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ton's cavalry, to advance upon and seize Malvern Hill. Through the incompetency of his guides, Hooker's first attempt miscarried; but it was renewed the next night," and, notwithstanding the ample notice of it given to the enemy, proved an easy success; Hooker driving the Rebels from Malvern with a loss of barely 14, and taking 100 prisoners; Col. Averill, with part of Pleasanton's cavalry, pushing north to White Oak Swamp Bridge, driving thence the 10th Virginia cavalry and capturing 28 men and horses. This advance, promptly and vigorously followed up in force, would doubtless have placed
McClellan in Richmond forthwith.
But Gen. M. had already received an order" directing a withdrawal of his army by water to Acquia creek, to support a fresh demonstration on Richmond from the Rappahannock; which order he began most reluctantly to obey; of course, recalling Gen. Hooker from Malvern. He was now eager to resume the offensive with far smaller rëenforcements than he had recently pronounced indispensable, and suggested that, in addition to Burnside's men, they might be spared him from Pope's army on the Rappahannock and from the West. Gen. Halleck-assuming the correctness of McClellan's own mistaken assumption as to the strength of the Rebel Army of Virginia-replied with crushing cogency as fol
ments from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are about thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect;
neither can rëenforce the other in case of
such an attack.
"If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction; and yet they must be united. To send
Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water-say Fredericksburg-where the two armies can be united.
"But, you will reply, why not reenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview, that you required it was impossible to give you so many. 30,000 additional troops. I told you that You finally thought that you would have some chance of success with 20,000. But would require 35,000, as the enemy was you afterward telegraphed me that you being largely rëenforced.
"If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized; which would require several
"To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reenforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James river; and, even after you receive the reenforcements asked for, you admitted
that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on
"Allow me to allude to a few of the facts Richmond. in the case.
"You and your officers at our interview estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then, you and others report that they have received and are receiving large rëenforce
"It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time-perhaps as much as those at Yorktown.
"This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean August 6.
RETREAT FROM THE PENINSULA.
time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you. "In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers-indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me—are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment."
Gen. McClellan forthwith commenced embarking his sick and five of his batteries, which had been assigned to Burnside; who, having been ordered on the 1st to Acquia creek, had immediately rëembarked his men, reaching his destination on the 3d, and promptly sending back his vessels to McClellan, who had been invested with complete control over the immense fleet of transports then in the Potomac, Hampton Roads, and the James. The latter commenced as if expecting to embark his entire force, including even the cavalry, at Harrison's Bar; but repeated and urgent messages from Washington, announcing" that the Rebels were crossing the Rapidan in force, and pressing Pope, soon impelled him to move the bulk of his troops by land to Fortress Monroe; the two leading corps (Porter's and Heintzelman's), preceded by Averill's
cavalry, taking that road on the 14th, crossing the Chickahominy by a pontoon-bridge at Barrett's Ferry and at Jones's Bridge; and Gen. M., with the rear-guard, breaking camp and following the army on the 16th; crossing and removing the pontoonbridge on the morning of the 18th. The retreat was covered by Gen. Pleasanton with the remaining cavalry.
Gen. Porter was under orders to halt the advance at Williamsburg until the crossing was complete; but, intercepting there a letter which apprised him that the enemy were concentrating rapidly on Pope, with intent to crush him before he could be rëenforced, he took the responsibility of pressing on to Newport News, which he reached on the 18th, having marched 60 miles in three days; and on the 20th his corps had embarked and was on its way to Acquia creek. On that day, the last of the army had reached its prescribed points of embarkation at Yorktown, Newport News, and Fortress Monroe." Heintzelman embarked at Yorktown on the 21st; Franklin at Fortress Monroe on the 22d; Keyes had been left at Yorktown to cover the embarkation, should any in as good condition as when they embarked, all have been embarked and landed by itself, and within two weeks. Each corps as a unit should its transportation have accompanied it; and, with the two wharves at Newport News, inconvenient as they are, three days and nights was ample time in which to put the transportation on shipboard; three days more would have been and one day in transitu-seven days. Three occupied in discharging it off and setting it up, corps could have shipped at the same time-one at Fortress Monroe, one at Newport News, and one at Yorktown. It has taken, in fact, nearly one month; and will be an entire month before all have arrived."
This view assumes that sufficient transportation was always in readiness exactly where and when it was required; which is unproved.
Rebel force be sent down the Penin- | bers, usually contrived to bring the
sula on the track of our army; but there was none, and our retreat was entirely unmolested-the attention and forces of the enemy being now absorbingly devoted to Pope. Gen. McClellan and staff embarked at Fortress Monroe on the 23d, and reported at Acquia creek next day; coming up to Alexandria, by Gen. Halleck's request, on the 26th.
larger force into action-fighting twothirds to three-fourths of his entire strength against one-fourth to onehalf of ours. Our commander, incessantly calling urgently for rëenforcements, never brought into action nearly all he already had, save that at Malvern the enemy forced a conflict before our army could again be scattered, and thus incurred a stingThus ended the unfortunate Pen- ing repulse, though a large portion insular campaign of the magnificent of our men were, even then, not Army of the Potomac. Its unsuc-enabled to fire a shot. Never before cess was due to the fact that the did an army so constantly, pressingly enemy nearly always chose the time need to be rëenforced-not by a and place of combat; and, though corps, but by a leader; not by men, uniformly inferior in aggregate num- but by a man.
GEN. POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.
GEN. JOHN POPE, having been | Winchester, of whom 40,000 might summoned from the West for the be considered disposable. To Gen. purpose, was selected by the Presi- Pope was assigned the duty of coverdent, after consultation with Gen. ing Washington and protecting MaScott, for the command of a force to ryland, with its great railroad, while be designated the Army of Virginia, threatening Richmond from the north. and to consist of all the troops then He had at first intended and expected covering Washington or holding the to advance to the neighborhood of lower end of the Shenandoah Valley. Richmond, and there unite in the This army was to be composed of operations of McClellan against that three corps, under Maj.-Gens. Fre- city. But he was appointed on the mont, Banks, and McDowell respec- very day' when Lee's designs against tively; but Gen. Fremont was re- McClellan's right wing were devellieved, at his own request, from serv- oped at Mechanicsville; and, before ing under one whom he regarded as he could concentrate his army, the rehis junior, and the command of his treat through White Oak Swamp to corps assigned to Gen. Sigel. The Harrison's Landing, by exposing his entire strength of this newly organ- meditated advance, unaided, to a ized army was nearly 50,000 men, succession of blows from the entire scattered from Fredericksburg to Rebel Army of Virginia, rendered
1 July 26.
POPE ADVANCES INTO VIRGINIA.
such a movement simple madness. In order, however, to effect at least a diversion in favor of McClellan's worsted army, and to enable it to abandon the Peninsula without further loss, he drew Sigel from Middletown, via Front Royal, to Sperryville, on one of the sources of the Rappahannock, near the Blue Ridge; while Banks, following nearly the same route from the Valley, came in a few miles farther east; and Ricketts's division of Gen. McDowell's corps advanced south-westwardly from Manassas Junction to a point a little eastward of Banks. Pope wrote to Gen. McClellan, then on the Peninsula, a letter proposing hearty cooperation and soliciting suggestions, which elicited but a vague and by no means cordial response. He had doubtless suggested to the President the appointment of a common military superior; whereupon Maj.-Gen. Halleck was relieved of his command in the West and called' to Washington as General-in-Chief, assuming command July 23d.
2 McClellan and his lieutenants had of course read and resented Pope's address to his army on taking the field, which they, not unreasonably, interpreted as reflecting on their strategy, though Pope disclaims such an application. Its text is as follows:
"WASHINGTON, July 14, 1862.
"To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia:
"By special assignment of the President of the United States, I have assumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants; in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and to the purpose.
"I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies -from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found -whose policy has been attack, and not defense. "In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you
Before quitting Washington for the field, Pope had ordered Gen. King, at Fredericksburg, to push forward detachments of his cavalry to the Virginia Central Railroad and break it up at several points, so as to impede the enemy's communication between Richmond and the Valley; which was effected. He had likewise directed Gen. Banks to advance an infantry brigade, with all his cavalry, to Culpepper Court House, thence pushing forward cavalry so as to threaten Gordonsville. advance to Culpepper having been unresisted, Banks was next ordered to send Hatch, with all his cavalry, to capture Gordonsville, destroy the railroad for 10 or 15 miles east of it, and thence push a detachment as far as Charlottesville, burning bridges and breaking up railroads as far as possible; but Hatch, taking along infantry, artillery, and heavy trains, was so impeded by bad roads that he had only reached Madison Court House on the 17th-a day after Ewell, with a division of Lee's army against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so; and that speedily.
win the distinction you are capable of achieving. "I am sure you long for an opportunity to That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you.
"Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you.
and holding them of lines of retreat and of bases "I hear constantly of taking strong positions of supplies. Let us discard such ideas.
"The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy.
"Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance.
Disaster and shame lurk in the rear.
"Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen JOHN POPE, forever. Maj.-Gen. Commanding."