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On reaching the site of the fort, it was found to have been converted by the explosion into a huge crater one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and from twenty-five to thirty deep. Here the assaulting column sought shelter, though there was nothing to prevent its rushing forward and crowning the crest; for the enemy, paralyzed by the explosion, remained inactive for above half an hour. Portions of the other two divisions, under Generals Potter and Wilcox, then advanced, but they also huddled into the crater, or sought cover behind the breastworks, which had been vacated by the enemy for two or three hundred yards to the right and left of the mine. Here the troops of the several divisions becoming mixed up: a scene of disorder and confusion commenced, which seems to have continued to the end of the operations.*

In the mean time the enemy, rallying from the confusion incident to the explosion, began forming his infantry in a ravine to the right, and planting his artillery both on the right and left of the crater. Seeing this, one of the division commanders, General Potter, made a praiseworthy effort to extricate himself from the disgraceful coil, and charged towards the crest; but, owing to want of support, he was compelled to fall back. It was now seven A. M., more than two hours after Ledlie occupied the crater, yet he made no advance himself, and obstructed the efforts of other officers. In this state of facts, the more troops that were thrown in, the worse was the confusion; yet General Burnside threw forward the black division to essay an assault. Passing beyond the crater, the colored troops made an advance towards the crest, when, encountering a fire of artillery and infantry, they retired in great disorder through the troops in the crater, and back to the

other obstacles to keep the enemy from us. Those obstacles should have been removed to enable our troops to move out promptly. There was but a small opening made, by which the Ninth Corps, fifteen thousand men, moved out by the flank."-Ibid., p. 35. See also the testimony of Major Duane, Ibid., p. 99 Warren, Ibid., p. 83.

* Meade: Report of the Battle of Petersburg

original lines.* After the repulse of the colored division, all semblance of offensive efforts ceased; Blacks and Whites tumbled pell-mell into the hollow of the exploded earthworksa slaughter-pen in which shells and bombs, rained from the enemy's lines, did fearful havoc.t Failing to advance, it soon proved almost equally difficult to retreat, though parties of tens and twenties, crawling out, ran back as best they could. The enemy then made a sally towards the crater, but was repulsed. A second assault, however, shook the disjointed structure of the hapless mass, which, without head or direction, obeyed the instinct of sauve qui peut. Above four thousand were killed or captured. Thus ended what General Grant justly called "this miserable affair," in which, if success promised results of the first importance, it would be difficult to say that the preparations were of a character to insure success.+

* "A part of the colored division was deflected to the right, and charged and captured a portion of the enemy's line, with a stand of colors and some prisoners."-Burnside: Report of the Battle of Petersburg.

The most destructive fire came from a gun in a work south of the mine, which was covered from the Union batteries by a fringe of trees on their front, that the chief of artillery had required should be felled. "This work having been delayed by the Ninth Corps until the night of the 29th, it was then objected to by General Burnside that the noise of chopping would alarm the enemy."-Hunt: Report of Siege Operations.

The report of the Congressional Investigating Committee finds that the failure of the assault was due to the following causes: 1. The fact that the charge was led by white, instead of black troops. This is stated by the committee to be "the first and great cause of disaster." 2. The fact that General Meade directed that the assaulting column should push at once for the crest of Cemetery Hill, instead of first clearing the enemy's lines to the right and left of the mine. This is a ridiculous charge; for the order to crown the crest involved, in its execution, the clearing of the enemy's lines right and left, as much as an order to General Burnside to pass through a door would presuppose his opening the door.

A very different verdict was, however, pronounced by a military court of in quiry instituted soon after the failure. This court was composed of Genera's Hancock, Ayres, and Miles, and its finding is as follows:

"The causes of failure are

"1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement

IV.

LEE'S DIVERSION.

In the threatening attitude maintained by Grant, there was one move open to Lee that promised, for a time at least, to relieve the pressure on his beleaguered lines. This was to make a diversion in favor of his own army by such a menace against Washington as would compel Grant to part with so much of the Army of the Potomac that offensive operations against Petersburg must cease. This measure was now adopted by Lee.

The execution of this project was facilitated not only by the fact that the position of the Army of the Potomac south of the

being mainly by flank, instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and the proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court, that there were no proper colufhns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

"2. The halting of the troops in the crater, instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

"3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps.

"4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led. "5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

"Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeoparded by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.”—Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 215.

Neither of these verdicts, however, reaches the root of the evil. If the reader will study carefully the passage I have quoted from Carnot, in its appli cation to the character of the troops that made the assault, he will have the ral cause of the failure. All the rest followed from that primal evil.

James completely uncovered Washington; but the direct line of march by the Shenandoah Valley had been left open to the advance of a hostile force by General Hunter, who, after his defeat before Lynchburg, had taken up an eccentric line of retreat by way of Western Virginia. The effect of this was completely to uncover the frontier of the loyal States.

The force detached by Lee for this expedition consisted of a body of twelve thousand men under General Early. Following the beaten track of invasion, Early marched rapidly down the Shenandoah Valley, arriving before Martinsburg the 3d of July. Sigel, who held post there with a small force, at once retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. General Weber, in command at Harper's Ferry, evacuated the town and retired to Maryland Heights. Hunter, who had made a toilsome march through the Alpine region of Western Virginia, experienced great delays in transporting his troops to Harper's Ferry, owing to the lowness of the river and the breaking of the railroad in several places. He was therefore not in position to check the irruption of the enemy into Maryland, and the Confederates, the way being thus open, passed the Potomac, and marching by way of Hagerstown, on the 7th, reached Frederick-a central point whence they might threaten both Baltimore and Washington.

The only force at hand with which to dispute Early's advance was a body of a few thousand foot artillerists, hundred days' men and invalids under General Wallace, then in command at Baltimore. But on learning the irruption of the enemy across the Potomac, General Grant detached the Sixth Corps from the Army of the Potomac and forwarded it by transports to Washington. It happened, too, at this juncture, that the Nineteenth Corps under General Emory, which had been ordered from New Orleans after the failure of the Red River expedition, had just arrived in Hampton Roads. Without debarking it was sent to follow the Sixth. The advance division of the Sixth Corps under General Ricketts having arrived, General Wallace, with that added to his own heterogeneous force, moved forward to meet Early, and took posi

tion on the Monocacy. Here he received battle on the 8th, and though he was discomfited, the stand he made gained time that was of infinite value. Wallace fell back on Baltimore, and the route to Washington being clear, Early at once pushed forward in that direction-sending towards Baltimore a cavalry force that destroyed a long stretch of the Northern Central Railroad and burnt the viaduct of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, thus effectually cutting off communication with the North and securing the Confederate rear.

Advancing by the great highway from Frederick to Georgetown, his column on the 9th reached Rockville, fourteen miles from the Federal capital. Bivouacking here, it next day resumed the march, and on the morning of the 11th, Early's van reined up before the fortifications covering the northern approaches to Washington. By afternoon the Confederate infantry had come up, and showed a strong line in front of Fort Stevens. Early had then an opportunity to dash into the city, the works being very slightly defended. The hope at headquarters that the capital could be saved from capture was very slender. But his conduct was feeble, and during the day the Sixth Corps arrived, and was soon followed by the Nineteenth.

After this, no one of sound nerves had any fears for the safety of Washington. The Confederates still held their position during the 12th, and that afternoon warm skirmishing took place, though without vigor on the part of the enemy. A brigade of the Sixth Corps made a sally from the lines and fell upon and drove the enemy for a mile, suffering a loss of near three hundred in killed and wounded, but inflicting heavier damage on the enemy. That night Early withdrew his force and retired across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, taking with him much booty, but little glory. Next day General Wright began pursuit, but did not overtake the enemy till he reached the Shenandoah Valley. After a smart skirmish at Snicker's Ferry, Early beat a retreat southward. The Sixth Corps was then drawn back to Washington, but as shortly afterwards the Confederates showed signs of repeat

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