ernment, and constituting the chief distinction between parties, an impartial execution of the task is rendered quite difficult, and in a work of so narrow limits it must be briefly accomplished, yet it shall be with candor and carefulness.

Some, having erroneous views of the American doctrine of popular sovereignty, are impressed with the idea that popular majorities are invested with supreme sovereignty. They suppose, in order to reconcile the Constitution with this idea, that it is the creature of a popular majority, and that in it is acknowledged their sole and absolute right to rule. So deeply impressed are some with this idea, they cannot perceive wisdom or justice in any constitution in conflict with it. Being forced by experience to acknowledge these as characteristics of ours, they, as much without reflection as without hesitation, concluded that it cannot conflict with the idea that a majority of the people should rule. But this is not the American doctrine. There is indeed nothing in any of our constitutions, or in that of any free government, that affords the least foundation for

so monstrous an idea. It is opposed to those just and honorable principles, termed the law of nature, by which individual sovereignty is distinctly acknowledged. By almost every writer on the law of nations, the relation between sovereign states is assimilated to the relations between individuals in a state of nature, in order distinctly to illustrate their character-and indeed the principle that majorities are sovereign has no sanction but in governments established by force, and indeed while it can be deduced from no other premises, leads inevitably to the conclusion that "might is

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right." To submit every thing to the rule of majorities, would be to subject minorities to their despotic control, and such a government would not be less a despotism, because of the number of despots. Indeed, for that reason, it is more objectionable than the rule of a single despot. For while the latter possesses the advantage of energy and secures the greatest responsibility to the people, the former is entirely devoid of these, possessing no redeeming qualities whatever.

How the idea, that majorities have a right to rule, became as prevalent as it has, is difficult to be imagined. Being entirely unacquainted with any arguments in support of it, and being affirmative in its character, it would seem sufficient to deny it. But in addition to the objection urged above, we submit that its consequences, if extended, would subject a small community to a larger one, a thinly inhabited state to the government of a more populous one, thereby destroying equality among sovereignties, completely subverting the whole foundation of the law of nations, and subjecting the minority of mankind to the complete, absolute, and despotic control of the rest. It cannot be a natural right; and in no classification of natural rights, by any writer upon ethics, is it embraced. It is purely adventitious, derived from the assent of the governed, and subject to such limitations as propriety may lead them to impose.

In fact the very object of constitutions is to impose those limitations, by distributing the powers of government among the various interests of communities, so as to secure them from the intolerable tyranny to which the absolute rule of majorities would necessarily sub

ject them. Where the interests of all constituting a. community are the same, it is perhaps well that majorities should rule; because they are more likely to embrace a greater amount of intelligence than minorities, and their interests being the same, selfishness making them partial, will only secure the more care for the general welfare. But when those interests are diversified, as always they are in every community of much extent, or advanced in civilization, the powers of government should be so distributed as to protect the weaker interests against the dominion of the stronger. The progress of government, in the earlier periods of the world, presents the most striking concurrence with this theory. While their interests remain the same, we find mankind under the control, to a great extent, of their natural guardian; but as they increased in numbers, and their interests became diversified, to the same extent, we perceive this or the federal principle gradually interweaving itself with the patriarchal form of government. It obtained to a considerable extent in the ancient Hebrew constitution; and after the demise of Moses, and of Joshua, whose government must be regarded more as military than as civil; it was adopted as a fundamental theory. The twelve tribes for fully five centuries continued this principle, and were held together more after the fashion of a confederation of independent states, than as forming a single consolidated empire. It is indeed true that the opposite theory, that of considering the community as a unit, has prevailed from the remotest periods over the greater portion of Asia. But the other, or federal principle, has ever formed a distin

guishing characteristic of the governments of Europe. Greece may be cited as an example of this in ancient times, and the Teutonic states in later times. That such was the theory of the Grecian states, none will deny who have any acquaintance with the history of their formation. So far as the assertion is concerned in regard to the Teutonic states, (erroneous views having been long entertained of the manner of their formation,) we deem it will suffice to quote from a writer of high authority. Mr. Palgrave, a writer upon the British Constitution, says, "They were assemblages of septs, clans, and tribes; they were confederated hosts, and armies, led on by princes, magistrates, and chieftains, each of whom was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine independence in proportion as he, and his compeers, became united under the supremacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the state, first as a military commander, and afterwards as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political connection, each member of the state continued to retain a considerable portion of the rights of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be considered as a federation; it is not an unit of which the smaller bodies politic therein contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baronies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom; all in a certain degree strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not always strictly applicable in terms, is always so sub

stantially and in effect; and hence it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very generally employed in treating on the English Constitution. It has been supposed that the kingdom was reduced into a regular and gradual subordination of government, and that the various legal districts of which it is composed, arose from the divisions and sub-divisions of the country. But this hypothesis, which tends greatly to perplex our history, cannot be supported by fact, and instead of viewing the Constitution as a whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must examine it synthetically, and assume that the supreme authorities of the state were created by the concentration of the powers originally belonging to the members, and corporations of which it is composed." This is the theory upon which also is founded the political system of the United States. The sovereignty of the colonies from which they sprang, was distributed among towns, boroughs, and shires, which, combined, formed the government of each. These governments also, though some of them were connected temporarily by league for certain purposes, and all of them by the bond of a common executive, were yet, in regard to their sovereignty, entirely separate and distinct. If proof be needed for this, it may be found in the very fact that leagues were formed; and moreover, it is fully attested by their separate charters-by their separate actions in matters relating to the defence of their territory, and by their separate and sometimes countervailing legislation. But however this may be, by the high authority of that instrument, which declared their separate national existence independent of Great Britain, they