authorized it, the legislature repealed the act. The court determined that this repeal was repugnant to the constitution of the United States, because it impaired the obligation of the contract, which the patent implied.

The title to land, and its acquisition, is a matter of state legislation; but a state or an individual having granted land, and having received a consideration therefor, cannot rightfully resume or impair the grant, because such grant is a contract executed. In another case, the state of New York passed an insolvent law, by which it undertook to discharge debtors from their liabilities incurred prior to its enactment; this statute was regarded as unconstitutional, because it impaired the obligation of contracts, and so far it was adjudicated to be an unauthorized state legislation, and void. Many other cases of similar character have arisen. In all these cases, the state authorities have readily yielded, and the firmness and integrity of the highest judicial tribunal known to our laws, have been admitted.

The most important case in which this clause of the constitution has been discussed, is that commonly called the Dartmouth College Case. This institution had a charter from the British crown prior to the revolution, by and under which property was holden for the benefit of the institution, which had been given by the Earl of Dartmouth and by other individuals. The legislature of New Hampshire undertook to increase the number of the trustees, and to exercise control over the college at its pleasure; this was resisted, and the sanctity of contract, by the decision which was made, was placed upon an enlarged, comprehensive, and firm basis. The effect which has been produced by the principles and reasoning of this case cannot be measured. The case, in its preparation and argument, was conducted on both sides with ability, and by eminent men. The brief in favor of the college

was mainly prepared by an individual who some few years since passed away; an individual who, when living, as a jurist had no rival, when dead left no superior.*

The argument upon the same side was made by an individual who has since, and now recently passed away; although dead, he lives in our recollection, in his public works, in his public acts; he lives in the influence which those works, those acts will exert upon our constitution and the institutions which it upholds.*

* Hon. Jeremiah Mason; he was assisted by Hon. Jeremiah Smith.
† Hon. Daniel Webster.

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LECTURE VIII.

THE FEDERAL AND STATE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS. IN GENERAL TERMS, THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEM MAY BE DESCRIBED BY SAYING, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IS INTRUSTED WITH THE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE ADJUDICATION OF ALL MATTERS ARISING UNDER OR DEPENDENT UPON THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS, OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES, OR THE LAW OF NATIONS.—THE STATE JUDICIARY IS INTRUSTED WITH THE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE ADJUDICATION OF ALL MATTERS WHICH DO NOT ARISE UNDER OR DEPEND UPON THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS, OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES, OR THE LAW OF NATIONS.*

LIBERTY is a relative term. Some persons regard it as a right in every individual to act in accordance with his own judgment. Such liberty is unknown to, and cannot be found in connection with, or as the result of government, or of the law of society. Government and societies are established for the regulation of social intercourse, of social institutions. Civil liberty is not dependent upon any particular form or system to the exclusion of every other. The purpose of legitimate government is the protection of person, character, and property. This

* In speaking of the legislative department, I used the terms " supreme and exclusive." In relation to the judiciary, I use the terms "final and conclusive,” not from any difference in the extent of the different powers, but because a difference exists in the form in which they may be rendered available. Some suits, commenced in a state court, may be transferred to a court of the United States. In a class of cases the supreme court of the United States may review the decisions of a state court by writ of error.

may be extended to the citizen by an absolute government. Experience and history, however, admonish us, that such government does not ordinarily afford such protection, and cannot with safety be relied upon. Protection may be extended to the citizen of a constitutional government, in which few only of the people exercise any control. Certainty of protection to person, character, and property, can only be attained in a government in which all the people, or a very large proportion of them, exercise an influence in the establishment and in the management of the public trusts, and in which these trusts and the will of the people are carried into effect through the instrumentality of different institutions or departments. Our system, as has been suggested, is composed of different sovereignties, each sovereignty having its own departments and division of power. The legis lative, judicial, and executive departments are equal in rank and dignity. They are independent of each other, and are charged with distinct and different trusts. The laws are established by the first, construed by the second, and executed by the third. This is familiar to you; the machinery is simple, and you perceive without difficulty how these departments, parts of an entire and of the same system, act in harmony with each other. The suggestion of collision, of conflict between these departments, is not often made. The legislative department is governed in its action by a constitution, and by certain fixed principles, within which it incurs no responsibility to, or danger of resistance from, any other department. And so long as its action is restricted within the limits imposed, its decrees constitute the law of the sovereignty to which it appertains. Whenever it disregards and goes beyond these limits, its decrees are of no force, and they may and will be declared by another department void and of no effect. The judicial department is not intrusted with