by Admiral Dupont from his flag-ship, the New Ironsides, for the vessels to weigh anchor. According to the plan of attack the vessels were to form in the following order ahead, at intervals of one cable's length: 1. Weehawken, Capt. John Rogers; 2. Passaic, Capt. Percival Drayton; 3. Montauk, Commander John L. Worden; 4. Patapsco, Commander Daniel Ammen; 5. New Ironsides, Commodore Thomas Turner; 6. Catskill, Commander George W. Rodgers; 7. Nantucket, Commander Donald McN. Fairfax; 8. Nahant Commander John Downes; 9. Keokuk, Lieut. Commander Alexander C. Rhind. The squadron was then to pass up the main ship channel without returning the fire of the batteries on Morris Island, unless signalized to do so, and was to take up a position to the northward and westward of Fort Sumter, and engage its northwest face at.a distance of from 1,000 to 800 yards. A squadron of reserve, consisting of the Canandaigua, Unadilla, Housatonic, Wissahickon, and Huron, under the command of Capt. Joseph H. Green, of the Canandaigua, was ordered to remain outside the bar, and be in readiness to support the ironclads, when they should attack the batteries on Morris Island, which would be subsequent to the reduction of Fort Sumter.

The chief works erected by the enemy for the defence of Charleston may be thus briefly described: On the upper or north end of Sullivan's Island a powerful sand battery guarding Maffit's Channel; another large sand battery, called Fort Beauregard, between this and the Moultrie House; Fort Moultrie, which had been greatly strengthened since the commencement of the war; Fort Sumter, built upon an artificial island in the middle of the channel, near the entrance of the inner harbor, and about 1 miles west of Fort Moultrie; Battery Bee, adjoining Fort Moultrie, on the western extremity of Sullivan's Island; the Mount Pleasant battery on the mainland between Sullivan's Island and Cooper river; Castle Pinckney, built on an island about a mile distant from Charleston; all, with the exception of Sumter, being on the right or northerly side of the harbor. On the other side of the harbor, in the immediate vicinity of the city, was the Wappoo battery on James Island, commanding the embouchure of Ashley river; next to which was Fort Johnson, and between it and Castle Pinckney, Fort Ripley, a work erected on an artificial island in what is known as the "Middle Ground." On Cumming's Point, Morris Island, opposite Fort Moultrie, was Battery Gregg, and a mile south of this Fort Wagner, an extensive sand battery of the most powerful construction. Finally, at Light House Inlet, which divides Morris Island from Folly Island, was another fortification covering the landing at that place. Within a few days of the attack the enemy also erected a new sand work between the two last mentioned. The number of guns mounted on these works was estimated at several hundred, comprising the heaviest VOL. III.-43 A

smooth-bore ordnance, and many rifled pieces of English manufacture; and as an additional means of protection, the channel between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island was obstructed by rows of floating casks supporting torpedoes and other submarine obstacles, and in that between Sumter and Cumming's Point were no less than four rows of piles extending nearly up to Charleston.

At half past twelve the fleet began to move, the Weehawken, the leading ship, having a pioneer raft attached to her bows for the purpose of exploding torpedoes and dearing away obstructions. Almost immediately her raft became deranged, and nearly an hour was consumed in putting it in position. At half past one the vessels were again under way and moved slowly up toward Fort Sumter, passing the works on Morris Island, which held an ominous silence. They then steered toward the entrance of the inner harbor, intending to pass between Fort Sumter and Sullivan's Island, and shortly before 3 o'clock came within effective range of these positions. At 2.50 P.M. the guns of Fort Moultrie opened upon the Weehawken, followed shortly after by all the batteries on Sullivan's Island and Morris Island, and by Fort Sumter. The remainder of the squadron followed steadily in the wake of the leading ship, which, however, upon reaching the entrance of the channel between Sumter and Sullivan's Island, encountered obstructions of so formidable a nature, that Capt. Rodgers considered it impossible to pass through them. He accordingly turned his ship to gain a better position for attack, and his movements being followed by the vessels immediately behind him, the line, in consequence of the narrowness of the channel, and the force of the tide, was thrown into some confusion. The New Ironsides, in attempting to turn, was caught in the tideway, refused to obey her rudder, and became in a degree unmanageable; while, to add to the complication, the Catskill and Nantucket, which kept in her wake, fell foul of her, and for fifteen minutes the three vessels were in a dead lock. On this occasion, and once subsequently, the Ironsides was obliged to come to anchor to avoid drifting ashore, in which case she would inevitably have been lost.

Nothing now remained but for the admiral to make signal to the fleet to disregard the movements of the flag-ship, and take up such positions as might seem most available. This was at once done, and shortly before 4 o'clock the remaining eight vessels were ranged opposite the northeast front of Sumter, at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards. The enemy during this time had not been idle, and from Forts Beauregard, Moultrie, and Sumter, Battery Bee and Fort Wagner, the concentrated fire of 300 guns was poured upon the devoted fleet, exceeding probably in rapidity and power any cannonade previously known in warfare. this the eight ironclads could oppose but 16 guns. During the climax of the fire 160 shots

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were counted in a single minute, and officers described the projectiles as striking their vessels sometimes as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. It is estimated that from first to last the enemy fired not less than 3,500 rounds of ammunition.

Placed in the focus of this tremendous fire, the ironclads fought at a disadvantage which rendered their offensive power of little effect. The confined space in which they were obliged to manœuvre called for unusual vigilance on the part of their commanders in avoiding collisions, as also in keeping clear of the floating obstructions and submerged batteries against which the tide was constantly bearing them. The dense clouds of smoke which hung over the water proved an additional source of embarrassment. They, nevertheless, entered resolutely upon the work before them, and directed their principal attack against Fort Sumter. Upon receiving the order to disregard the movements of the flag-ship, Lieut. Commander Rhind gallantly ran his vessel, the Keokuk, up through the others to within 550 feet of the fort, where she became a special target for the enemy. During the short period that she was able to retain this position, she was struck 90 times in the hull and turrets, 19 shots piercing her at and below the water line, and others entering her turret. The vessel was in fact so completely riddied, that her commander, fearing she could not much longer be kept afloat, withdrew from action at the end of half an hour, and succeeded in getting her to anchor out of range of fire. She was kept afloat during the night by means of her pumps, but sank the next morning. The Keokuk was only able to fire three times during the engagement, one of her guns having been almost immediately disabled, and the other rendered unavailable by casualties to the crew. She differed in construction and strength from the other ironclads of the squadron, and her side and turret armor of an average thickness of 5 inches, proved entirely insufficient to withstand the terrible fire to which she had been subjected.

The remaining vessels, though suffering no calamity comparable in extent with that of the Keokuk, were more or less damaged by the fire from the forts. The Nahant had her turret so jammed as effectually to prevent its turning, and the pilot house became nearly untenable in consequence of flying bolts and nuts. The Passaic was unable to use her 11-inch gun after the fourth fire, and had her turret temporarily jammed. The Patapsco lost the use of her rifle gun after the fifth fire, owing to the carrying away of her forward cap square bolts; and the Nantucket had her 15-inch gun permanently disabled after the third fire. The Weehawken, Montauk, and Catskill were obstructed in the use of their guns only by the obstacles to navigation above mentioned. The New Ironsides never got nearer than within 1,000 yards of the enemy's fire, and directed her chief attention to Fort Moultrie, against

which, however, she was unable to discharge but a single broadside.

At 4.30 P. M. Admiral Dupont observing signs of distress on the part of several of his ships, made signal to withdraw from action, intending to resume the attack the next morning. The reports, however, which the different commanders made on that evening respecting the injuries to their vessels, the character of the obstructions in the inner harbor, and the number and weight of the enemy's guns, convinced him of the "utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston with the force under his command." During the forty-five minutes that the fleet had been under the hottest concentrated fire of the enemy, one vessel had been wholly, and four partially disabled, and in the opinion of the admiral another half hour would have sufficed to put the remainder hors de combat. To compensate for these damages, nothing had been effected by the ironclads beyond some injuries to the east wall of Fort Sumter -a result which confirmed the admiral in his opinion that the opposing forces were too unequal to justify him in renewing the contest. The nine ships of the squadron had been able to fire but one hundred and thirty-nine shots against Fort Sumter in reply to the thousands of shells, solid shot, and steel pointed bolts hurled against them from six or seven different forts; and there was good reason to suppose that even had Sumter been silenced, the obstructions beyond would have been impassable, and the fire from the forts have sunk every vessel attempting to go up the harbor. This opinion, however, was not shared by all. Under these circumstances Admiral Dupont not only determined not to renew the fight, but to recross the bar and return with the ironclads to Port Royal; being prompted to the latter course partly by the necessity of making repairs, and partly by his belief that the anchorage inside or outside the bar was unsafe for vessels of the Monitor class. On the 12th the whole fleet, with the exception of the New Ironsides, which anchored outside Charleston bar, returned to Port Royal.

The casualties of the fleet were remarkably few, considering the fierceness of the enemy's fire, and resulted in almost every case from flying bolts and concussions within the turrets. But one man died of injuries received, and about twenty-five were wounded, principally on the Keokuk and Nahant. In some of the vessels no casualities whatever were reported. The Passaic was struck 35 times, the Nahant, 36 times, the Patapsco, 47 times, the Nantucket, 51 times, the Montauk, 14 times, and the Catskill, 20 times. Many of the shots made but slight indentations in the turrets and side armor, but in every ship repairs of greater or less extent were considered necessary. The Ironsides escaped with comparatively little injury, having during the whole engagement been out of range of the severest fire. The capabilities of the ironclads in contests of this

nature, and the opinions of their officers and of other naval commanders, are stated under the head of NAVY OF THE U. S.

In explanation of his failure to renew the attack, Admiral Dupont wrote as follows to the Navy Department, on the 15th:

Any attempt to pass through the obstructions I have referred to, would have entangled the vessels and held them under the most severe fire of heavy ordnance that has ever been delivered; and while it is barely possible that some vessels might have forced their way through, it would only have been to be again impeded by fresh and more formidable obstructions, and to encounter other powerful batteries, with which the whole harbor of Charleston has been lined. I had hoped that the endurance of the ironclads would have enabled

them to have borne any weight of fire to which they might have been exposed; but when I found that so large a portion of them were wholly or one half disabled, by less than an hour's engagement, before at tempting to overcome the obstructions, or testing the power of the torpedoes, I was convinced that per sistence in the attack would only result in the loss of the greater portion of the ironclad fleet, and in leaving many of them inside the harbor, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The slowness of our fire, and our inability to occupy any battery that we might silence, or to prevent its being restored under cover of the night, were difficulties of the gravest character, and until the outer forts should have been taken, the army could not enter the harbor or afford me any assistance.

On the 13th, the President despatcned the following telegram to Admiral Dupont:

Hold your position inside the bar near Charleston; or, if you shall have left it, return to it and hold it until further orders. Do not allow the enemy to erect new batteries or defences on Morris Island. If he has begun it, drive him out. I do not herein order you to renew the general attack. That is to depend on your own discretion or a further order. A. LINCOLN.

And by another order, dated on the succeeding day, he directed him, should he not succeed in taking the batteries on Morris Island or Sullivan's Island, to continue the demonstration for a time, and to make "the attempt a real one, though not a desperate one, if it affords any considerable chance of success." In reply, Admiral Dupont said that he should use every exertion to push forward the repairs of the ironclads, and get them inside the bar. "I think it my duty, however," he observed, "to state to the department that this will be attended with great risk to these vessels from the gales which prevail at this season, and from the continuous fire of the enemy's batteries." He urged various objections to a further employment of them against the works on Morris Island, but expressed his willingness to obey all orders with the utmost fidelity, even should his judgment be opposed, and to renew, if necessary, the attack on Charleston, although he thought such a measure "would be attended with disastrous results, involving the loss of the coast."

In the early part of June, Admiral Dupont, having reason to believe that the Atlanta and other rebel ironclads at Savannah were meditating an attack upon the blockading vessels in Warsaw Sound, despatched the Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, and the Nahant, Com

mander J. Downes, thither to prevent any disaster to the fleet. The Atlanta, originally a swift and powerful British steamer called the Fingal, had early in the war run the blockade of Savannah, and been converted by the enemy into an ironclad at a great expense. She was 191 feet in length, and 40 feet beam, somewhat over 1,000 tons in measurement, and had a low deck, with a casemate or covered ironplated house in the centre, with sloping sides and ends, in which was her battery, consisting of two 6-inch and two 7-inch rifled guns. Of these the former were broadside guns, and the latter worked on a pivot, either as broadside or bow and stern guns. She was further armed with a powerful ram, and had attached to her bow a submarine torpedo, charged with about fifty pounds of powder. No efforts had been spared to render her formidable, and it was believed by the enemy that her speed, her heavy armament, and her ram, would render her more than a match for any two vessels of the Monitor type. They therefore boldly steamed down the sound at dawn of June 17th, followed by several small steamers conveying pleasure parties who were to be the witnesses of her triumph. At a few minutes past four she was perceived by the Federal ironclads, which were lying at anchor near the mouth of Wilmington river, and they at once prepared for action. The Weehawken, being nearest the enemy, got under way first and stood up the sound, followed by the Nahant, which, having no pilot, was ordered by Captain Rodg ers to keep in the wake of his vessel. A few minutes before five, the Atlanta, which was then lying across the channel awaiting the attack of the Federal steamers, fired a single shot at the Nahant, which failed to take effect. The Weehawken steamed steadily toward the Atlanta, and when about 300 yards distant opened upon her with her 15-inch gun. Drifting 100 yards nearer, she discharged both her guns, upon which the Atlanta hauled down her colors, and ran up a white flag in token of surrender. The signal was not understood until after another discharge from the Weehawhen, when all firing ceased, and the prize was taken possession of, after a contest of scarcely fifteen minutes, in which the Weehawken alone had participated.

On examination it was found that the enemy had been struck four times. The first shot knocked a hole in her casemate, without, however, going through, and scattered over the enclosed decks great quantities of wood and iron splinters, by which upward of 40 men were stunned and wounded, one of whom subsequently died. This is believed to have been the first shot from a 15-inch gun fired in a naval combat, and according to the rebel officers its effect was to demoralize the whole crew of the Atlanta. The second shot struck the edge of the overhang; the third knocked off the top of the pilot house, wounding two pilots and stunning the men at the wheel, and

the fourth struck a port stopper in the centre, breaking it in two and driving the iron fragments through the port. The first and third shots decided the battle, the former, as Captain Rodgers observed, having taken away the desire to fight, and the latter the ability to get away. The captured prisoners amounted to 145, officers and men, and the hull of the Atlanta was so little injured that in a short time she was enabled to take her place among vessels of her class in the United States navy.

The combat was characterized by the Secretary of the Navy as "the most marked and extraordinary in the service during the year, and in some respects one of the most significant and instructive naval battles of the war." Whatever opinions may have been entertained of the efficacy of ironclads against forts of masonry or sand, few could doubt after this that when ironclads were pitted against ironclads their execution could be of the most decisive character. The Monitor class of vessels, which had fallen into temporary disfavor after the attack on Fort Sumter, became again popular, and were recognized as likely to be of the highest value in harbor or coast defence. The brevity of the conflict and the complete disabling of the Atlanta also reconciled many to the heavy ordnance carried by these vessels, the efficacy of which had been a subject of some dispute among professional men.

Notwithstanding the failure of the attack of April 7th, the Government was unwilling to relinquish further efforts against Charleston, and as the tone of Admiral Dupont's letters indicated that he was opposed to a renewed attack upon the forts, it was determined to relieve him by the appointment of Rear-Admiral Foote. That officer dying in New York before his departure, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren was appointed to the command of the squadron, and entered upon his duties on July 6th. Previous to this date the demonstrations against Charleston had been exclusively naval, but with the arrival of General Gillmore as commander-in-chief of the military department of the South, arrangements were made for combined operations by the land forces and the ironclads.

On July 10th, the Catskill, Montauk, Nahant, and Weehawken coöperated with the land attack upon the rebel works on Morris Island, and during the greater part of the day maintained a vigorous fire upon Fort Wagner. The Catskill, which was selected as a special mark by the enemy, was struck 60 times, but came out of action in good working order. The other ironclads escaped with trifling injury. A few days later the New Ironsides was brought over the bar, and on the 18th she with the four vessels above mentioned and the Patapsco was laid abreast of Fort Wagner, to cooperate in the intended assault by the troops. The fort was completely silenced during the day, but darkness having come on before the assault was made, Admiral Dahlgren was

obliged to discontinue his fire, not being able to distinguish whether it took effect on friend or foe. The enemy were in consequence enabled to return to their guns, and the assault was repelled with great slaughter. On the 16th an attack was made by shore batteries on the gunboats Pawnee and Marblehead, in the Stono river, but was repulsed after an animated contest.

For upward of a month after this no important action took place. General Gillmore was engaged in pushing his intrenchments toward Fort Wagner, and the navy was unable to effect anything without coöperation from the land forces. Every day two or three of the ironclads bombarded Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, on Cumming's Point, to divert the attention of the enemy, but escaped any serious casualty. The Ironsides was struck repeatedly by 10-inch shot, at a distance of 1,200 to 1,400 yards, without material impression. Early on the morning of August 17th, General Gillmore opened all his batteries upon Fort Sumter, firing over Fort Wagner and the intervening space; and about the same time Admiral Dahlgren brought the Ironsides, Weehawken, Catskill, Nahant, and Montauk abreast of Fort Wagner, which was effectually silenced by them during that day. The Passaic and Patapsco, having rifled guns, took a position about 2,000 yards from Sumter, and coöperated with the shore batteries in the attack upon it. No material damage was done to the ironclads, but the navy suffered a severe loss in Capt. George W. Rodgers, of the Catskill, chief of staff to Admiral Dahlgren, who was killed while in the pilot house by a flying piece of fractured plating. Shortly before dawn, on the morning of the 23d, five ironclads opened fire upon Sumter at a distance of about 800 yards, but retired at about 6 A. M., after inflicting considerable damage upon the fort. By the 1st of September Sumter was almost entirely disabled, and with a view of removing the obstructions between it and Fort Moultrie, the ironclads were on that night brought up to within 500 yards of the former work, and for several hours a steady fire was maintained, which was answered by Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Sullivan's Island. The ebb tide setting in before daylight, the ironclads retired.

On the night of September 6th the enemy evacuated Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, and on the succeeding day Admiral Dahlgren sent a demand to Gen. Beauregard for the surrender of Fort Sumter. Receiving no reply he put in operation a plan to capture the fort, by sending the Weehawken in by a narrow channel winding about Cumming's Point to cut off all communications in that direction. In making this movement she got hard aground, and so remained for many hours. Late in the day the admiral with the remaining ironclads moved up to feel and, if possible, to pass the obstructions between Forts Moultrie and Sum