LECTURE VII. THE STATE GOVERNMENT. THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF ITS LEGISLATION. - WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS IT IS SUPREME, AND EXCLUSIVE OF FEDERAL CONTROL - RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED THEREUPON. SEVERAL of the subjects embraced within state sovereignty, which are controlled by its legislation, have been discussed. Some of the most important remain to be examined in general terms, sufficiently definite, however, to exhibit their character, purpose, and practical operation. The authority or power to establish corporations, for municipal and for business purposes, appertains to the state sovereignty, so far as it may be exercised for internal matters, and it has been exercised in the several states with great liberality, and with more frequency than the public interests have required. In many of the states, the sovereign power is exercised by the creation of municipal corporations, through the instrumentality of which some of the purposes of government are executed; counties, towns, and cities, belong to this class of corporations, and exercise such authority as the legislative department of the state, from time to time, may confer. The purpose to be accomplished by them is of a public nature, and their doings are upheld and sustained, whenever they may be without violating some fundamental principle, or provision of the constitution or some statute applicable to them. Every intendment in favor of these corporations and of the acts of their corporate officers is made, which with propriety can be, upon the broad principle, applicable to our system and to every portion of it, that the government and the trust confided thereto, must be sustained. These corporations are subject to the control of the judiciary, and they may be restrained, and their officers may be enjoined from going beyond their power or rightful jurisdiction. They may also be required to perform the trusts and duties with which they are or may be intrusted. The officers of counties, towns, and cities, are generally elected by the people, and their appropriate duties, in general terms, are prescribed by law, so that their discretion is somewhat controlled. This subdivision of authority is convenient, and well adapted to the speedy and careful management and protection of the public interests. In a political view, and as a branch of our political economy, it is of the utmost importance. The division of power, the establishment of institutions, by and through which all the purposes of government are accomplished, constitutes a prominent feature in the several state governments, and may be regarded as one of the safeguards of the people, and of their rights. The public business which concerns and appertains to the daily pursuits of the community, is performed by these municipal corporations, so that the administration of the powers of government in these matters, is conducted and exercised by those whose immediate interests are operated upon. Every citizen, by his right of suffrage, by his personal opinion and influence, and by his eligibility to office, holds his personal security, to a great extent, in his own hands; and if this is invaded, such invasion must result from his neglect of and inattention to his duty. As a general fact or position, it may be said, these corpora tions confine their action within their corporate limits or power, although instances have occurred, in which they have transcended their appropriate sphere. Towns or municipalities under a city organization are more likely to exceed their jurisdiction, than are those which act under a different system. City officers, from habit, from association, and from the nature of their powers, are regarded as of more importance and dignity than are plain common citizens, acting under the name of selectmen. The power of a city government, is undoubtedly more direct and efficient than is that of a town, which has no such organization. The chief executive officer of a city devotes a large proportion of every day to the duties of his station, and is more directly the object of observation and responsibility than is a selectman of a town. Many other officers devote a large proportion of their time to the public duties. The population of cities is usually greater than is that of a town. In the commonwealth of Massachusetts, it was formerly doubted whether the legis lative department had power to establish city governments. To obviate this supposed difficulty, the constitution was amended, and the general court is now authorized to establish city governments in any town which has at least twelve thousand inhabitants, provided the application for a charter, and its acceptance, shall be made by a majority of the inhabitants voting upon the question. The powers, privileges, and immunities granted, if not repugnant to the constitution, are such as the legislative department of the state may consider expedient, provided that all by-laws made by any city government shall be subject, at all times, to be annulled by the general court. This division of authority, as an element of political economy, is not without influence in another important aspect. It creates a large number of offices, all of which, although they are not equally fasci nating or desirable, or of equal pecuniary value, are readily and easily filled. The love of place, of power, is natural to the human mind; it is as great under a republican form of government as it is in any other. Arbitrary power, or its unauthorized assumption, is more easily resisted and controlled in a republican form of government, than it can be in a government whose source of power is not immediately derived from the people. So far as power can be safely divided, its authority diffused, and its execution intrusted to a large number of individuals, it should be, inasmuch as thereby the entire people apparently constitute the government, as they do in fact, except so far as they have limited and controlled their right and capacity by constitutions, by charters, or by statutes. By this diffusion of authority, the distance and difference which otherwise might seem to exist between those, who from time to time control the machinery of government, and those governed, is trifling and unimportant. The capacity of towns, of cities, of counties, or other territorial divisions, as parts of a state sovereignty or government, to perform their duties, is understood and admitted at once, upon its suggestion or statement. No cause of conflict between them and the state sovereignty can arise, because all these divisions have limited, subordinate, and prescribed trusts, and are subject, in their exercise and performance, to the direction of the state, carried into effect by its legislative, judicial, and executive departments. The corporations to which I have referred are of a public nature, and exclusively for public purposes. They have no power to embark in enterprises or business operations of a private character, however profitable or plausible they may seem to be, which are not essential to the existence or exercise of the legitimate purposes of government. Under state sovereignty, a large number of other corporations of a private nature, for the profit and advantage of individuals, have been and may be established. They are designed to facilitate, to aid individual enterprise, and thereby subserve the general welfare and interests of society. The progress of society, of its institutions, the employment of capital, of labor, are advanced and carried forward by these corporations. The wealth and importance of the community, as a whole, is undoubtedly enlarged by their operation. They are, however, dangerous implements, inasmuch as individual responsibility is frequently merged and lost in that of an intangible corporate existence. In the early legislation of free states, especially of those which are new and unimproved, acts of incorporation are easily obtained. Efforts for individual gain are always importunate, and, when accompanied by glowing exhibitions of public advancement, generally succeed in obtaining the desired implements, by which it is sought to be attained. This is evident from the legislation of the several states, in relation to corporations created for private purposes. Restrictions, from time to time, are imposed upon their action. Their charters may be taken away by the judiciary, and may be declared void upon a hearing, and satisfactory proof of any clear and material violation of their chartered rights or duties. In many stances, by express provision in the charters granted, the legislative department reserves to itself a right of repeal or rescission of the grant. In many of the states, it has recently become common to provide by general statutes, that corporations thereafter established, shall be subject to revision, alteration, amendment, or repeal, at the pleasure of the department which created them. They are also made subject to examination by public agents or officers; are obliged to report to the public authority their condition and doings, and, under certain circumstances, the stockholders or corporators are made person in |