taking up any new base of operations the city of Washington shall be left entirely secure. The other points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the enemy, since its date, have abandoned their positions and batteries on the Potomac, and retired behind the Rappahannock.

Second. The council of general officers held at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroad in their rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the generals-a majority-decided that the force necessary to be left should be sufficient to fully garrison the forts on the right bank of the Potomac, and "to occupy" those on the left bank, with a covering force of 25,000. It is, we think, the judgment of officers, that some 30,000 men would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000.

"Third. The President's directions of March 13th to General McClellan direct, first, to leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy may not repossess it; second, that Washington shall be left entirely secure; third, that the remainder of the army move down the Potomac, or move in pursuit of the enemy. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position. "Fourth. Major General McClellan's report to the adjutant general of April 1, after giving the several positions of the troops proposed to be left for the defence of Washington, gives a representation as follows: At Warrenton there is to be 7,780; at Manassas, say, 10,859; in the valley of the Shenandoah, 35,467; on the lower Potomac, 1,350. Total in all, 55,456. And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000. In the above enumeration General Banks's army corps is included; but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah valley, should be regarded as a part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion.

Fifth. General Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his force as follows: infantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 858-six companies only being mounted. Total, 20,477.

"Deduct sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. Total for duty, 19,022.

"From this force General Wadsworth is directed to detach two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to replace the 37th New York, in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's ferrytotal, four regiments.

"It is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. General Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states that there were several companies of reserve artillery still here, but not under his command, or fit for service.

"General Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field, in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place; two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the city of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.

"In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defence of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as,left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, that the city shall be left "entirely secure," not only in the opinion of the general-inchief, but that of the "commanders of the army corps" also, has not been fully complied with.

"All of which is respectfully submitted.

"L. THOMAS, Adjutant General. "E. A. HITCHCOCK,

"Major General United States Army."

The day after this report was written, the President directed the Secretary of War to order one corps of the army of the Potomac to remain in front of Washington until further orders. The corps of General McDowell, being the only corps remaining intact here, was selected to remain, without the knowledge of General McDowell, he being engaged, at the time of receiving this order, in making preparations to immediately follow the rest of the army to the peninsula.

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

General Heintzelman, who commanded the first troops of the army of the Potomac that landed on the peninsula, arrived at Fortress Monroe on the 23d of March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas. He had orders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe as possible, in order that the enemy should have no idea of the direction in which the army was to move, whether towards Yorktown or Norfolk. General Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he obtained information that the enemy had not more than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the peninsula, and is satisfied that he could have advanced and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have been no serious obstacle in the way of proceeding directly to Richmond. On the 27th of March he sent out reconnoitering parties as far as Big Bethel and Watt's creek, and went near the Half-way House, where about 400 of the enemy and a little artillery were He telegraphed to General McClellan what he was doing, and received a despatch, in reply, that he (General McClellan) hoped that nothing had been done to give the enemy information of the line of operations of the army. The reconnoissance was then withdrawn.

Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, and on the 2d of April General McClellan himself arrived. On the 4th of April the army commenced its movement in the direction of Yorktown, and on the 5th appeared before the enemy's lines. General McClellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon hearing that the enemy were sending down re-enforcements.

All the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the peninsula the force of the enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, variously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by General McClellan, who estimates it from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States senator from Virginia-then living within the rebel lines, near Williamsburg-testifies that the rebels did not determine to re-enforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forces intended to stop before Yorktown and commence a regular siege of the place. It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works across the peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, and cutting off re-enforcements, when the place must have fallen in a very short time. Some of our generals expected and desired that that should be done. General Heintzelman Rep. Com. 108-2

forwarded to General McClellan the application of General Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application.

Instead of that, however, a siege was determined upon, contrary to the desire of the President, who, as early as the 9th of April, wrote to General McClellan as follows:

66

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. I telegraphed you on the 6th, saping that you had over 100,000 with you. I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say that you will have not 85,000, when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 25,000 be accounted for? As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away.

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will steadily gain on you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone.

'And, once more, let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, as only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note-is noting now-that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched position is but the story of Manassas repeated."

And the repetition was made complete nearly a month later, when the enemy, in the face of a superior force, evacuated their works without loss, and without the knowledge of the general commanding our army.

General McClellan, however, did not deem his forces sufficient, and objected very strongly to the order of the President detaching McDowell's corps for the defence of Washington, as "imperilling the success of our cause." He called again and again for re-enforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCall's divisions of McDowell's corps, to be under command of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's division, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th of April Franklin's division was ordered to Alexandria to embark for Fort Monroe. the 14th General Franklin reported to General McClellan near Yorktown, but his troops remained on board the transports until after the enemy evacuted the place, when they were ordered to West Point.

On

On the 6th of April General McClellan telegraphed to the President-"I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles;" and asks that all his orders for wagon-trains, &c., may at once be complied with. All was sent to him as desired, until even General McDowell found himself so stripped of the transportation designed for his corps, that when he moved to Fredericksburg it was with the greatest difficulty he could move supplies for his small force from Aquia to Falmouth, until the railroad was completed.

A month was spent before Yorktown, our army, in the opinion of some of our ablest officers, becoming more demoralized by the labors of a long siege than it would have been even by an unsuccessful assault.

The returns in the Adjutant General's office, signed by General McClellan and his adjutant general, show that, on the 30th of April, 1862, the forces on the peninsula under General McClellan amounted to 112,392 present for duty. On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to General McClellan—“ Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that General McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from his batteries on Monday, the 5th of May.

The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock General Stoneman, with the cavalry and some lighthorse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock General Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown, with orders to support General Stoneman. Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes also moved out during the day with the whole or portions of their corps. About five miles from Yorktown the division of General Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of other troops, coming from another direction, getting into the road before him.

up

In the meantime General Stoneman had overtaken the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the time, until the enemy reached their works in the neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was checked. Governor Sprague was sent back to hurry the infantry support under General Hooker. After considerable delay, finding it impossible to pass the troops ahead of him, General Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained information from some of the inhabitants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at daylight, and came up to the advanced works of the enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about a half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the

enemy.

There seems to have been great misapprehension and confusion in relation to the management of the troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, General Heintzelman was instructed by General McClellan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Monday orders were sent to General Sumner to take the command; General McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending two divisions up the York river to West Point. A heavy rain set in on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable for the passage of troops. The troops of the different commands became mingled-divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other and it seems to have been difficult to get the troops up in time.

During Monday forenoon General Hooker, finding himself hard pressed by the enemy, and understanding that General Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, sent repeatedly for re-enforcements. So did General Stoneman and General Heintzelman, but no re-enforcements arrived. General Sumner states that, having sent General Hancock to the right, he had at the centre only about 3,000 infantry—the cavalry there not being fitted for operations against the enemy, on account of the country being so wooded. Upon receiving the call for re-enforcements to be sent to the left to General Hooker, he sent staff officers to hurry up troops from the rear, his own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce Hooker. Re-enforcements not coming up to General Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the Prince de Joinville and Governor Sprague went to Yorktown to urge General McClellan to come up to the front, and take charge of matters there. Governor Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when General McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time General McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

By that time General Kearney had reached the field and re-enforced General Hooker, taking command, being the senior in rank to General Hooker. General Hancock had been engaged on the right, but, upon being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy, losing about forty men. The principal fighting was done by the troops under General Hooker, his division sustaining a loss of

about 1,700 men. Before he was re-enforced, his troops were obliged to hold their position with the bayonet and such ammunition as the men could obtain from the bodies of those who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition.

That night the enemy evacuated their position at Williamsburg. General McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the enemy had been beaten and would be compelled to evacuate their position that night or be taken at a great disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown.

The next day the pursuit was continued for a short distance by General Stoneman and the cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Several of the generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond-one of them says without firing a gun. General McClellan says that the roads were so bad, in consequence of the rains, that it was impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit. The battle of Williamsburg appears to have been fought under many and serious disadvantages. Nothing was known of the nature of the country or the defensive works of the enemy until our troops arrived before them; there was no controlling mind in charge of the movements; there was uncertainty in regard to who was in command; each general fought as he considered best; and, by the time the general commanding appeared on the field, the principal part of the fighting was over.

Some three or four days were spent at Williamsburg for the purpose of bringing up supplies, &c., and then the line of march was taken up for the Chickahominy. It was about the time that the army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken and the Merrimack destroyed. But preparations had been made before those events occurred to have supplies sent up York river instead of the James, and the line afterwards followed was adopted. The consequence was, that the gunboats were of little or no service in the operations against Richmond, and remained entirely inactive, except in some operations against Fort Darling, until they were called upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back to the James river.

The distance between Williamsburg and the line of operations on the Chickahominy was from forty to fifty miles, and the army was about two weeks in moving that distance. The first troops that crossed the Chickahominy were the corps of General Keyes, which crossed on the 24th of May, followed by the corps of General Heintzelman on the 25th. The rest of our army remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy until the battle of Fair Oaks, when the corps of General Sumner crossed to the assistance of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes. General McClellan continued calling for re-enforcements, representing that the force of the enemy in his front was superior to his own, and that the force under General McDowell would do more for the protection of Washington, if sent to his army, than in any other position in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the 21st of May he asks that General McDowell's corps be sent to him by water rather than by land, as the more expeditious mode, and that he and his forces be explicitly placed under his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying:

"I believe there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can; but, in any event, I shall fight it with all the skill, and caution, and determination that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government or that it may close my career."

In reply to the request of General McClellan that General McDowell should join his forces by water, the President writes, on the 21st of May: "McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case