Lee should have independent supreme control of the armies, and supersede the military authority of the President.

The discussion of this change in the Confederate Administration ended with the apparent acceptance by Gen. Lee of the appointment of Commander-in-chief. It was thus announced by him to the public:

"In obedience to General Order, No. 3, from the Adjutant and Inspector-General's office, February 6, 1865, I assume command of the military forces of the Confederate States. Deeply impressed with the difficulties and responsibility of the position, and humbly invoking the guidance of Almighty God, I rely for success upon the courage and fortitude of the army, sustained by the patriotism and firmness of the people, confident that their united efforts, under the blessing of Heaven, will secure peace and independence."

But Gen. Lee did not accept the position in the sense and to the extent that Congress had intended. He had not discarded the scruple referred to; he still believed the President to be "constitutionally" Commander-in-chief; and while accepting the position to which Congress and the country had called him, in terms so as to satisfy public sentiment and end a controversy in which he was unpleasantly involved, he did it with a mental reservation to respect the views of the President quite equivalent to the former written conditions that had been attached to the position. This explanation is necessary to understand a part of Confederate history which has been generally confused; and proofs of it we shall soon see in the sequel, where the unfortunate judgment of the President was still visible, and took its accustomed precedence in the conduct of military affairs.

The apparent change, however, in the military conduct of affairs, which the public interpreted according to the letter of the announcement, and without knowledge of its limited application, was the occasion of some new animation in the Confederacy. It was believed now, that with the renewal of confidence in the armies under Gen. Lee's hand, that the efflux of desertions might be stayed, and time gained for new measures to recruit the armies. Men commenced to lay hold on new grounds of hope. Gen. Lee himself was not despondent, as might be supposed, in his full knowledge of the desperate condition of affairs; he had conceived

the hypothesis that the Confederacy might last another campaign, and proceeding on this hypothesis, he meditated many measures by which its strength might be repaired in another twelve months' lease of existence, and the really large resources which yet remained in the country he made available for the purposes of the war. Mr. Rives was given as authority in Congress for saying that Gen. Lee "had but a single thing to fear, and that was the spreading of a causeless despondency among the people." "Prevent this," he said, "and all will be well. We have strength enough left to win our independence, and we are certain to win it, if people do not give way to foolish despair."

These hopeful views of Gen. Lee contemplated time; and probably proceeded in a great degree from his conception of a measure to make available the negro population of the South-a vast resource, indeed, but unwieldy, and surrounded by embarrassing questions as to the precise methods of employment. In September, 1864, Gen. Lee had given his opinion in a letter to the Secretary of War, that the army should have the benefit of a certain per cent. of the negroes, free and slave, as teamsters, labourers, etc.; and he suggested that there should be a corps of them permanently attached to his army. Subsequently, he enlarged his view of the matter, and addressed the following letter to a leading member of Congress:

HEADQUARTERS CONFEDERATE STATES ARMIES,
February 18, 1865.

Hon. E. Barksdale, House of Representatives, Richmond:

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th inst., with reference to the employment of negroes as soldiers. I think the measure not only expedient, but necessary. The enemy will certainly use them against us if he can get possession of them; and as his present numerical superiority will enable him to penetrate many parts of the country, I cannot see the wisdom of the policy of holding them to await his arrival, when we may, by timely action and judicious management, use them to arrest his progress. I do not think that our white population can supply the necessities of a long war without overtaxing its capacity and imposing great suffering upon our people; and I believe we should provide resources for a protracted struggle—not merely for a battle or a campaign.

In answer to your second question, I can only say that, in my opinion, the negroes, under proper circumstances, will make effi cient soldiers. I think we could at least do as well with them as the enemy, and he attaches great importance to their assistance. Under good officers, and good instructions, I do not see why they should not become soldiers. They possess all the physical qualifications, and their habits of obedience constitute a good founda tion for discipline. They furnish a more promising material than many armies of which we read in history, which owed their efficiency to discipline alone. I think those who are employed should be freed. It would be neither just nor wise, in my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves. The best course to pursue, it seems to me, would be to call for such as are willing to come with the consent of their owners. An impressment or draft would not be likely to bring out the best class, and the use of coercion would make the measure distasteful to them and to their owners.

I have no doubt that if Congress would authorize their reception into service, and empower the President to call upon individuals or States for such as they are willing to contribute, with the condition of emancipation to all enrolled, a sufficient number would be forthcoming to enable us to try the experiment. If it proved successful, most of the objections to the measure would disappear, and if individuals still remained unwilling to send their negroes to the army, the force of public opinion in the States would soon bring about such legislation as would remove all obstacles. I think the matter should be left, as far as possible, to the people and to the States, which alone can legislate as the necessities of this particular service may require. As to the mode of organizing them, it should be left as free from restraint as possible. Experience will suggest the best course, and it would be inexpedient tc trammel the subject with provisions that might, in the end, prevent the adoption of reforms suggested by actual trial.

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

What might have been the results of this measure if the conditions of time necessary to realize them had been secured, it would be profitless speculation now to inquire; for the time to test it was

never obtained. The experiment was but poorly initiated by Congress in a very defective bill passed on the heel of the session, and shared the fate of all Confederate things in a few weeks thereafter. While Gen. Lee laid hold of new hopes and new measures, all were overwhelmed by one catastrophe, and the Southern Confederacy fell with a suddenness that the enemy even had not expected, and perished before the time predicted in which a temporary recovery might take place and a last grand struggle of arms terminate the contest.

CHAPTER XII.

Extraordinary cheerfulness of Gen. Lee.-A psychological reflection.-The Army of Northern Virginia at a third stage in its history.-Military preparations for the evacuation of Richmond.-Protests of the Government.-Gen. Lee's last and desperate resolution.-Battle of Five Forks.-Theory and results of the action.Grant's assault in front of Petersburg.-How Gen. Lee received it. His remark to a staff-officer.

Ir has often been remarked by those who saw Gen. Lee in Richmond in the last periods of the war, shortly before the final battles of Petersburg, what extraordinary cheerfulness he exhibited, despite of all he knew of the extreme condition of the Confederacy. His manners were observed to be unusually lively and pleasant at this time; his step was elastic; and he presented a picture of healthy, cheerful activity that many despondent persons were at a loss to understand. There is in some measure a psychological explanation of this apparent inconsistency of behaviour. While ordinary men are depressed by the approach of a desperate trial, it appears to be the gift of the great soul to meet it with inspirations of alacrity, and to show a smiling face even in the last agonies of the contest against fate. It is the old heathen picture of man sublimely contending with fate, to the admiration of the gods; the modern idea of the true hero, with elated form and illuminated face, accepting the last test of endurance, and with the smile of a sublime resolution risking the last defiance of fortune. Cheerfulness in such circumstances is an inspiration; the crest of the truly great man rises in circumstances wherein the ordinary countenance falls, and the thought of a desperate trial puts a peculiar smile on his face when that of meaner men it would stamp with anxiety and alarm.

But there were reasons other than this recondite inspiration that so perceptibly kindled Gen. Lee's manners in what proved to be the last days of Richmond. He had conceived a resolution, at that time utterly unknown to the public, and founded on it a rational and lively hope.