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tenance of the neutrality which her Majesty has proclaimed, and provided also that in the meantime the Alexandra and other vessels which may be found violating or preparing to violate the law, be prevented, so far as the law may allow, from leaving British ports to prosecute their work of devastation."

The President is not prepared to believe that the judiciary of Great Britain will, with well-considered judgment, render nugatory and void a statute of the realm which, with its counterpart in our own legislation, has hitherto been regarded by both nations as a guarantee of that mutual forbearance which is so essential to the preservation of peace and friendship. Nor shall I incur the hazard of producing irritation on either side of the ocean by criticising the reasoning by which the learned judge who tried the case of the Alexandra justified his conclusions thereon, or by which that portion of the British press which approves the

verdict labors to defend it.

If the rulings of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer in the case of the Alexandra shall be affirmed so as to

regulate the action of her Majesty's Government, the President will, as he thinks, be left to understand that

there is no law in Great Britain which will be effective to preserve mutual relations of forbearance between the subjects of her Majesty and the Government and the people of the United States in the only point where they are exposed to infraction. The fitting out of the Alabama and the Florida, as well as of the Alexandra, will thus receive the sanction of the Government, and the United States will be without any guarantee whatever against the indiscriminate and unlimited employment of capital, industry, and skill, by British subjects, in building, arming, equipping, and sending forth ships of-war from British ports to make war against the United States.

On the bill of exceptions being tendered to the Lord Chief Baron he declined to sign it, because it imputes to him certain legal declarations which he never made, and objects to him that he did not give instructions which he avers were the very ones he did give. As a consequence, a technical barrier was at once raised against further operations, which proved so difficult to remove, that resort was finally had to the extraordinary step of creating a new rule for the purpose of admitting a motion on the part of the Government. Upon a motion made under this new rule, in the Court of Exchequer, on November 5th, before Lord Chief Baron Pollock and Barons Bramwell, Chanwell and Pigott, for a rule to show cause why there should not be a new trial on the ground of misdirection by the learned judge, and also on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, a rule nisi was granted. After argument of the rule, to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, the Court of Exchequer discharged the rule, thus denying a new trial, and an appeal was brought to the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The case book an unexpected turn at the hearing in this court, in the early part of February, 1864.

When the appeal from the Court of Exchequer was taken there was some discussion as to practice, but it was finally understood that the case was put in such shape that, although the Chief Baron would not sign a bill of exceptions, the legal questions involved in his rulings could go before the higher courts. The critical questions need not be stated here, as they do not relate to the more imporVOL. III.-23 A

tant matters connected with the case, and involve the construction of provisions in the "Common Law Procedure Act" and the "Queen's Remembrancer's Act," upon purely technical points. The judgment of the matter of jurisdiction was given on the 8th of February, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and disclosed a singular division of opinion. The Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench and three puisne judges of that court who were present, were of the opinion that there was no jurisdiction; the Lord Chief Justice and two judges of the Common Pleas were of opinion that there was jurisdiction, and the former having the majority by one the appeal was dismissed.

The expedient by which, notwithstanding this denial of jurisdiction in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, the case is finally sent to the House of Lords, is thus explained in the London Times of the 29th of February:

Happily, a loophole was discovered by the court, by informality may yet be avoided. Instead of simply means of which this grievous sacrifice of justice to an admitting the preliminary objection and declining to peal be dismissed. There will, therefore, be an entry hear the appeal, the form of judgment is that the apof a decision on the record, and against this decision, although not founded on the merits of the suit, the counsel for the Crown may appeal to the House of Lords. Thus this ignoble break down in our legal machinery is not past remedy if the House of Lords shall agree with the three Judges of the Common Pleas rather than with the four Judges of the Queen's Bench. It may perhaps strike some of our readers that the expedient devised to extricate our courts from the dilemma is not much less technical than the origin of the dilemma itself. The solution is in pari materia with the difficulty, and probably neither would have occurred to an unprofessional mind. Where, however, a great mistake has been made in a very serious matter, we must be content to get out of its consequences as best we may consistently with justice and precedent. If the Alexandra case had been stopped in its present stage, not only would a golden opportunity of reducing an important branch of law to certainty have been irretrievably lost, but a new pretext would have been provided, very unseasonably, for impugn; ing the faith of our Goverment. (See GREAT BRITAIN.)

FRANCE. The diplomatic relations between the United States and France appear to have been of a very friendly kind during 1863. No further movements were made by the French Government relative to an acknowledgment of the insurrectionary States, and no vessels, during that period, were allowed to leave her ports for the purpose of destroying the commerce of the United States. The intentions of France in Mexico, and the views of the United States Government on that subject, were explained in the correspondence, as will appear by the following extracts:

On the 26th of September Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dayton as follows:

It is well understood that through a long period, closing in 1860, the manifest strength of this nation was a sufficient protection for itself and for Mexico, against all foreign States. That power was broken down and shattered in 1861 by faction. The first fruit of our civil war was a new, and in effect, though not intentionally so, an unfriendly attitude assumed by

Great Britain, France, and Spain, all virtually, and the two first named powers avowedly, moving in concert. While I cannot confess to a fear on the part of this Government that any one or all of the maritime powers combining with the insurgents could overthrow it, yet it would have been manifestly presumptuous, at any time since this distraction seized the American people, to have provoked such an intervention, or to have spared any allowable means of preventing it. The unceasing efforts of this department in that direction have resulted from this ever-present consideration. If in its communications the majestic efforts of the Government to subdue the insurrection, and to remove the temptation which it offered to foreign powers, have not figured so largely as to impress my correspondents with the conviction that the President relies always mainly on the national power, and not on the forbearance of those who it is apprehended may become its enemies, it is because the duty of drawing forth and directing the armed power of the nation has rested upon distinct departments, while to this one belonged the especial duty of holding watch against foreign insult, intrusion, and intervention. With these general remarks I proceed to explain the President's views in regard to the first of the two questions mentioned, namely, the attitude of France in regard to the civil war in the United States.

We know from many sources, and even from the Emperor's direct statement, that, on the breaking out of the insurrection, he adopted the current opinion of European statesmen that the efforts of this Government to maintain and preserve the Union would be unsuccessful. To this prejudgment we attribute his agreement with Great Britain to act in concert with her upon the questions which might arise out of the insurrection; his concession of a belligerent character to the insurgents; his repeated suggestions of accommodation by this Government with the insurgents; and his conferences on the subject of a recognition. It would be disingenuous to withhold an expression of the national conviction that these proceedings of the Emperor have been very injurious to the United States, by encouraging and thus prolonging the insurrection. On the other hand, no statesman of this country is able to conceive of a reasonable motive, on the part of either France or the Emperor, to do or to wish injury to the United States. Every statesman of the United States cherishes a lively interest in the welfare and greatness of France, and is content that she shall enjoy peacefully and in unbounded prosperity the administration of the Emperor she has chosen. We have not an acre of territory or a port which we think France can wisely covet; nor has she any pos'session that we could accept if she would resign it into our hands. Nevertheless, when recurring to what the Emperor has already done, we cannot, at any time, feel assured that, under mistaken impressions of our exposure, he might not commit himself still further in the way of encouragement and aid to the insurgents. We know their intrigues in Paris are not to be lightly regarded. While the Emperor has held an unfavorable opinion of our national strength and unity, we, on the contrary, have as constantly indulged entire confidence in both. Not merely the course of events, but that of time, also, runs against the insurgents and reinvigorates the national strength and power. We desire, therefore, that he may have the means of understanding the actual condition of affairs in our country. We wish to avoid anything calculated to irritate France, or to wound the just pride and proper sensibilities of that spirited nation, and thus to free our claim to her forbearance, in our present political emergency, from any cloud of passion or prejudice. Pursuing this course, the President hopes that the prejudgment of the Emperor against the stability of the Union may the sooner give way to convictions which will modify his course, and bring him back again to the traditional friendship which he found existing between this country and his own, when, in obedience to her voice, he assumed the reins of empire. These designs and purposes do not imply either a fear

of French hostility, or any neglect of a prudent posture of national self-reliance.

The subject upon which I propose to remark, in the second place, is the relation of France toward Mexico. The United States hold, in regard to Mexico, the same principles that they hold in regard to all other nations. They have neither a right nor a disposition to intervene by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish and maintain a republic or even a domestic government there, or to overthrow an imperial or a foreign one, if Mexico chooses to establish or accept it. The United States have neither the right nor the disposition to intervene by force on either side in the lamentable war which is going on between France and Mexico. On the contrary, they practise in regard to Mexico, in every phase of that war, the non-intervention which they require all foreign powers to observe in regard to the United States. But, notwithstanding this self-restraint, this Government knows full well that the inherent normal opinion of Mexico favors a government there republican in form and domestic in its organization, in preference to any monarchical institutions to be imposed from abroad. This Government knows, also, that this normal opinion of the people of Mexico resulted largely from the influence of popular opinion in this country, and is continually invigorated by it. The President believes, moreover, that this popular opinion of the United States is just in itself, and eminently essential to the progress of civilization on the American continent, which civilization, it believes, can and will, if left free from European resistance, work harmoniously together with advancing refinement on the other continents. This Government believes that foreign resistance, or attempts to control American civilization, must and will fail before the ceaseless and ever-increasing activity of material, moral, and political forces, which peculiarly belong to the American continent. Nor do the United States deny that, in their opinion, their own safety and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America. They have submitted these opinions to the Emperor of France, on proper occasions, as worthy of his serious consideration, in determining how he would conduct and close what might prove a successful war in Mexico. Nor is it necessary to practise reserve upon the point, that if France should, upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the American opinions and sentiments which I have described, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies, which might ultimately ripen into collision between France and the United States and other American republics. An illustration of this danger has occurred already. Political rumor, which is always mischievous, one day ascribes to France a purpose to seize the Rio Grande, and wrest Texas from the United States; another day rumor advises us to look carefully to our safety on the Mississippi; another day we are warned of coalitions to be formed, under French patronage, between the regency established in Mexico and the insurgent cabal at Richmond. The President apprehends none of these things. He does not allow himself to be disturbed by suspicions so unjust to France and so unjustifiable in themselves; but he knows, also, that such suspicions will be entertained more or less extensively by this country, and magnified in other countries equally unfriendly to France and to America; and he knows, also, that it is out of such suspicions that the fatal web of national animosity is most frequently woven. He believes that the Emperor of France must experience desires as earnest as our own for the preservation of that friendship between the two nations which is so full of guarantees of their common prosperity and safety. Thinking this, the President would be wanting in fidelity to France, as well as to our own country, if he did not converse with the Emperor with entire sincerity and friendship upon the attitude which France is to assume in regard to Mexico. The statements made to you by M. Drouyn de l'Huys, con

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

cerning the Emperor's intentions, are entirely satisfactory, if we are permitted to assume them as having been authorized to be made by the Emperor in view of the present condition of affairs in Mexico. It is true, as I have before remarked, that the Emperor's purposes may hereafter change with changing circumstances. We, ourselves, however, are not unobservant of the progress of events at home and abroad; and in no case are we likely to neglect such provision for our own safety as every sovereign state must always be prepared to fall back upon when nations with which they have lived in friendship cease to respect their moral and treaty obligations. Your own discretion will be your guide as to how far and in what way the public interests will be promoted, by submitting these views to the consideration of M. Drouyn de l'Huys. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD. WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c.

On the 9th of October, Mr. Dayton reports his communication of the views expressed in the preceding letter, to the French minister M. Drouyn de l'Huys, as follows:

I brought out your views, however, in the course of a general conversation about Mexican affairs. I asked of M. Drouyn de l'Huys what character of test was to be adopted, with a view to learn the wishes of that country (Mexico) as to its form of Government. He said that the vote of the entire country, and of all its departments, whether the French were or were not in their possession, would be taken, and if upon its registries it should appear that a large majority of the whole population (Spanish and Indian) were favorable to a monarchical form of Government, he supposed that would be sufficient. He thought there would be no difficulty in applying this test, and showing a large numerical majority in favor of the archduke, and that

form of Government.

M. Drouyn de l'Huys went on to say, that the dangers of the Government of the archduke would come principally from the United States, and the sooner we showed ourselves satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that Government, the sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new Government to take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as it could; but that it would not lead or tempt the archduke into difficulty, and then desert him before his Government was settled. He added, that France could

not do that. He said, that the early acknowledgment of that Government by the United States would tend to shorten, or perhaps, he said, to end all the troublesome complications of France in that country; that they would thereupon quit Mexico.

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I told him that, without having any authority from my Government to say so, I should scarcely suppose that France, under the circumstances, would expect the United States to make haste to acknowledge a new monarchy in Mexico, but I would report his views to the Government at home; not suggesting, however, that any answer would be given. In the course of conversation, he took occasion again to repeat, voluntarily, their disclaimer of any purpose to interfere with Texas, or to make or to seek any permanent interest or control in Mexico.

On the 23d of October, Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dayton acknowledging the receipt of his despatch, and saying:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your despatch of the 9th instant (No. 361), which brings me the views expressed by M. Drouyn de l'Huys concerning the situation in Mexico. Various considerations have induced the President to avoid taking any part in the speculative debates bearing on that situation which have been carried on in the capitals of Europe as well as in those of America. A determination to err on the side of strict neutrality, if we err at all,

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in a war which is carried on between two nations, with which the United States are maintaining relations of amity and friendship, was prominent among the considerations to which I have thus referred.

The United States, nevertheless, when invited by France or Mexico, cannot omit to express themselves with perfect frankness upon new incidents, as they occur, in the progress of that war. M. Drouyn de l'Huys now speaks of an election which he expects to be held in Mexico, and to result in the choice of his Imperial Highness the Prince Maximilian of Austria to be Emperor of Mexico. We learn from other sources that the prince has declared his willingness to accept an imperial throne in. Mexico on three conditions, namely: first, that he shall be called to it by the universal suffrage of the Mexican nation; secondly, that he shall receive indispensable guarantees for the integrity and independence of the proposed empire; and thirdly, that the head of his family, the Emperor of Austria, shall acquiesce.

Referring to these facts, M. Drouyn de l'Huys intimates that an early acknowledgment of the proposed empire by the United States would be convenient to France, by relieving her, sooner than might be possible under other circumstances, from her troublesome complications in Mexico.

Happily the French Government has not been left uninformed that, in the opinion of the United States, the permanent establishment of a foreign and monar

chical Government in Mexico will be found neither l'Huys that this opinion remains unchanged. On the easy nor desirable. You will inform M. Drouyn de other hand, the United States cannot anticipate the action of the people of Mexico, nor have they the least purpose or desire to interfere with their proceedings, or control or interfere with their free choice, or disturb them in the enjoyment of whatever institutions of Government they may, in the exercise of an absolute freedom, establish. It is proper, also, that M. Drouyn de l'Huys should be informed that the United States continue to regard Mexico as the theatre of a war which has not yet ended in the subversion of the GovStates remain in the relation of peace and sincere ernment long existing there, with which the United friendship; and that, for this reason, the United States ognizing a Government which, in the further chances are not now at liberty to consider the question of recconsistently with their principles, can do no otherwise of war, may come into its place. The United States, than leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of independence in whatever form they themselves shall her own people, and recognize their sovereignty and choose that this sovereignty and independence shall be manifested. I am, sir, your obedient servant, WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c. The correspondence with other countries, when important, is noticed in the articles elsewhere on those countries.

DOST MOHAMMED, KHAN, emir of Cabul, born in the country of the Barekzais, about 1785, died under the walls of Herat in May, 1863. The vicissitudes of his career have been rarely equalled except in oriental countries, where the sovereign of to-day may be a wandering refugee to-morrow. The tribe of the Barekzais have been for a long period the lar gest and most prominent of the Tartar hordes which occupy the western portion of Central Asia, and its chiefs have borne a conspicuous part in the government of that region, and the control of the successive empires which have risen and fallen there within the past three or four centuries. In 1738-'9, Nadir Shah, the most enterprising and energetic of the Persian monarchs in modern times, had conquered Af

ghanistan, and conferred its government upon one of his viceroys. In 1744 he died, and one of his generals, Ahmed Khan, chief of the tribe of the Abdallehs, seized Afghanistan, and, proclaiming his independence, caused himself to be crowned king or emperor at Kandahar, under the title of Ahmed Shah, Dour-e-Douran (pearl of the age), and his tribe thenceforth took the name of Douranis or Douranians. The kingdom of the Afghans, of which he thus took possession, extended from Khorassan to India, and from Beloochistan to Cashmere, and included also Scinde, in the northwest of India. His reign of twenty-nine years was peaceful and without remarkable incidents, and he was succeeded in 1773 by his son Timour Shah, who died in 1793, after a quiet reign of twenty years, leaving several sons, who aspired to the throne. One of the youngest of these, Zeman Shah, having obtained the powerful assistance of Sarferaze Khan, chief of the tribe of the Barekzais, ascended the throne, and for a time succeeded in maintaining his authority, but his brothers, Mahmoud, who had secured the influence of the East India Company in his favor, and Shoudja, both older than himself, conspired against him, and the weak and jealous Zeman Shah, accusing his protector and friend Sarferaze of participating in the conspiracy, put him to death. The eldest son of Sarferaze, Fatteh Khan, to avenge his father, espoused the cause of Mahmoud, and caused him to be proclaimed shah or king of Afghanistan; but Shoudja, the younger brother of Mahmoud, at once commenced intriguing with the East India Company, and in 1809 concluded a treaty with them, against France, by virtue of which he was to be elevated to the throne. Meanwhile, Mahmoud, whose hold upon the kingdom was at first somewhat weak, had, by the energetic efforts of Fatteh Khan, succeeded in deposing Zeman Shah, and in keeping Shoudja in exile, and in 1809 consolidated his power, and with Fattch Khan, as prime minister, entered upon a vigorous administration, the prime minister restoring order throughout the realm, and keeping foreign powers at a distance. In 1818, he led the Afghan army against a large Persian force, which was marching upon Herat, and repulsed it with heavy loss. This success of Fatteh Khan, however, excited the jealousy of Kamran, the son of the Shah Mahmoud, who, prejudicing the mind of his father against him, caused him to be arrested and his eyes put out. The intelligence of this unjust and inhuman treatment of their beloved chieftain caused the Barekzais to rise at once in rebellion. Mahmoud, causing Fatteh Khan to be brought into his presence, ordered him to cause his tribe to return to their allegiance, but he answered that he was only a poor blind man, and had nothing further to do with the affairs of state. Enraged at this reply, Mahmoud caused him to be hacked to pieces with sabres by his concubines.

Within the next two years the brothers of Fatteh Khan had made themselves masters of

the whole of Afghanistan except Herat, and the territory immediately adjacent, which was still held by the Shah Mahmoud and his son Kamran. Dost Mohammed, the eldest of these brothers, reigned at Cabul; four of his brothers, Sir-dil, Raham-dil, Mur-dil, and Kohan-dil, ruled conjointly at Kandahar, and a still younger brother at Peshawur, under the suzerainty of Runjeet Singh, king of Lahore.

Of these brothers, the only one who inherited the intelligence, energy of character, ardent ambition, and capacity for governing of his father and elder brother, was Dost Mohammed. His brothers made themselves odious to the people at Kandahar, and he looked forward with hope to the time when he might succeed in bringing the whole old Afghan empire under his sway. He found the East India Company, however, ready to interpose formidable obstacles in the way of his success. That company were constantly apprehensive of an invasion of India by the way of Cabul and Kandahar, and believing that Dost Mohammed would become an instrument in the hands of the Russian Government to aid in such an invasion, they were disposed to cripple his power as far as possible. For nineteen years he had succeeded in maintaining his authority at Cabul, and had seen his old enemy Kamran deposed at Herat. The British Government meanwhile had allowed a pension to the pretender Shoudja, and in 1839 sent a large army into Afghanistan to drive out Dost Mohammed and his brother, and place Shoudja upon the throne. They succeeded in their object for the time. Dost Mohammed, finding himself unable to contend with so large a force, fled from Cabul, and, though he fought two pitched battles with the { English forces, was defeated, and Shoudja was crowned king of Afghanistan. On the 3d or 4th of November, 1840, Dost Mohammed, with an eye to future success, appeared before the gates of Cabul, presented himself before Sir William McNaughton, the British Resident, declared his name, and surrendered his sword. The Resident, touched with his apparent magnanimity, treated him with great respect, and sent him to India.

Meantime, the Government of Shah Shoudja was becoming daily more unpopular, and not the Barekzais alone, but the other Afghan tribes were rising in insurrection, and in the latter part of 1841 a general outbreak took place, in which the English garrison were compelled to fly for their lives; Shah Shoudja was assassinated, Sir William McNaughton slain by the hand of Akbar Khan, a son of Dost Mohammed, who led the insurrection, and the British troops in the country, attempting to retreat to India, were, many of them, destroyed in the defiles of the Himalayas. The English Government in 1842 revenged their defeat by burning Ghuzna, Cabul, Jellalabad, and other towns of Afghanistan, and left the country in a state of anarchy, having placed a son of Shoudja upon the throne. He proved as unfit to rule as his father, and as his downfall was inevitable, the

English Government found themselves reduced to the necessity of treating with Dost Mohammed for his restoration to authority. He had remained in India quietly biding his time, and in 1843 he left Calcutta, furnished by the Government with money, and, remaining for a time at Lahore, where he met his son Akbar Khan, he prepared for his return to Cabul, which he entered in the ensuing summer. Here he exerted himself successfully to repair the injuries which British interference had brought upon his country, reestablished commerce, and gave his eldest daughter in marriage to Seid Mohammed, who in 1852 succeeded his father Yat Mohammed as king of Herat. An attack having been made by the Persians upon Seid Mohammed, Dost Mohammed sent a force to aid his son-in-law, and, though unsuccessful, he exerted such influence with his English allies, that the Persian Government was compelled to acknowledge by treaty the independence of Herat. One of his brothers, who ruled jointly at Kandahar, died in 1855, and in his will made Dost Mohammed the guardian of his children, and thus opened the way, in part, for him to become master of Kandahar. The same year he concluded a treaty of close alliance, offensive and defensive, with the East India Company. In the autumn of 1855, a nephew of Kamran, and grandson of Mahmoud, the murderer of Fatteh Khan, by treachery introduced himself into Herat, assassinated Seid Mohammed, and seized the throne. Dost Mohammed immediately prepared to march upon Herat to avenge the death of his son-in-law and put to death the usurper; but the Persian Government had meantime sent an army to Herat, which besieged it in the summer of 1856, and captured it on the 26th of October of that year, taking the usurper Mohammed Yussuf ChahZudeh prisoner. When Dost Mohammed Khan arrived before the city he found himself unable to accomplish anything directly, and was compelled to return to Cabul. Through his influence with the English Government, how ever, he procured from the Persians the concession for his nephew Ahmed Khan of the government of Herat. The new sovereign was equal to his uncle in intelligence and ambition, and, allying himself with the Persian Government, he was soon on unfriendly terms with his uncle. In 1862 the governor of Ferah, one of the provinces of the kingdom of Herat, at the instigation of Dost Mohammed, declared himself independent, and Ahmed Khan marched against him. The insurgent governor called upon Dost Mohammed to come to his assistance, and the old khan, proceeding with great rapidity, defeated his nephew at the battle of HeriRoud, and moved at once upon Herat, which he besieged, and having gained the chief of the Ulemas to his side, soon had a powerful faction in the city in his favor; but Ahmed Khan, ascertaining the facts, hanged the chief of the Ulemas, and some of his fellow conspirators, and soon received assistance from the Persians.

The old khan, however, not discouraged, continued the siege for several months, but in May, 1863, was seized with severe illness, from which he died in a few days.

DUNCAN, PHILIP BURY, Esq., an English scholar and philanthropist, born in South Warnborough in 1772, died at his residence, Westfield Lodge, near Bath. His early education was received at Winchester School, and in 1790 he entered New College, Oxford, where he was associated with the late Archbishop Howley, Bishop Mant, and Sydney Smith, with all of whom he kept up an intimacy and correspondence through life. About the year 1796, he, with his brother, the late John Shute Duncan, was called to the bar of Lincoln's Inn, and, for a few years, attended the Home and Western Circuits. In 1801 his father took up his residence in Bath, and from that time to the date of his death, the subject of this sketch divided his time between Bath and Oxford, and was intimately associated with nearly every local scheme in any way conducive to the welfare of the poor, as well as with all objects of scientific or literary interest. He took an active interest in the affairs of the Bath United Hospital, of which institution he was made president in 1841. With his brother he was one of the earliest promoters of the Bath Royal Literary and Scientific Institution, to whose valuable collection he was a most liberal contributor. But no notice of Mr. Duncan's career would be complete without an allusion to his connection with the University of Oxford, in which a great portion of his useful life was spent. He was the warm advocate and friend of all measures in any way calculated to extend the benefits of university education, or to give a place among the studies to physical science and mathematics, which, until that period, were not recognized in the same degree as ancient literature and philosophy. His experience of men and things was much enlarged by foreign travel and the acquaintance of men of letters on the continent. In 1826 Mr. D. received the appointment of keeper of the Ashmolean Museum, which office had been previously filled with great advantage to the University by his brother. Under the good taste and liberality of these brothers the museum became highly successful, and the valuable collections in the zoological and other departments kept alive in the University the attention to natural science which finally resulted in the erection of the University Museum, at a cost of £60,000, with provision for the proper teaching of the several branches of physiology, zoology, chemistry, experimental philosophy, geology, and mineralogy. The University is indebted to him also for the casts of the best statues of antiquity, wax models in the anatomy school, and models of ancient architecture which are among the chief ornaments of the picture gallery in the Bodleian Library. The poor of Oxford, too, are indebted to his exertions for the foundation of a savings bank,

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