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the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time the corps of Franklin and Sumner, 19,000 strong, joined me at Centerville, the original Army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman, and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required, and should have had, some days of rest to put them into anything like condition to perform their duties in the field."
Gen. McClellan, we have seen, was ordered on the 3d of August to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. He hesitated, and remonstrated; but the orders were rëiterated more peremptorily; and he left Harrison's Bar with his rear-guard on the 16th of August. Having embarked and dispatched his corps successively at and near Fortress Monroe, he left that post on the 23d, arriving at Acquia creek on the 24th, removing to Alexandria on the 27th; on which day Halleck telegraphed him:
"Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centerville." To this, he replied, at 10:20 A. M.:
"I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation."
At 1:15 P. M., he again telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows:
"Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense? I have no means of knowing
the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the Valley?"
Half an hour later, he telegraphed:
"I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible; but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry."
An hour later, he telegraphed again:
"I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac.
"I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform wish to act in the dark." me at once what my position is. I do not
At 6 P. M., he telegraphed again: "I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 A. M., this morning, in which he says: All
forces now sent forward should be sent to
my right at Gainesville.'
"I now have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2,800 of Gen. Tyler's brigade, and Col. Tyler's 1st Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defense of Washington.
"If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate.
"In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey to hold his men for [from] Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off till further orders."
At 4:40 P. M. next day, Aug. 28th, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck:
"Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any
MCCLELLAN 'MARKING' TIME.
cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare | tion to accomplish much, if he meets with them, I will send a good corps of troops serious resistance. I should not have moved there. It is the key to Washington, which him but for your pressing order of last connot be seriously menaced so long as it is night. What have you from Vienna and held." Dranesville?"
At 4:45 P. M., he telegraphed again:
"Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field; and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out." To these dispatches, Gen. Halleck, at 8:40 P. M., responded as follows: "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."
At noon, he telegraphed again:
"Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation. Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown?
"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance ?"
Gen. McClellan had already directed Franklin to halt his command near Anandale; and, at 1 P. M. this day, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows:
"I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who, I really day"-think, ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond Anandale ?"
At 10:30 of the following the day of Pope's first indecisive battle at Gainesville or GrovetonMcClellan telegraphed to Gen. Halleck as follows:
"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving Gen. Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon, however. Detailed last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condi
Halleck, at 3 P. M., replied:
"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going farther. Otherwise, he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."
Fifteen minutes before, McClellan had telegraphed the President as follows:
"I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: 1st. To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; 2d. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe.
"No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I wil do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish August 29.
to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." To which the President, at 4:10 P. M., responded as follows:
"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope'-is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels. "A. LINCOLN."
But McClellan had already not only arrested Franklin's march at Anandale, but sent Sumner's corps northward toward Arlington and Chain Bridge, instead of toward the enemy. At 7:50 P. M., Halleck telegraphed him thus:
"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas."
wagon trains to move to Pope with the least possible delay."
Gen. Halleck, at 9:40 A. M. on the fatal 30th, telegraphed McClellan:
Franklin's march of yesterday, considering "I am by no means satisfied with Gen. the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."
At 11 A. M., McClellan responded:
"Have ordered Sumner to leave one
brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?"
To which Halleck, at 12:20 P. M., responded as follows:
"I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives."
Franklin's and Sumner's corps were now actually pushed forward, and found Pope without difficulty,
McClellan, at 8 P. M., telegraphed defeated and driven back on Centerto Halleck :
until we knew what was at Vienna. Franklin remained here until about 1 P. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow."
ville. Had they been there two days earlier, and had Porter now and then condescended to obey an order, that defeat might have been transformed into a victory. It seems clear that neither McClellan, nor any of his devoted lieutenants, was anxious that victory, under such auspices, should
At 10 P. M., Gen. McClellan tele- be achieved. Pope's appointment to graphed again:
the command, and his address to his army on opening the campaign," had been understood by them as reflecting on the strategy of the Peninsular campaign; and this was their mode of resenting the indignity. "See page 173.
"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope by advancing, as soon as possible, and, at the same time, cover the transit of Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and
LEE'S ADVANCE INTO MARYLAND.
'MY MARYLAND'-LEE'S INVASION.
GEN. MCCLELLAN had already' been verbally charged with the command of the defenses of Washington; and was, upon fuller advices of Pope's disasters, invested' by the President and Gen. Halleck with the entire control, not only of those fortifications, but of "all the troops for the defense of the capital," in obedience to the imperious demand of a large majority of the surviving officers and soldiers. Pope's original army had in great part been demolished; while that brought from the Peninsula by McClellan had been taught to attribute the general ill-fortune not to the tardiness and heartlessness wherewith Pope had been rëenforced and supported by their leaders, but to his own incapacity, presumption, and folly. McClellan at once ordered a concentration of his forces within the defenses of Washington; where they were soon prepared to resist the enebut whither Lee had no idea of my, following them. Having been joined by D. H. Hill's fresh division, from Richmond, he sent that division at once in the van of his army to Leesburg; thence crossing the Potomac and moving on Frederick. Jackson followed with a heavy corps, consisting of A. P. Hill's, Ewell's, and his own divisions, embracing 14 brigades, crossing at White's Ford and moving on Frederick, which was occupied on the 6th, without resistance. Gen. Lee, with the rest of his army, rapidly followed, concentrating at Frederick; whence he issued the following seductive address:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN “VIRGINIA, NEar Frederick, 'Sept. 8, 1862.
"To the People of Maryland:
"It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.
"The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties, and reduced to the condition
of a conquered province.
"Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, and contrary to all the forms of law.
"A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt.
"The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your Legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed; words have been declared offenses utive; and citizens ordered to be tried by by an arbitrary decree of the Federal Execmilitary commissions for what they may dare to speak.
"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a Government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this
foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence and sovereignty of your
Sept. 1. Sept. 2. VOL. II.-13
among you, and will protect all of you in | tomac to replenish their wasted and every opinion.
"It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will,,
"R. E. LEE, General Commanding."
The fond expectations which had prompted this address were never realized. The Marylanders had no gluttonous appetite for fighting on the side of the Union; still less for risking their lives in support of the Confederacy. All who were inclined to fighting on that side had found their way into the Rebel lines long before; there being little difficulty in stealing across the Potomac, and none at all in crossing by night to Virginia from the intensely disloyal, slaveholding counties of south-western Maryland. In vain was Gen. Bradley T. Johnson-who had left Frederick at the outset of the war to serve in the Rebel army-made Provost-Marshal of that town, recruiting offices opened, and all manner of solicitations to enlistment set forth. The number of recruits won to the Rebel standard while it floated over Maryland probably just about equaled its loss by deserters-say from 200 to 300.
The conduct of the Rebel soldiery was in the main exemplary. Hungry, ragged, and shoeless, as they often were, they rarely entered a house except by order, and never abused women; but cattle, horses, and everything that might contribute to the subsistence or efficiency of an army, were seized by wholesale, not only for present use, but thousands of animals were driven across the Po*Sept. 3.
Gen. McClellan was early apprised' of the disappearance of the Rebels from his front, and soon advised that they were crossing into Maryland. His several corps were accordingly brought across the Potomac and posted on the north of Washington; which city he left' in command of Gen. Banks, making his headquarters that night with the 6th corps, at Rockville. He moved slowly, because uncertain, as were his superiors, that the Rebel movement across the Potomac was not a feint. But his advance, after a brisk skirmish, on the 12th entered Frederick, which the Rebels had evacuated, moving westward, during the two preceding days, and through which his main body passed next day. Here he was so lucky as to obtain a copy of Lee's general order, only four days old, developing his prospective movements, as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN
"VIRGINIA, September 9, 1862. "The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's command will form the advance; and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.
"Gen. Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
"Gen. McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.
"Gen. Walker, with his division, after