on the 9th of May, with orders to engage the enemy's cavalry, and after destroying the Fredericksburg and Central railroads, to threaten Richmond and eventually communicate with and draw supplies from Butler's force on the James River.*

To mask the march the first move was towards Fredericksburg, near which, turning southward to the right, the column thrust itself inside the enemy's lines. The clouds of tell-tale dust, miles in length, soon informed Stuart, however, of its presence, and he dispatched a force in pursuit. But the rear being skilfully covered, the blows directed thereat did not retard Sheridan's progress. Reaching the crossing of the North Anna on the following day, he captured Beaver Dam Station on the Central Railroad, destroying ten miles of the track, two locomotives, three trains of cars, and a million and a half of rations. Here also he recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to captivity in Richmond. At this point he was attacked by the enemy in flank and rear, but his loss was inconsiderable, and this affair did not serve to impede his progress. The South Anna was crossed at Groundsquirrel Bridge; Ashland Station was captured at daylight of the 11th, and the depot, six miles of the road, a train, and a large quantity of stores were destroyed. After this, Sheridan resumed the march towards Richmond.

To meet this advance, Stuart had succeeded by a detour in interposing himself between the assailants and the Confederate capital, and had massed all his available cavalry at Yellen Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond. Here Sheridan immediately attacked him on the 11th, and after an obstinate contest gained possession of the turnpike, driving the Confederate force back towards Ashland and across the North Fork of the Chickahominy. In this passage at arms between the two ablest cavalry leaders of the rival armies, General J. E. B. Stuart, whose dashing exploits fill a brilliant page in the history of the war, was killed.

Pursuing his advantage gained at Yellow Tavern, Sheridan

*Meade: Report of the Rapidan Campaign.

made a bold dash upon the outer defences of Richmond. The first line, feebly defended, was carried-Custer's brigade capturing a section of artillery and a hundred prisoners. The second line, however, was too strong to be assailed, being thoroughly commanded by redoubts and bastioned works, and as the garrison rallied for the defence Sheridan retired towards the Chickahominy. Crossing at Meadow Bridge he drove the enemy from his front, and repulsed an attack on his rear by Confederate infantry from the city. After destroying the railroad-bridge over the Chickahominy, Sheridan moved to Haxall's Landing, which he reached on the 14th of May Here he remained three days to refit, when he returned by way of Baltimore Store, White House, and Hanover Courthouse, rejoining the Army of the Potomac, the 25th of May, on the Pamunkey.

IV.

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS ON THE JAMES AND IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

Thus far in the campaign, the course of this narrative has followed the main action as waged between the two mighty adversaries in tide-water Virginia. It is now necessary to interrupt for a time this recital, and trace the development of the movements co-operative under Butler and Sigel, on the banks of the James River and in the Valley of the Shenandoah. This I shall only do so far as may be necessary to set forth their relations with the general system of operations.

The force under General Butler was assembled at Yorktown and at Gloucester Point, on the opposite side of the York River, during the month of April. It was composed of the Eighteenth Corps, under General W. F. Smith, and the Tenth

Corps, which General Q. A. Gillmore had lately brought from the coast of South Carolina. General Butler had in addition a division of horse, under General Kautz; this division was, at this time, at Norfolk and Portsmouth. The strength of the army was somewhat above thirty thousand of all arms.

At Yorktown, Butler was in position to move by land up the Peninsula in the direction of Richmond; to use the line of the York River for an advance similar to that of McClellan, in 1862, or to take up the line of the James and threaten the Confederate capital from the south side. The last was the move actually intended, but the real destination of this column was kept secret; and feints of striking in both the other directions were made. The 1st of May, Butler dispatched a detachment of his force (Henry's brigade of Turner's division) by water to West Point, at the head of the York, and at the same time he sent a force of eighteen hundred cavalry to move, by way of West Point, across the Peninsula, attract the attention of the enemy towards Richmond, and then make a junction with his main body when it should have reached its destination. Kautz, with his mounted division, was instructed to move northward from Suffolk to the south side.

During the night of May 4th, the same day the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, the entire command of Butler embarked on transports, dropped down the York, passed Fortress Monroe, and, entering the James, ascended that river, convoyed by a fleet of gunboats. The following afternoon a landing was effected on the south side of the James-one detachment at City Point, another at Fort Powhatan, a few miles below; but the main body a mile or two above City Point, at Bermuda Hundred, a neck of land formed by the sinuous course of the James and Appomattox. The point of debarkation was between Petersburg and Richmond -ten miles north of the former and twenty miles south of

* The Tenth Corps was composed of three divisions under Brigadier-Generals Terry, Ames, and Turner; the Eighteenth Corps, of two divisions of white troops, under Brigadier-Generals Brooks and Weitzel, and a division of colored troops, under Brigadier-General Hinks.

the latter place. The landing was a complete surprise, and was made without molestation. Indeed, the Confederate force about Petersburg and Richmond was at this time very trivial.

General Butler's instructions from General Grant prescribed Richmond as his objective point; but his operations were to be contingent upon the results achieved by the Army of the Potomac. The programme drawn up by the lieutenantgeneral for Butler's governance is indeed vague, and in some respects contradictory, and it is difficult to tell precisely what was expected of that officer. He was commanded first of all to intrench at City Point, which would indicate rather a defensive than an offensive purpose. Further instructions ordered him to move against Richmond by the south bank of the James, capturing it if possible, and if not, investing it on the south side so as to have his left resting on the James above Richmond. It is, however, clearly set forth in papers not embodied by General Grant in his official report, that Butler's action was to hinge on General Grant's own success; that he expected, after decisive action, either to defeat Lee or drive him into the intrenchments at Richmond; that he would then approach the Confederate capital from the direction of the north and west, and, swinging across the James, make a junction with Butler, whose signal for action was to be Grant's guns thundering on the north side. But, as Grant's guns were never heard thundering on the north side, it is a matter of less surprise that Butler also was foiled in his part. Moreover, I shall attempt to show that there was, in any event, very little likelihood that the James River column would meet what seem to have been General Grant's expectations.

An advance against Richmond by the south bank of the James placed that great river between the city and the assailants, and the defence of the points of passage could readily be maintained by the local garrison until strengthened to withstand attack. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss this problem in detail, as it is hardly possible that General Grant ever

really expected General Butler to capture Richmond. Equally remote was the possibility of investing it from the south bank of the James, where the ground is a low, open plain. But there is another circumstance that greatly complicates any operation on that line, whether directed against Richmond immediately, or with a view to invest it from the south side, or with the object of holding a débouché for the Army of the Potomac above that city. This is the dangerous exposure of its rear and communications which the operating column must make. It is hardly to be supposed that, in framing a plan of operations for the James River column, there could be failure to note the certainty of the approach of adverse masses from the south; for the withdrawal of Gillmore's force from South Carolina left Beauregard free to hurry forward with a considerable army to Richmond, the danger to which was apparent the moment Butler landed on the south side of the James River. It is marvellous how it could have been expected that in this event Butler's army could have maintained a position above Richmond when not only its rear must have been so greatly exposed, but its line of communications, with its depot at Bermuda Hundred, must have been quite uncovered to the enemy.

In the actual situation the only effective service that Butler's force could render towards the execution of the general plan was to secure a lodgment on the south side of the James River, below Richmond, in case the Army of the Potomac should need to be transferred thither. This purpose might best of all have been attained by another operation, which, while serving this end, would have had the most important bearings on the general object of the campaign. This is to have immediately seized Petersburg, which, as the strategic key to Richmond, would probably have been decisive of the fall of that city. Had Petersburg been taken at this time, it is probable that Lee, abandoning as vain the attempt to defend the Confederate capital, would have fallen off on the Lynchburg or Danville line. But even had Lee attempted, by throwing himself upon Butler, to recover Petersburg, the