his love, by his comparing it to the sweetness of honey.

Indeed, comparisons of this kind occur fo frequently in the most serious writers, of all nations, and all ages, that from this circumftance only I think we may reasonably conclude there is a foundation for them in nature. The Pfalmift David fays, that "the law of God was fweeter to him "than honey and the honey-comb," and that "the poifon of afps was under the tongue of his "enemies."

However, as we probably catch the first hint of thefe comparisons from the words, they may lead an incautious writer into those comparisons which are merely verbal.

LECTURE

Of the Nature of METAPHORS.

A Metaphor hath already been defined, to be a

fimile contracted to its smallest dimenfions. Hence, in ufing metaphors, the mind makes the leaft fenfible excurfion from the ideas that engage its attention. So fhort is the excurfion, that when a metaphor is used, the moment the mind hath catched the idea of any refemblance to the thing which it is about to exprefs, it immediately transfers the terms belonging to the foreign object to it, as if they were one and the fame thing. So that, in fact, ufing metaphors is nothing more than giving new names to things.

The advantage of ufing metaphors is, that we can borrow a name from a thing which contains the quality we mean to exprefs in a greater degree than the fubject to which we afcribe it; and by this means can often suggest a stronger idea of a quality than any terms originally appropriated to our fubject could convey. Befides, along with the name, other ideas, as of dignity or meannefs, agreeableness or difagreeableness, and the like, will be transferred to the object to which

it is applied. So that, by means of the complex ideas which accompany the names of things, we can give just what fize and colour we please to any thing we are describing.

Moreover, as metaphors are most naturally taken from fenfible things, and particularly from vifible objects, in perusing a discourse abounding with well-chofen metaphors, the mind is entertained with a fucceflion of agreeably-varied views and landscapes. And though these prospects be extremely tranfient, they cannot fail to contribute confiderably to a reader's entertainment.

I may add that, though, in fome of these refpects, a comparison hath the advantage of a metaphor; yet, in one refpect, a metaphor gives a more fenfible pleasure than a comparifon. This arifes from the harshness and impropriety there, for a moment, appears to be in the ufe of a metaphorical instead of a proper term, which increases the fatisfaction we inftantly receive from approving of the new application of the word. That this contraft between the ufual and unusual fenfe of words is a neceffary ingredient in the pleasure we receive from metaphors, is evident; because, when metaphors have, by frequent use, become evanefcent, they have no more pleafing effect than the proper names of things; and be cause, in order to become fully fenfible of all the beauty of metaphorical expreflions, we must dif

tinctly

tinctly attend to the original meaning of fuch terms, at the fame time that we perceive their figurative application in the paffage before us.

I fhall exemplify these obfervations by that strong and happy metaphor of Virgil, I have mentioned once before, by which he calls the two Scipios the thunderbolts of war. This image might have been extended to a long fimile; but the fituation of the hero did not admit of fo great an excurfion from his principal fubject. The poet, therefore, having firft laid hold of the idea of refemblance as it occurred to his mind, without multiplying the objects of his attention, by exprefsly comparing his heroes to thunderbolts, calls the heroes themselves the thunderbolts. This was evidently only giving a new name to his heroes, but with this great advantage, that the ideas we conceive of the rapidity and destructive power belonging to thunderbolts are hereby transferred upon them. At the fame time, likewife, the ideas of grandeur accompanying a scene of thunder and lightning, throw a confiderable degree of the fublime into their characters, and the mind of the reader is entertained with a momentary profpect of fo folemn and grand a scene in nature. Moreover, along with this, the oppofition between the two very different fenfes of the word (which, however harsh it may appear for a moment, we prefently fee the propriety of) heightens the plea furable fenfation..

Highly ornamental as metaphors are in dif course, it is to neceffity that we are indebted for the first use of them. It was neither poffible, nor convenient, that every different object should have, a distinct name. That would have been to multiply: words, both to the overburthening of the memory, and the prejudice of feience. For it greatly favours the propagation of knowledge to call things that are fimilar to one another by the fame name. Without this there could have been no fuch thing as general principles, or general knowledge. Now it is one and the same process by which we make general or abstract terms, and by which figurative expreffions are invented. The difference is only in degree, not in kind.

Suppofe, for inftance, we had never feen but one horse, unless we give the fame name to things that are similar, and even to things that are not in all respects fimilar, we must have given another name than horse to every other animal we should afterwards have met with of the fame fpecies? becaufe, not only is it abfurd to fuppofe that any two things are the fame, but that any two indivi duals of the fame fpecies fhould be exactly alike.

If objects differ but little, we give them the fame name in what we call a literal fenfe; as, to the heads, the mouths, the eyes, the hearts, &c. of men and other animals. To these the fame names are so constantly applied, that it is impoffible to

fay