Southerners were hardly less demoralized than their opponents, so that the idea of pursuit was not to be entertained. On this point, again, the testimony of General Johnston is of the highest value. "In our condition," said he, "pursuit could not be thought of; for we were almost as much disorganized by our victory as the Federals by their defeat. Next day, many, supposing the war was over, actually went home. A party of our soldiers, hearing that a friend lay wounded twenty miles off, would start out to go and see him; or that another acquaintance was dead, and they would go and bury him. Our men had in a larger degree the instinct of personal liberty than those of the North; and it was found very difficult to subordinate their personal will to the needs of military discipline." * Both sides, in fact, had much to learn; and it is the fact that the battle of Bull Run was the first great lesson which the two armies received, that makes the events which transpired on the plains of Manassas that July Sunday, forever memorable in the history of the War. corted by two or three comrades, Mr. Davis exclaimed to Jordan, "Battles are not won where several unhurt men are seen carrying off each wounded soldier!" * General Johnston in his official report says: "The war department has already been informed of all the causes that prevented pursuit, some of which only are proper to be communicated." I suppose, what is stated above, which I had from General Johnston's own lips, supplies the rest. III. THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. JULY, 1861-MARCH, 1862. I. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. WHEN the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there was that had suffered worse defeat than the army-it was the system under which Bull Run had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted,-when campaigns were planned by ignorant politicians, and battles, precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by raw three months' levies, the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Run experiment taught the country it was a real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles. The spirit in which the country rose to meet the emergency showed that it had benefited by the experience; and if before Bull Run the public mind had been in a mood to require just such a stern lesson for reproof and correction and instruction, it soon appeared that there was in it a temper to rise above the worst lapses and failures. For then was seen that which again and again throughout the war has been seen a spectacle f ng that so lately had gone forth with such nossas shattered and discomPot mac, wise men saw there was defeat than the army-it was the Run had been fought and lost. The but if it was needed to demonstrate * tio crude experimentalism under which lated, --when campaigns were planned battles, precipitated by the jounalists, were fought by raw three e paid was perhaps not too high. at tought the country it was a real war , air that success could only be hoped for mity to military principles. which the country rose to meet the emergency quire just istruction, above the it had benefited by the experience; a d if before The public mind had been in a mood to n lesson for reproof and correction ani red that there was in it a temper to 1 and failures For then was seen that hut the war has been seen n hich again spectacle |