This order, which was the first intimation General Hancock had received that Petersburg was to be attacked that day, or that General Smith was operating against it,* met him when he was some miles distant from Petersburg. He immediately hastened forward his command, but was unable to join General Smith till after the attack had been made; and, although

chief of staff to General Hancock, who was furnished with a map on which the position to be reached behind Harrison's Creek was marked. But the map proved to be utterly worthless-the only roads laid down on it being widely out of the way. The staff-officer, however, bestirred himself to obtain information of the country from negro guides, and this being communicated to General Hancock, he judged that the speediest way to get to the position he was directed to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince George Courthouse road towards Old Courthouse, then by a cross-road get behind Harrison's Creek. Accordingly, Birney's and Gibbon's divisions were turned to the right, leaving the Prince George Courthouse road within six miles of Petersburg before three P. M. At half-past five P. M., as the column neared Old Courthouse, the dispatch from General Grant, directing the march to join Smith, was received. Fortunately, this came to hand just as the head of Birney's division was passing a country road leading directly towards Petersburg, and the column (Birney's and Gibbon's troops) was turned in that direction, arriving at Smith's position as the assault was over. No time had been lost on the march during the day, and the circumstance of Hancock's non-arrival at an earlier hour is due exclusively to the fact that he was not directed on Petersburg, and had no intimation, until between five and six P. M., that it was to be attacked. Had he been so informed, he could readily have joined Smith early in the afternoon, by marching directly towards Petersburg. The best hours of the day were spent in marching by an incorrect map, in search of a designated position which, as it was not in existence as described, could naturally not be found. With these facts, which are of official authenticity, it will not be difficult to judge who is responsible for the non-capture of Petersburg. As Lieutenant-General Grant states that he "threw forward the Army of the Potomac, by divisions, as rapidly as could be done" (Report, p. 12), and as the manner in which he threw it forward is sufficiently manifest in the fact hat neither General Meade nor General Hancock knew that Petersburg was to be attacked even, I leave the reconciliation of this discrepancy to those better equipped for the task.

"I desire to say here that the messages from Lieutenant-General Grant, and from General Smith, which I received between five and six P. M. on the 15th, were the first and only intimation I had that Petersburg was to be attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notified from any source that I was expected to assist General Smith in assaulting that city.”—Hancock Report of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864.

he then proffered his troops to General Smith, that officer had determined to suspend operations for the night, judging it wiser to hold securely what had been won, than, by attempting to reach the bridges, to risk the loss of all the gain.*

Whether General Smith, in thus acting, did ill or well, may be a question; but there can be no question as to who is really responsible for the failure to take Petersburg. This is no other than the lieutenant-general himself. Yet, as the event proved, it was fortunate it was not taken. The resolution on the part of the Confederates to try out the issue of the war there, gave the Union army an excellent line of operations on an easy base; whereas, had Petersburg fallen, Lee would have retired from Richmond to the interior, thus greatly complicating matters.

During the night of the 15th, the van of Lee's army reached the town, and men of a very different mettle from the crude soldiers to whom its defence had been intrusted silently deployed in line of battle. In the morning it was found that a new line of works had been thrown up around the town, defended by a large force already present, which was constantly re-enforced by the rapidly arriving Confederate corps. It was soon manifest that the "Cockade City," which the day before was the open prize of the first captor, would demand for its possession a battle or a siege. As the event

*It will probably always remain one of those questions respecting which men's opinions will differ, whether General Smith did well or ill in not pushing into Petersburg, and seizing the bridges of the Appomattox. His conduct was shaped by considerations thus stated in his official report: "We had thus broken through the strong line of rebel works, but heavy darkness was upon us, and I had heard some hours before that Lee's army was rapidly crossing at Drury's Bluff. I deemed it wiser to hold what we had, than, by attempting to reach the bridges, to lose what we had gained and have the troops meet with a disaster. I knew, also, that some portion of the Army of the Potomac was coming to aid us, and therefore the troops were placed so as to occupy the commanding positions and wait for daylight."-Smith: Report of Operations before Petersburg.

There is on file in the archives of the army a paper bearing this indorsement, by General Meade: "Had General Hancock or myself known that Peters burg was to be attacked, Petersburg would have fallen."

proved, Grant was compelled to sit down before it in formal beleaguerment, and it was not till after the lapse of near a twelvemonth that, in the last act of the eventful drama of the war, Petersburg fell.

II.

THE ARMY BEFORE PETERSBURG.

In its strategic relations to Richmond, Petersburg may be defined as a fortress thrust forward on the flank of the Confederate capital. The great lines of supply for an army covering Richmond-the Lynchburg Railroad, James River Canal, and Danville Railroad-run into that city from a westerly and southwesterly direction. But Petersburg, securely held, easily holds off at arm's-length any force threatening the communications of the Confederate capital. It is distant twentytwo miles south from Richmond, with which city it is connected by the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, while by means of the Lynchburg Railroad it taps the great Danville line, and from the south it receives the Weldon and the Norfolk railroads. In case it should lose the two latter, as would be likely if assailed by a force following the line of operations of the Union army, there remained the two former, which from their situation are almost unassailable.

Invested with this value, Petersburg could not fail to be a possession coveted with equal eagerness by each combatant. This was indeed the case: Grant had designed to seize it before the Confederate army could join the meagre local force left for its defence; and Lee, as soon as the transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the south side of the James had plainly declared his rival's purpose, drew his columns also to the south bank and hurried them forward to Petersburg, where they began to arrive during the hours of darkness that followed the assault on the evening of the 15th of June.

How nearly Petersburg then fell a prize to Smith's coup de main has already been seen. But night sufficed to throw into the city a Confederate force so considerable as to insure that its capture would cost a severe struggle.

The morning of the 16th found on the Union side present before Petersburg no more than the two corps of Smith and Hancock the remaining corps were distant several hours' march. The centre of the line of redans enveloping the city from the south had been penetrated the night before, and the positions then gained were securely held by the Union force. But the Confederates clung tenaciously to a hastily improvised line close in the rear of the lost point; and this on its left flank ran into portions of the original system of earthworks that remained still in the enemy's hands.

But although by the morning of the 16th Lee had succeeded in throwing into Petersburg a considerable body of troops, it was outnumbered by the Union force present, while the latter was also in position to be re-enforced more rapidly than the Confederates. The situation, therefore, was not even yet of a nature to forbid the hope of securing Petersburg, or at least securing all the commanding ground before the heavy Confederate re-enforcements should arrive. General Hancock, to whom, in the absence of Generals Grant or Meade, the command of the field fell, was fully alive to the importance of so doing, and he had the night before instructed his division officers, Generals Birney and Gibbon, that all such ground between their positions and the Appomattox should be attacked and taken at or before daylight. These instructions were not promptly complied with, nor indeed did the efforts of these officers possess any serious character. This forfeited the one opportunity that remained; and when, later in the morning, reconnoissances were pushed forward, it was found the enemy had secured the commanding positions and greatly strengthened his line at all important points.†

* Hancock: Report of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. Among these dominating points was the high ground at the position which will be found marked on the accompanying map as the " Avery House."