KILPATRICK AND DAHLGREN'S RAID. 565 having otherwise inflicted little loss | an end. Kilpatrick had lost 150 men But Col. Ulric Dahlgren, who led a subordinate command of about 400 cavalry, had been far less fortunate. Crossing also at Ely's ferry, Dahlgren, after leaving Spottsylvania C. H., had gone farther to the right, through Louisa and Goochland counties, intending to cross the James and enter Richmond from the south when Kilpatrick assailed it from the north; but he found the river (at Dover mills) far too deep to be forded, and hanged his negro guide in the belief that he had purposely misled him away from Richmond rather than toward that city. Dahlgren now pushed down the north bank of the James to the fortifications of Richmond, which he charged at dark," passing the outer works; but was repulsed with loss This raid, though directed against the enemy's dépôts, railroads, &c., was designed to distract attention from another, far more formidable, led by Gen. Kilpatrick; who, starting" from Stevensburg, crossed the Rapidan at Ely's ford, and moved rapidly down the opposite flank of Lee's army, by Spottsylvania C. H., to the Virginia Central Railroad at Beaverdam station, where he had his first the enemy; collision and drove thence across the South Anna to Kilby Station, on the Fredericksburg road; cutting both roads as he passed, and pushing on to within 3 miles of Richmond;" passing its first and second lines of defenses, and fighting several hours before the third, which he was of course unable to carry, and compelled to fall back, Kilpatrick camped for the night six miles from Richmond and two from the Chickahominy; where a two-of course, by far superior numbersgun battery opened upon him, at 103 P. M., just as his weary men were dropping asleep. The charge which quickly followed was as quickly repulsed; but it was so manifest that the position was not adapted to quiet slumbers, that Kilpatrick moved on forthwith to the Pamunkey, which he could not find boats to pass; so he was obliged to move across the White House railroad and thence down the Peninsula; soon striking the track of a cavalry force sent up to his aid from Fortress Monroe by Gen. Butler, and encountering, when near New Kent C. H., a brigade of Black infantry, which had been likewise sent by Butler on the same errand. Pursuit by the enemy was of course at 10 Feb. 28. at the inner lines. He then, with the remnant of his forces, made a circuit around the city by Hungary to Hanovertown ferry; and, finding that Kilpatrick had been driven off eastward, struck thence for King and Queen C. H.; but was stopped, just after crossing the Mattapony at Dabe ney's ferry, by a body of local militia, at whose first fire he fell dead, pierced by five balls. His command was here scattered, each seeking to reach our lines as he best might; and some of them made their way to Kilpatrick; but at least 100 of them were picked up as prisoners. Col. Dahlgren's body was treated with ignominy; it being asserted that papers were found on it evidencing 11 March 1. 13 March 2. a plot to liberate our prisoners on | the Rapidan on his right, at Germa nia and Ely's fords: Warren leading at Germania, followed by Sedgwick, and pushing straight into 'THE WILDERNESS; Hancock crossing at Ely's ford, and moving on Chancellorsville, followed by the trains of the whole army. Burnside followed next day. The Wilderness is a considerable tract of broken table-land, stretching southward from the Rapidan nearly to Spottsylvania Court House, seamed with ravines and densely covered Belle Isle, near Richmond, and, by their aid, burn that city, taking the lives of Davis and his Cabinet! That these papers were Rebel forgeries, and the meditated arson and murder a Rebel invention, intended to 'fire the Southern heart,' and justify murder by a pretense of retaliation, seems no longer doubtful; while that the Confederate authorities authorized the placing of several barrels of gunpowder under Libby prison, so as to blow some thousands of Union captives into fragments in case of a successful with dwarfish timber and bushes, attack, is entirely beyond dispute. It is not impossible that Richmond might have been taken at this time, had Kilpatrick kept his men together, and taken the hazards of a sudden, sanguinary, persistent assault; but it could not have been held two days; so that its capture would have been of small importance. Had he been directed simply to destroy the railroads as thoroughly as he could, while Butler, moving by steam, had rushed on Richmond with 20,000 men, well provided with artillery, the chances of durable success would have been far better. Butler had, in fact, attempted" to surprise Richmond by a forced march, some weeks earlier; but the design had miscarried, through the escape by bribery of a culprit from prison, who gave the alarm to the enemy, and enabled them to obstruct the roads beyond Bottom's bridge. Butler's infantry, on this expedition, marched 80 miles within 56 hours; his cavalry 150 miles in 50 hours. All being at length in readiness, Gen. Meade's army, masking its intention by a feint on Lee's left, crossed" 23 diversified by very few clearings, but crossed by three or four good roads, the best of them centering on Fredericksburg, and by a multiplicity of narrow cart-tracks, used in peace only by wood-cutters. (It is a mineral region, and its timber has been repeatedly swept off as fuel for miners.) In this tangled labyrinth, numbers, artillery and cavalry, are of small account; local knowledge, advantage of position, and command of roads, everything. Lee's army, alert and vigilant, was just west of it; the roads diverged, fan-like, on that side: it was Grant's obvious interest to get through this chapparal as quickly and with as little fighting as possible: it was Lee's business not to let him. Hence, the moment our movement was developed, the Rebel army, which had been looking north across the Rapidan, was faced to the right and moved rapidly down parallel with our advance, forming line of battle some six miles east of its strong defenses on Mine run, which proffered a safe refuge in case of disaster. Lee, like Meade, had reorganized his army in three corps; 14 May 4. infantry under Hill against Warren, | tle after 1 P. M.; but Ewell was not and under Ewell against Sedgwick: the former driving in the 5th N. Y. cavalry with loss, and striking Warren heavily and full in front, long before he had reached Parker's store, and before Hancock had orders to arrest his southward march and, facing westward, swing in on Warren's left. In short, the battle commenced before our army was in position, and while our Generals still supposed that there was no considerable Rebel force at hand-as Lee evidently intended to have it. And Hill, having, by an early advance, secured a strong and sheltered position on a ridge crossing the road, repelled with loss the brigades of Bartlett and Ayres, of Griffin's division, that were first sent up against him; not pressing far his advantage until about 3 P. M.; when, perceiving the approach of Hancock, he attempted the favorite Rebel maneuver of interposing a strong force between our usually loosely joined commands, but was checked by Hancock's arresting his direct advance and pushing rapidly to the right, to close on Warren. This was effected, not a moment too soon; the enemy's charging column being already on Warren's left flank; but Hancock, with his division Generals, Birney, Barlow, and Gibbon, struck heavily on their right, and two hours' stubborn and bloody conflict, with musketry alone, resulted in great loss to both sides, and little advantage to either: Hancock's corps, which had, ere this, been strengthened by Getty's division of Sedgwick's, saving itself from rout by the most obstinate fighting. at first in so great force as Hill was; and the advantage here was on our side: the enemy being obliged, at 31 P. M., to give ground, after a most determined effort: Maj.-Gen. J. M. Jones and Brig.-Gen. Stafford having been killed. Rhodes's division, led by Gordon, next charged vigorously, and pushed back our advance with loss, taking some prisoners. In a return charge from our side, Gen. Pegram fell severely wounded. Hereupon a general advance on our side was ordered, but arrested by the coming of night. The Rebels claimed 1,000 prisoners to our 300 as the net product of the day's work; otherwise, the losses were nearly equal. Grant had decided to open next morning" by an advance along our whole front; Burnside's corps having arrived during the night by a forced march, and been distributed to the points where it seemed to be most needed. Sedgwick was ordered to move at 5 A. M.; but the enemy were upon him a quarter before; attempting to turn our right flank, which was held by Gen. Wright's division, with Gen. Seymour's provisional division still nearer the Rapidan. This attack, twice repeated during the forenoon, but not resolutely (being a feint to mask the real attack on Hancock), was repulsed, and our line advanced a few hundred yards to a more favorable position. At 8 A. M., our whole front was assailed, and again two hours later, as if the enemy were feeling for a weak point. Then, efforts were made, as before, to push in between our several corps and their divisions; and at length to strike with crushing force 16 Friday, May 6. Sedgwick had been attacked a lit GEN. WADSWORTH KILLED-SEYMOUR CAPTURED. 569 on one wing and then the other; | striking heavily on Stevenson's divi and this proved the more successful maneuver. It was evident that the Rebels, in their perfect knowledge of the country, and in the facility of moving their forces from left to right and back again in the rear of their defenses and fighting line, thus thoroughly screened from observation on our part, possessed advantages fully counterbalancing their deficiency in numbers. On our left, Gen. Hancock had moved out, at 5 A. M., and had pushed forward, fighting, crowding back Hill and taking many prisoners, nearly two miles, across the Brock road, on his way to Parker's store. Here he was stopped by the arrival of Longstreet; who, after a brief lull, charged in turn, throwing our front into confusion, and requiring the presence of part of Burnside's men to restore and steady it; when Longstreet in turn was pressed back, falling severely wounded—it was said by a fire from his own men. Again a desperate attack by the enemy bore back the front of the 2d corps to its intrenched line and abatis along the Brock road; near which, but farther to the right, Gen. James S. Wadsworth, gallantly struggling to stem the adverse tide, was shot through the head and mortally wounded; as Gen. Alex. Hays had been the day before. But, another lull now occurring, our front was straightened and strengthened; Gen. Burnside's corps having been thrown in between Hancock and Warren, so as to give our line the full strength of our infantry. Hardly had this been done when the now united corps of Hill and Longstreet fell furiously upon our left and left center, pushing them back, and, sion of Burnside's corps, drove it back and rushed through the gap. Hancock promptly sent Col. Carroll, with the 3d brigade of his 2d division, to strike the advancing foe in flank, which was admirably done: the ene my being driven back with heavy loss, and our troops regaining their former position. Thus ended the battle on our left; but, the enemy, massing swiftly and heavily on our right, after our Generals supposed the day's fighting over,struck again, under Gordon, just before dark, at that flank; surprising and routing Truman Seymour's and then Shaler's brigade, taking nearly 4,000 prisoners, including Seymour himself. For a moment, it seemed that our army, or at least its right wing, was exposed to rout; but Gen. Sedgwick exerted himself to restore his lines, and succeeded: the enemy making off with most of their prisoners in triumph. In fact, this charge had been made at so late an hour that no farther success than was achieved could wisely have been aimed at. Our army rested, after the second day's bloody struggle, substantially on the ground held by it at the beginning. Early next morning, some guns (which had just been posted on our right) opened; but there was no reply; then our skirmishers advanced, but were met by skirmishers only; and it was soon evident that Lee had intrenched his whole front, and was willing to receive an attack behind his works, but not inclined to advance again and make one. And, as fighting in this labyrinth was nowise Grant's choice, but Lee's wholly, and as the latter did not invite a persistence in it, Grant resolved to resume |