's division force the passage of the bridge. It had always been intended that this division should pass at or near the bridge, but it was hoped, by taking its defences in rear, it could be passed without force. The commanding general promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his attack with all vigor. I had yet much confidence that, though we had been anticipated, (owing to the delays mentioned,) the enemy was not yet assembled in numbers to oppose us in great force, (a confidence which I think the facts justified ;) that we might successfully attack him in front, while the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank and rear. When we reached the front of Hunter's column the battle was just commencing. The events of the battle-field will be described in the reports you will receive from other quarters. I was near the commanding general until some time after the arrival of Sherman's brigade on our left. Being accidentally separated, I saw yourself on the right, and joining you, we observed for some time the action on the heights, where the enemy made his final and successful stand. As we were observing, the Zouave regiment of Heintzelman was driven back, leaving Rickett's battery, upon which we observed the enemy charge. Third-The divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman (in the order named) to leave their camps at 23 A. M., (they were encamped about two or You left me here, and I remained a few minthree miles behind Tyler,) and, following his utes longer an anxious spectator, and for the movement, to diverge from the Warrenton first time beginning to anticipate a possible deturnpike at the by-road beyond Cub Run, and | feat. Two brigades of Tyler's division had Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Col. Heintzelman. Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. D. C. Houston, to the First Division, under Gen. Tyler. First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the First Division, under Col. Miles. passed over the run, and I supposed (and I be- | Charles E. Cross, to the Second Division, unlieved the commanding general supposed) that der Col. Hunter. the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point that I sought you again, and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Col. Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington. While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated. They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving upon them. A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is herewith annexed. Reports from Capts. Wright and Alexander and Lieut. Prime will be furnished when received. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient, MAJOR BARRY'S REPORT. ARLINGTON, VA., July 23, 1861. I have stated that it was a part of the plan of the battle, that Tyler's division should pass Capt. J. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General, at or near the stone bridge. Two of his bri- Head-quarters Department N. E. Virginia: gades actually did pass, not at the bridge, (they CAPTAIN: Having been appointed, by special finding fords a half mile higher up,) and con- orders No. 21, Headquarters Department Northnected themselves with our left. In anticipa-eastern Virginia, Centreville, July 19, 1861, tion that the stone bridge would be blown up, Chief of Artillery of the Corps d'Armée, comCapt. Alexander had been instructed to ob-manded by Brig. Gen. McDowell, and having tain a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had served in that capacity during the battle of the on the spot, but there appears to have been no 21st inst., I have the honor to submit the folmine prepared under the bridge. Capt. Alex-lowing report: ander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis-two hundred yards in extent obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck's brigade to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front. The Artillery of the Corps d'Armée consisted of the following named batteries: Rickett's (Light Company I, 1st Artillery) six 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Hunt's (Light Company M, 2d Artillery) four light 12-pounders; Carlisle's (Company E, 2d Artillery) two James's 18pounder rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Tid, It will be seen from the above that the com- ball's (Light Company A, 2d Artillery) two 6bination, though thwarted by adverse circum-pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; stances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point. A fault, perhaps it was, that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles's (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, (though not on the battle-field.) and in its affair at Blackburn's Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the enemy. Green's (Company G, 2d Artillery) four 10pounder Parrott rifle guns; Arnold's (Company D, 2d Artillery) two 18-pounder James's rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Ayres's (Light Company E, 3d Artillery) two 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounder guns; Griffin's (Battery D, 5th Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's (Company G, 5th Artillery) two 20-pounders and one 30pounder Parrott rifle guns. The 2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers had with it a battery of six 13-pounder James's rifle guns; the 71st Regiment New York Militia, two of Dahlgren's On retiring to Centreville my opinion was boat howitzers, and the 8th Regiment New asked as to maintaining our position, and I York Militia a battery of six 6-pounder guns. gave it in favor of a prompt retreat; for I be- The men of this last-named battery having lieved the enemy was far superior in numbers, claimed their discharge on the day before the and that, elated by his victory, he would pur- battle, because their term of service had exsue, and I believed that a defeated army, actu-pired, the battery was thrown out of service. ally driven back on Washington before a pur- The whole force of artillery, of all calibres, suing enemy, would endanger the safety of the Capital. The engineer officers under my command and attached to the different divisions were as follows: Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut. was therefore 49 pieces, of which 28 were rifled guns. All of these batteries were fully horsed and equipped, with the exception of the two hewitzers of the 71st regiment New York Militia, which were without horses, and were drawn by drag-ropes manned by detachments from |