honor abandon them. The proper boundary between the two countries in this part of the world was obviously the line of the lakes, and the British commissioner did not strenuously dispute it. to concede the American claims from the fact that Spain also was claiming the Ohio valley, and likely to make trouble for the nation which possessed it.1

Great Britain was perhaps the more ready

Thus was the Northwest conquered and secured for the American Union. A different result would have changed the whole current of subsequent American history; how much no one can calculate, or has basis for any reasonable conjecture. The achievement was of incalculable value to America, and it was won with a handful of men by the patriotism, unflinching courage, and energy of George Rogers Clark.

1 Secret Journals of Congress, vol. ii. p. 225; Works of John Adams, vol. viii. p. 18; Works of Franklin, by Sparks, vol. ix. 128 et seq.; Pitkin's Hist. of U. S. ch. 15.

CHAPTER VI.

GREAT BRITAIN RELUCTANTLY SURRENDERS THE

NORTHWEST.

THE valor and endurance of America had won from the mother country an acknowledgment of independence, but had not produced a clear conviction that it was secure and permanent. A loose Confederacy of thirteen states, without army or navy, or treasury, or stable executive, or power of any sort to compel obedience by a single person to its proper requirements or commands, was not a spectacle calculated to excite admiration or to inspire confidence. To the thoughtful and disinterested observer it must have seemed probable that for want of cohesive force it would shortly fall to pieces. The interests of the several states were greatly variant, and for that reason amicable relations with other countries on some subjects might become impossible. The Confederacy owed a large debt which the states were expected to pay, but upon what basis or in what proportions it was not possible to secure consent of opinion or harmony of action. In the treaty of peace stip

ulations had been inserted in the interest of Brit

ish creditors and American loyalists, which must depend for their enforcement on the voluntary action of individual states, and the popular opposition to these stipulations was in some quarters so positive and aggressive that enforcement seemed quite out of the question. But these were not all the discouraging circumstances which the patriot was forced to contemplate, and in which the enemies of the country rejoiced. The poverty of the people, and their manifest inability to pay their debts, was in some parts of the country so great that rebellion was threatened if the courts were allowed to perform their regular functions. The Indians also gave occasion for alarm. In the negotiations for a treaty of peace they had not been included, but had been left to be dealt with separately. From central New York to the Mississippi they had in general sympathized with Great Britain in the late war; large numbers had taken arms in its cause, and Joseph Brant, the head chief of the Six Nations, a man of education, of great intelligence and ability, known and respected by all the tribes, had held a commission in the British army. After the war he had removed with his own tribe, the Mohawks, to Canada, that he might be under British, rather than American jurisdiction. Brant had a deep sense of the wrongs his people had suffered and were likely to suffer at the hands of the Americans; reflecting in this particular the general feeling

THE ENGLISH KEEP BACK THE POSTS. 107

among them.

Under all these circumstances a condition of semi-hostility existed on the part of the Indians, which gave no little concern to the state and confederate governments, and kept the new settlements disquieted.

The action of the British authorities tended very greatly to increase this disquiet, and to keep up the belligerent condition among the Indians. When the line of the lakes had been agreed upon as the northern boundary, it had been expected that the British would immediately surrender possession of Oswego, Niagara, Detroit, and the minor posts which fell within the limits of the United States. This expectation was not fulfilled. Baron Steuben was sent by Washington, in July, 1783, to the British General Haldiman to receive possession; but on making known his business he was informed by that officer that he had received no instructions for the surrender of the posts, and did not consider himself at liberty even to discuss the subject. He was so ungracious as even to refuse the baron passports to visit Niagara and Detroit; and the latter was compelled to return with nothing accomplished. For this conduct at the time there could have been no sound or friendly reason. Afterwards, the retention of the posts was excused by the failure on the part of the states to perform some of the stipulations contained in the definitive treaty of peace; and it was continued until the ratification of Jay's treaty,

twelve years later. Meantime there was a lingering hope that if the American Confederacy, as was not apparently improbable, should fall to pieces from its own inherent weakness, some of the states at least, to secure to themselves the blessings of permanent government, might be ready to return to their old allegiance, and the possession of the posts by the British would favor that result. What was certain was that the possession contributed largely to keeping up the hopes of the Indians, and to perpetuating the condition of hostility.

In the fall of 1784 the United States had entered into a treaty with the Six Nations at Fort Stanwix, by which that Confederacy was made to consent to relinquish all claims to the country west of a line beginning on Lake Ontario, four miles east of Niagara, thence passing southerly to the mouth of Buffalo Creek, thence to the north boundary of Pennsylvania, and thence west and south along the Pennsylvania line to the Ohio River. This treaty had caused bad feeling: the Six Nations had objected to entering into it without the presence and concurrence of the western tribes; but the government had insisted on negotiating with them alone, and they had very unwillingly assented. It was ominous that Brant was not present: he felt, as did his people generally, that it was unjust to require them thus to make a treaty which affected others as well as