was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured twenty wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks's supply train for that purpose.

"General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it. "I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

"Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at one a. m. via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportati on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you."

At 10.45 a. m. of the 31st of August General Pope sends the following to General Halleck, from Centreville:

"Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose."

On the 2d of September General Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of General MeClellan.

The following is from the testimony of General Halleck:

"Question. Had the army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

"Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so."

In relation to the command of General McClellan, he himself testifies as follows:

66

Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days, perhaps without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it prop erly."

army

The testimony of General Halleck upon the same point is as follows: "Question. What was the position of General McClellan in regard to the troops of the army of the Potomac as they landed at Aquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command; and if so, how long did they remain under his command?

"Answer. General McClellan retained the command of the army of the Potomac as it landed at those two points, except such portions of it as were sent into the field under General Pope. Those portions were considered as temporarily detached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the troops as detached, while under General Pope's immediate command, must be sent through the headquarters at Washington. He retained command of all the troops of his army as they landed at those places until sent into the field, and reported to General Pope; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of the detachments, until General Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under General McClellan's command. On his (General McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told to take immediate command of all, the troops in and about Washington, in addition to those which properly belonged to the army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directed to take such command he asked for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant General's office. The order issued from the Adjutant General's office was after General Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated September 2; but General McClellan had been in command ever since his arrival in Alexandria.

"Question. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria?

"Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might have no difficulty with General Pope's forces; that they might not question his authority."

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.

Very soon after General Pope and his army fell back on Washington the rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryland your committee will quote from the testimony of General McClellan and General Halleck. The testimony of General McClellan is as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days, perhaps without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position which I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly.

"Question. How long did you remain in command of the defences of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?

"Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the defences of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with General Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign. And it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three times of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been

determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came I went out."

The following is the testimony of General Halleck upon that point:

"Question. By whose orders was General McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were those orders verbal or in writing?

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to General McClellan by the President, at General McClellan's house, about 9 o'clock in the morning, previous to General McClellan leaving the city for Rockville.

"I will add that General McClellan, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defence within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the field. The decision was made by himself, and announced to General McClellan in my presence. I did not know what the decision was until I heard it thus announced."

In regard to the instructions given to General McClellan his testimony is as follows:

'Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that point?

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after that morning, when I was told to take command of the army in front of Washington. I do not think he gave me any instructions about the Maryland campaign.

"Question. After you commenced the movement did you receive any instructions from any one?

"Answer. I received some telegrams, that might be looked upon in the nature of instructions, from General Halleck and from the President. The general tenor of General Halleck's despatches was that I was committing an error in going so far away from Washington; that I was going rather too fast. He had the impression that the main force of the enemy was on the south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a small force in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of September, I recollect a telegram of General Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong in going so far away."

The testimony of General Halleck upon that point is as follows:

Question. What instructions, if any, were given to General McClellan in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Maryland?

66

Answer. The day the President gave General McClellan directions to take command of the forces in the field, we had a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was agreed between us that the troops should move up the Potomac, and, if possible, separate that portion of General Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder on the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions, further than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the campaign.

"I submit herewith copies of despatches to and from General McClellan, after he left Washington to take command of operations in Maryland, to the time that he was relieved from command. These papers comprise all the despatches sent to and received from General McClellan, so far as I know, except a letter dated October 13, addressed to him by the President, and which was shown to me just as the President was about to despatch it to General McClellan, and General McClellan's reply, dated October 17." [The letter of the President, with the reply of General McClellan, is incorporated in another part of this report.] "In regard to General McClellan going too fast or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the

meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more upon the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most immediate danger; that he was pushing forward his right too fast relatively to the movements of his left-not that the army was moving too fast or too far from Washington."

The letter of General Halleck of September 13, referred to by General McClellan, is as follows:

"Sent 10.45 a. m.

66

"WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, D. C., September 13, 1862. "MAJOR GENERAL MCCLELLAN: Yours of 5.30 p. m., yesterday, is just received. General Banks cannot safely spare eight new regiments from here, You must remember that very few troops are now received from the north nearly all being stopped to guard the railroad. Four regiments were ordered to General Dix to replace Peck's division. Porter took away yesterday over 20,000. Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania, so as to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over.

"In your letter of the 11th you attach too little importance to the capital. I assure you that you are wrong. The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us. Beware of the evils I now point out to you. You saw them when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance. No more troops can be sent from here till we have fresh arrivals from the north."

The letter from General McClellan of the 11th, to which General Halleck here refers, contains the following:

"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a victory at this time, and will fight well; but the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful; and, if we should be defeated, the consequences to the country would be disastrous in the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would recommend that one or two of the three army corps now on the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at once withdrawn, and sent to re-enforce this army. Twould also advise that the force of Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, where it can be of little use, and is continually exposed to be cut off by the enemy, be immediately ordered here. This would add about 25,000 old troops to our present force, and would greatly strengthen us.

"If there are any rebel forces remaining on the other side of the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in the forts, after the two corps shall have been withdrawn, will be sufficient to check them; and with the large cavalry force now on that side, kept well out in front to give warning of the distant approach of any very large army, a part of this army might be sent back within the intrenchments to assist in repelling an attack. But even if Washington should be taken while these armies are confronting each other, this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disasters which would follow a single defeat of this army. If we should be successful in conquering the gigantic rebel army before us, we would have no difficulty in recovering it. On the other hand, should their force prove sufficiently powerful to defeat us, could all the forces now around Washington be sufficient to prevent

such a victorious army from carrying the works on this side of the Potomac after they are uncovered by our army? I think not."

Your committee having gone so fully into the details of the Peninsula campaign, do not deem it necessary to devote so much space to the campaign in Maryland. The same mind that controlled the movements upon the Peninsula controlled those in Maryland, and the same general features characterize the one campaign that characterized the other. In each may be seen the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously; the same desire for more troops before advancing; and the same references to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. Your committee, therefore, content themselves with referring briefly to the leading operations of the campaign.

In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, your committee have not deemed it necessary to take much testimony upon that subject. The military commission which was convened in this city in October last fully investigated that subject, and their report has been given to the public. Attention is called merely to two telegrams of September 11, which passed between General McClellan and General Halleck, and which are as follows:

"ROCKVILLE, September 11—9.45 a.m.

"Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered at once to join me by the most practicable

"Washington, D. C., September 11, 1862.-Sent 2.20 p. m.

"There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present. The only chance is to defend his works until you can open a communication with him. When you do so, he will be subject to your orders.

"Major General MCCLELLAN, Rockville."

"H. W. HALLECK,
"General-in-Chief.

On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain was fought-the troops at Turner's Gap being under command of General Burnside, and those at Crampton's Gap being under the command of General Franklin-resulting in the enemy retiring to the vicinity of Sharpsburg.

On the 17th of September the battle of Antietam was fought. It was commenced by General Hooker on the right, at dawn, our troops driying the enemy before them and gaining an important position. When General Hooker was wounded and taken from the field, General Sumner took command of our right. General Sumner had been ordered to hold his corps in readiness to advance an hour before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance until twenty minutes past 7 o'clock in the morning. General Mansfield, who had come up to the support of General Hooker, had been killed. Our troops, seeing their leaders fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distance from the advanced position General Hooker had reached; but finally, with the assistance of the troops brought up by General Sumner, checked the enemy's progress and maintained their position.

On the left, General Burnside, about 10 o'clock, was ordered to attack the enemy at the bridge across the Antietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of General Burnside was met by a most obstinate resist