"The differences of one and the other right are clear. 1st, When I have a right in the thing, the thing is that which is bound to me, and when I have a right to the thing, the person."

“2d. By right in the thing, I demand that which already is mine; and by right to the thing, I demand that there be given me or done for me that which another is under obligation to give me, or do for me."

“3d. From right in the thing originate real actions, against any possessor whatever, and from right to the thing, only personal ones, against that particular person with whom the contract was made. By the example which is presented in the case of a thing in which dominion is held being lost or stolen, and, in the case of another being bought, and not delivered, will be seen clearly the distinction between both rights."

“Of rights to the thing, there is no more than one kind, and that is obligation; bnt of rights in the thing there are various. Four are commonly enumerated, dominion, inheritance, servitude, and pledge."

"Sec. 2. What dominion is, and its divisions.

"The highest species of right in the thing we say is called dominion this is the right in a thing corporeal, from which arises the faculty of disposing of it, and of reclaiming it, in case law, contract, or the will of the testator does not forbid."

"We say right in the thing, because to the lord (Senor) the thing is in such manner bound, that it may be withdrawn from any possessor whatever. It should be in a thing necessarily corporeal, becanse incorporeal things are not in dominion, but in property (bienes). It is said, also, from which arises the faculty of disposing of the thing and of reclaiming it, because he who is lord has, in the first place, the faculty of disposing of his things, using them to the exclusion of every other person, may give, sell, and transfer it to another as he pleases, and has, in the second place, the faculty of reclaiming it, that is, withdrawing

it from any possessor whatever. But, nevertheless, to meet various cases, it is added in the definition, in case law, contract, or the will of the testator does not forbid: law-for example-it is forbidden that we should reclaim the things which already have been prescribed against us; contract--it is forbidden to the feudatory to alienate the land although he is master of it; will of the testator--and it is finally prohibited to alienate a thing left by the testator with the condition of never alienating it."

"Dominion is divided into full and less full. The first is where the faculty of disposing of the thing, and that of using it, are joined in one person. The second, is where these two rights. are seperated, so that one person holds the one, and another distinct, the other. For example, in the feud, the vassal has the right of taking the profits (utilidades) of the thing, but not that of disposing of it, at his will; that is divided between the lord and his vassal, in such manner that the latter cannot alienate the land, nor hypothecate it, without the consent of the lord, since neither of the two hold full dominion, but less full."

"This dominion less full, is divided into direct, and useful: he who has the faculty of disposing of the thing, will have the direct dominion, and he who enjoys only its profits, the useful dominion.

The enfiteusis will serve us for an example: the lord of the enfiteusis holds the direct dominion, and the tenant (enfiteuta) the useful dominion.

Sec. III. What is meant by mode of acquiring dominion:

"The distinction is worthy to be noted which is encountered between the title and the mode of acquiring dominion; and should be kept in mind in all that is treated of hereafter."

"All dominion has two causes, proximate and remote.· Prox imate is that by which, without the intervention of any other

thing, the dominion is obtained; and that is called remote which ought to precede it, and by means of which, it is acquired. For example, if I buy a jewel of Ticio, and he delivers it to me, I acquire dominion. In this case, the delivery (tralicion) is the proximate cause, and the contract of purchase is the remote one. The proximate cause is called mode of acquiring, and the remote, title (titulo.)”

"The effects of these two things are likewise different.

1st. By the title is acquired. only, the right to the thing; and by the mode of acquiring, the right in the thing. 2d. The title gives only an action personal against that person with whom we contracted, and the mode of acquiring gives a real action against any possessor whatsoever."

"It serves then for a general rule, that the title never gives a right in the thing, if there is not added to it delivery (tradicion.)” "Therefore, although I may have bought any thing, or it may have been given, or bequeathed to me, I am not lord of it before that the delivery (la entrega) takes place, which is that which, alone, transfers the dominion, or right in the thing, provided always there precedes title sufficient to transfer the dominion."

"Therefore, neither title suffices, without delivery, nor delivery, without title."

"This is so, notwithstanding that some cases are met with in which right in the thing is conferred, without delivery, on account of its not being possible."

"1st. In the mortgage (hypoteca): The thing is not delivered to the creditor, as other pledges, and nevertheless, produces a right in the thing by the contract alone, without delivery, it being established that the creditor has an action real, although he has not received, nor possessed, the thing hypothecated."

"2d. In the negative servitudes: Servitudes (Las servidum

bres) are rights, and these are things incorporeal, in which, from their nature, delivery cannot take place, but quasi delivery. This quasi delivery consists in its exercise by one, and its tolerance by the other; for example, if one has promised me the servitude of way (camino) through his field (fundo), and I, in virtue thereof, come, go, and exercise the said servitude, then it will be said that it is quasi delivered to me, But this only can take place in the affirmative servitudes, as of gutters, ways, drains, and others similar. But not in those which are called negative, because in them, it is impossible that either delivery, or quasi delivery, should take place; for example, if I promise to Ticio the servitude of not raising my walls, in this case, I have nothing to deliver to him, nor he to exercise, so that by the agreement alone, which has preceded, he holds the right in the thing, that is to say, by means of the title only."

"Sec. IV. How are divided, and what are, the modes of acquiring dominion."

"Some modes of acquiring dominion have their origin from the law of nature and of nations, and these are common to all nations, and others are derived from the civil law, and differ according to the laws of the people. Delivery, for example, is a mode of acquiring common to all nations, on the contrary prescription either is unknown, or at the least it is regulated by different rules, from whence it may be inferred, that delivery is a mode of acquiring by the law of nations, and prescription by civil law."

"Of natural modes of acquiring, some are called original, and others derivative. If we acquire a thing which is not under the dominion of another, as a wild beast, or a fish, etc., it will be a mode of acquiring original; but if a thing which is in the dominion of another is transferred to us, and delivered by its lord, it will be derivative.

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"From what has been said may be clearly inferred the natural modes which there are of acquiring. One is original perfect, and is called occupation; another is original less perfect, and is called accession; and another, derivative which is called delivery."

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"Sec. VII. Of delivery the only derivative mode of acquiring.

"We have seen already the ordinary modes of acquiring the derivative follows, which is one only, and is called delivery (tradicion). We have said that the derivative mode of acquiring is when the dominion is transferred from one to another: and thus we shall define delivery by saying, that it is a derivative mode of acquiring by which the lord of the thing, who has the right, and mind or intention, of alienating, transfers, with just cause, a corporeal thing to him who receives it."

"From hence spring three axioms:

1st. That only things corporeal can be delivered, since only these can be transferred by corporeal act, from one to another.

"For this reason, things incorporeal, as rights, are not delivered, but are quasi-delivered; and the quasi-delivery consists in the sufferance of one, and the exercise of the other. From the same definition is collected that delivery is either natural, or symbolical, short hand, or with long hand. Natural delivery is when by corporeal act the thing is transferred to the subject who receives it. It is called symbolical, when one thing is delivered in token of another, the dominion of which it is desired to transfer; e. g. if the keys of a granary are given which encloses the wheat which was sold. The delivery is said to be made with long hand (longa manu) when the thing is placed in the pres