in some of our state governments more than a majority is required. Each principle is equally subject to objection, since both operate to place the government in the bands of the minority-In the first case a minority may transact, and, in the second, prevent business. It was, therefore, wisely determined in our Constitution that a mere majority should be necessary to form a quorum; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and, to prevent the dissolution of the legislative body, compel the attendance of absent members. The want of such provisions in the articles of confederation was deemed a great defect, and proved to be a productive source of mischief. In many cases the members of two-thirds of the states were requisite for a quorum, and there existed no power to compel the attendance of absent members.

The propriety of the power to determine the rules of proceedings is also clear, and will be readily admitted, since, if it did not exist, it would be impossible to preserve decency and order. This, however, would be unavailing, if they had not the power to punish for disorderly behaviour and a breach of those rules, and even to expel a member when it should become necessary for their preservation. From the large majority that is required for the exercise of this last mentioned power, it is evident it was not intended as a common punishment-but, as a last resort, and to be inflicted where slighter punishments would not suffice, and upon those who, hardened in vice and lost to every sense of decency and duty, turn a deaf ear to reproof. The majority of two-thirds was required, in order to insure a proper discretion in the exercise of a trust so

delicate. But perhaps it is more than sufficient for that purpose; for many instances might be cited of gross and aggravated misconduct in the House of Representatives, which, though calculated to bring shame on the nation, have been passed by unobserved, or at most with slight regard.

Next, "each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, except such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal." The passage of this clause in the convention met with some opposition, though the first part was passed by a unanimous vote. The exception received but a small majority, and the last part, after an ineffectual struggle to strike out "one-fifth," and insert in its place "every member present," was passed unanimously. By means of this provision the proceedings of each house may come under the inspection of their constituents, and while the ignorance and treachery of the unworthy will be exposed thereby, they will present the claims of the faithful and those deserving of reward. The exception, it must be acknowledged, is exposed to much objection from the fact that it confers a power which might be used so as to render nugatory the preceding part of the clause, or at least which makes the important duty thereby required a discretionary one. But it is said, in defence of it, that it is necessarily discretionary-for there are some measures which, at particular times and under particular circumstances, require secrecy; because their objects might be defeated by

giving them publicity. This I will readily admit, but it does not follow that a duty, because it must be a discretionary duty, should be discretionary with agents from whom it is required, especially when they may be interested in its non-performance. But it should be lodged with the principal if possible, and if not, in the hands of some disinterested party. The first would be as impolitic as it is impracticable, but the second is not so; because the judiciary for instance, in which are combined disinterestedness, integrity and intelligence, might have been allowed the exercise of its discretion, as to the publication of parts excepted by either house. This would make the clause far less objectionable, and serve other very important purposes. It would make the balance of power more perfect ;moreover, it would disarm each house of the power to screen its acts from the scrutiny of their constituents, and their members would be more apt to act with decency, integrity, and judgment, if they knew their conduct-not according to their own discretion, but according to that of the wisest and most disinterested of all the departments-must be submitted to public inspection.

The calls of the yeas and nays were restricted to one-fifth, in order to place the resort to this inconvenient, though very proper method, beyond the caprice of a single member.

Under the confederacy, much trouble and inconvenience were experienced from a constant resort to it, and even under the present restriction it is often resorted to by minorities for the sole purpose of delay.

The object of the next clause is to prevent a waste of time and unnecessary delay of business. It provides that neither house during the session of Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses are sitting. The duration of the session of our legislature depends upon the will of its members, subject to be restricted by the expiration of their term of service, and to be dissolved by the president in case its two branches disagree with respect to the time of the adjournment. Under the British Constitution, the king may at any time put an end to a session of parlia ment, by prorogation, or by the dissolution of one and the call of another. The British parliament, like ours, may also be dissolved by the expiration of the term for which they are elected. As a consequence of these powers of the crown, it is usual to obey the king's pleasure when he intimates his wish that either or both of the houses should adjourn to a particular day. The exercise of these prerogatives by the royal governors of the colonies, was deemed a great grievance, and it was therefore charged against the king, in the Declaration of Independence, that he had called to. gether legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the repository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. That he had dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people, and that he had refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected, &c. The

people were therefore very jealous upon this subject, and it was but natural they should avoid its ill effects, by confiding this power to the legislature themselves, instead of to the executive.

PRIVILEGES OF CONGRESS.

THE first clause of sec. 6th of art. 1st, confers on senators and representatives three privileges, the propriety of which will not, probably, now be doubted. First, the senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. Second, they shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same. Third, for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

In

The propriety of the first of these privileges, though somewhat debatable, has, nevertheless, been generally approved, even under the colonial system, and since sanctioned by the universal practice of the states. this there is a difference between the practice in America, and that of Great Britain. The British parliament are not at present entitled to receive any compensation for their services. A long time ago, however, the members of the house of commons were entitled to wages from their constituents-for a knight of the shire four shillings sterling, per diem, and two shillings for a member of a city or borough. These apparently