the advance of the two corps. The Sixth Corps also lost several hundred prisoners. Thus this operation, which had been designed against the enemy's communications by the Weldon Railroad, resulted simply in a considerable extension of the line of the army to the left. The additional ground occupied gave no advantages whatever, and the operation could not be considered a gain in any respect.

The co-operative cavalry expedition under Generals Wilson and Kautz met with more success. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams' Station, the force destroyed the depot and several miles of the track. The columns then proceeded to the Southside Railroad-Wilson's division reaching it about fifteen miles from Petersburg and destroying it thence to Nottoway Station, where he met General W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry, and, after a sharp conflict, defeated him. Kautz reached Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and Danville railroads, on the afternoon of the 23d. At this point he damaged the track considerably, and then moved to Meherrin Station, where he formed a junction with Wilson's column on the 24th. The two then destroyed the road as far as Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles. Further progress, however, was impeded by the enemy, who was found in force and could not be dislodged. In returning, Wilson met, on the evening of the 28th, the enemy's cavalry, massed at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stoney Creek, where he had a severe engagement. He then made a detour by his left, and endeavored to reach Reams' Station, presuming it to be in possession of the Union force; but he here encountered not only the Confederate cavalry but a hostile infantry. Being largely outnumbered, he was overwhelmed and forced to retire, with the loss of his trains and artillery and a considerable number of prisoners.* He succeeded in crossing the Nottoway, however, and escaped within the Union lines

* "In the various conflicts with the enemy's cavalry, in their late expedition against the railroads, besides their killed and wounded left on the field, one thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of artillery, and thirty wagons and ambulances were taken."-Lee: Dispatch of July 1st.

by their left and rear with the remnant of his shattered force. The first intimation General Meade had of Wilson's situation, was in intelligence brought by one of his aids, who cut his way through from Reams' Station. The Sixth Corps was immediately sent thither, and Sheridan ordered up with the cavalry; but before they could reach that point the affair was over and the enemy had withdrawn.

Such raids on the communications of the enemy had frequently been made by both armies, and generally with impunity; but the disastrous upshot of this expedition showed that such detached columns operating far from the main body must always be in a perilous situation, if there be vigilance and vigor on the part of the antagonist. The present raid had inflicted considerable damage to the Confederate communications; but it was soon repaired, and it is doubtful whether the temporary advantage gained over the enemy more than balanced the losses in men and material suffered by the expeditionary force.

Two weeks of exhausting effort thus passed; but the lines of Petersburg had withstood all the shocks they had received. There now remained no hope of carrying the city by assault. Indeed, the Union army, terribly shaken as well in spirit as in material substance, by the repeated attacks on intrenched positions it had been called on to make, was in a very unfit moral condition to undertake any new enterprise of that character.

In these preliminary operations against Petersburg, which may be brought together under the definition of the "period of assaults," though no large action had taken place, the rolls of the army showed a loss of fifteen thousand men. Lee had, with much address, taken advantage of every opportunity afforded him to thrust his rapier through the somewhat loosejointed harness of his antagonist. Though he had struck no vital blow, he had yet drawn blood, inflicted many smarts, and gained time to draw around Petersburg a system of defences that bade defiance to assault.

III.

THE LINES OF PETERSBURG.

It required no clearer demonstration than that already given in the unpromising results of the several assaults made against the Confederate lines, to show that the difficult problem of the capture of Petersburg had passed beyond that stage at which success might be hoped from expedients, partial efforts, and coups de main. The task was one of the first magnitude, in which an auspicious issue was only to be expected from systematic operations and a well-considered combination of effort. This will be manifest from a brief description of the relative situation of the opposing armies.

Growing in strength day by day, the Confederate line of defence had, by the beginning of July, become so formidable that assault was pronounced impracticable by the chiefs of artillery and of engineers.* This line consisted of a chain of redans, connected by infantry parapets of a powerful profile, while the approaches were completely obstructed by abatis, stakes, and entanglements. Beginning at the south bank of the Appomattox, it enveloped Petersburg on the east and south, stretching westward beyond the furthest reach of the left flank of the Union army. A continuation of the same system to the north side of the Appomattox protected the city and the Petersburg and Richmond railroad against attack from the direction of the front held by Butler's force at Bermuda Hundred. The defence of Richmond was provided for by its own chain of fortifications.

The attitude assumed by Grant before Petersburg was somewhat peculiar. As the Union lines were drawn, the defending force was not under siege, investment, or blockade;

* Report of an Examination of the Enemy's Lines, July 6th, by General Hunt, chief of artillery, and Major Duane, chief-engineer.

for its lines of communication were all open. Petersburg, in fact, was in the same situation as Sebastopol, when beleaguered by the Allies in the so-called siege—a term not applicable to the kind of operation practised in both these cases. This is of a character novel and modern, and may be better described as a partial investment, or an attitude of watching. There were, however, several manoeuvres and operations open to the Union commander.

1. The first of these was a move resulting from that peculiar strategic relation of the contending armies by which, while Richmond was the ultimate objective of attack and point of defence, the actual struggle was waged before Petersburg, on the south side of the James, and twenty-two miles distant from the Confederate capital, situate on the north side of that river. A lodgment for the Union force on the north side of the James had early been secured by General Butler at Deep Bottom, only ten miles south of Richmond. Here a force under Foster held an intrenched camp, and communication with Bermuda Hundred was established by means of a ponton-bridge. Thus it was always practicable for General Grant, by a movement to the north bank of the James, to threaten Richmond by its direct approaches. These were, however, "observed" by General Lee, who, by pontonbridges across the James, near Drury's Bluff, a few miles below Richmond, preserved his interior lines, and held the means of rapidly re-enforcing either wing. Yet, since General Grant could at any time take the initiative, it was always in his power to outrun any immediate action of his opponent.

2. The next course open to the Union commander was to operate against the railroad lines that fed Lee's army at Petersburg. These lead into that city from the south and west. They could be acted against, either by a gradual extension of the left flank, or by cutting loose a column of active operations powerful enough to meet any force the enemy might bring to meet the menace. The Weldon Railroad was within the scope of the former course, and, as will presently appear, it was soon afterwards seized and held,

and the left flank of the army extended to insure its tenure. The main lines of supply by the Southside and the Danville roads were, however, well covered by Lee's army. The distance from the position of the army before Petersburg to the nearest point at which the Southside Railroad could be struck is from ten to fifteen miles, and to Burkesville-which, as the junction of the Southside and the Danville roads, is the strategic key to all the Confederate communications of Petersburg and Richmond-the distance is near forty miles. These, therefore, could not be reached by any extension of the Union intrenched line to the left, without dangerously weakening the front covering Grant's depot at City Point; but they could be operated against by a column able to cut itself loose from its base.

3. In the relative situations of the opposing armies, the line to be guarded by Lee was between thirty and forty miles, running from southwest of Petersburg to northeast of Richmond. There was, accordingly, open to General Grant a a great variety of tactical combinations, compelling, on the part of the Confederates, continued motion to the greatest distances from flank to flank, and visiting concentration on one flank by a sudden blow on the other. There also reremained the contingency of a good opening for direct assault, in case the Confederates should reduce the force within their lines of defence to meet these manœuvres.

In order to hold the actual front with a fractional force, and relieve as large a part of the army as possible for a column of active operations, the construction of a powerful line of redoubts was pushed forward, and a series of heavy batteries was placed in position to cover an assault, in case a suitable opening therefor should present itself. By the close of July, a system of earthworks covering the front then held by the army had been constructed and armed. Grant was then in position either to undertake direct assault or operate on the flanks of the Confederate line.